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Pricing Analysis and Tools for Emerging e-Commerce
Michael Levi Hamilton
With the deluge of big data, many retailers are experimenting with rich, data-
driven pricing strategies. In this dissertation we study three emerging pricing strate-
gies: (i) Opaque pricing, the pricing of products where some feature is hidden from
the customer until after purchase. In a general model we give a sharp characteriza-
tion for when opaque selling outperforms traditional forms of differentiated pricing.
(ii) Personalized pricing, i.e. pricing strategies that predict an individual customer’s
valuation for a product and then offers them a customized price. Leveraging natural
statistics of the valuation distribution, we prove tight upper and lowers on the ratio
between personalized pricing strategies and simpler selling strategies, which, among
other things, yields insight into which markets personalized pricing is most valuable.
(iii) Loot box pricing, the pricing of (random) bundles of virtual items, the contents of
which are revealed after purchase. In an asymptotic regime we compare and contrast
the revenue of different forms of loot box pricing with traditional selling models, and
give theory to explain the recent proliferation of loot boxes in mobile gaming markets.
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Introduction
With the deluge of big data, retailers have more information about their customers
and their preferences than ever before. Flush with rich, fine-grained market infor-
mation, a host of new selling practices have proliferated in e-commerce retailing. In
practice these strategies can take many novel forms, often involving many parameters
or exploiting information asymmetry between the seller and the customers. In this
dissertation we conduct a focused study of some of these emerging pricing schema
and analyze their performance over traditional pricing technologies. In particular,
we will take a closer look at three novel selling paradigms appearing in practice and
in each case, place the strategies on firm theoretical grounding from which we can
compare and contrast them with well studied pricing paradigms.
At a high-level the approach taken in this paper can be summarized as follows: first
we observe a novel or alternative pricing scheme occurring in practice, for example
opaque selling or personalized pricing. Next, we consider what traditional pricing
structures the new pricing strategy is subverting, for example a single posted price or
discriminatory pricing strategy. Finally, we place both the emerging pricing scheme
and the traditional scheme in a grounded, random-utility maximizing framework and
compare the expected revenue of each strategy against one another. In this thesis we
apply this three step approach to opaque selling, personalized pricing, and loot box
selling.
More generally, this thesis contributes to the larger field of revenue management
and pricing, which uses quantitative analysis to determine what sort of products to
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sell, how to sell those products, and at what prices to offer them. Our work concerns
the latter two of these three, setting the right prices in the right way such that it
maximizes a sellers revenue. While there are many possible factors to be taken into
account when designing and analyzing revenue management systems, for instance
the management of inventory or the effect of competition, and objectives for the
system, for example social welfare or market penetration, this thesis focus solely on
how to set prices for the goods so as to maximize revenue. This approach allows us
to isolate the core differences between these emerging e-commerce technologies and
their traditional counterpoints without muddying the story with overly complicated
models. In relation to the deep literature on pricing, in this thesis we compare novel
pricing paradigms against well studied strategies. In the process, we derive many
new insights about well studied single price strategies and discriminatory pricing
strategies.
In the remainder of this section we provide a short introduction to the framework
employed in this work. We then flesh out the simplest pricing scenario and contrast
it with the models studied in the next three chapters. Finally we summarize the
contributions made in this thesis.
0.1 Introduction to Pricing for Revenue
Maximization
In this thesis we imagine markets of potential customers as being described by a dis-
tribution over valuations for the product(s). Each customers individual valuation(s)
(i.e. willingness to pay) for the good(s) is represented as a draw from this distribu-
tion. Throughout the thesis we will use V to represent the customers valuations for
the good(s), and F to be the distribution of V . Further, in this work we assume V
is positive valued and admits a density f .
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Now we describe how customers make purchasing decisions. A customer arrives
to the seller and observes prices for the good(s). Based on the price and the cus-
tomers drawn valuation(s), they choose to purchase the good that maximizes their
utility, the difference between their valuation for the good and the price. When a
customers valuation for all the goods are strictly less than their prices, we assume the
customer will opt not to purchase anything. In the instance of ties (i.e. a customer’s
utility from two items is the same) we will make the standard assumption that a
customer purchases the more expensive item. Often this assumption is without loss
of generality. We call a customer behaving in this way quasi-linear utility maximizing
and the overall model is known as random utility maximizing (RUM). We emphasize
that, although the assumption of perfect rationality of a customer is quite strong,
this model is ubiquitous across operations, business analytics and economics. All
customers studied in this work will behave in this fashion.
Since markets are described by a distribution over valuations, F , and a customers
purchasing decision depends solely on their drawn valuations and the fixed price;
for any price p and market F there is an associated expected revenue where the
expectation is taken over draws from F . By measuring this expected revenue we can
assess the quality of a price. We will illustrate this framework in the next section, in
the simple case of a single good.
0.2 Pricing a Single Good
To introduce the general paradigm considered in this thesis we will give a thorough
treatment to the case of a retailer offering a single good. Suppose that the market
is described by a positive valued random variable V drawn according to F . Then a
customer offered the good at price p will purchase with probability Pr (V ≥ p) = F (p)
where F (·) := 1 − F (·) is known as the survival function or the complementary
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cumulative distribution function (cCDF). Since F describes the market, the expected
revenue a seller will earn by pricing the good at p is
pF (p) = E[I(V ≥ p)p] := RSP (p),
where RSP is shorthand for the expected revenue of a single price p. Naturally the
seller aims to maximize this revenue. When there is a single good, this maximization
corresponds to maxpRSP (p). We refer to the maximum achievable revenue in this
thesis as simply RSP . Now it is straight forward to characterize this optimal price in
terms of the distribution. By checking first order conditions,
d
dp
RSP (p) = F (p)− pf(p) = 0
which implies the optimal price satisfies p = F (p)
f(p)
. The ratio F (p)
f(p)
is the reciprocal of
the well known as the hazard rate from reliability theory. If this ratio is decreasing in
p (what is known as the monotone hazard rate condition (MHR)) it follows that the
optimal price is unique. More generally. an optimal price can be found via standard
one dimensional optimization techniques.
0.3 Pricing Beyond A Fixed Market and Single
Good
In the three main chapters of this thesis we will be interested in the characterizing
the revenue garnered by the optimal prices for a market. To provide some context for
these results let’s highlight a few nice features about the single good case that yielded
a complete characterization of the achievable revenue, and contrast them with the
models studied in the later three chapters.
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1. (Well Characterized Prices) In the single item case the optimal price can be
written down in implicit closed form, as a function of the distribution F . As
we will see in Chapter 1 of this thesis, such nice implicit forms vanish when one
attempts to generalize this setting beyond a single item i.e. to the multiple prod-
uct case. When there are many competing goods, even when the underlying
valuation distribution satisfies all our favorite assumptions (i.e. finitely sup-
ported, independent across items), just finding the optimal prices is intractably
hard. In these cases, reasoning about the revenue of an optimal pricing strate-
gies requires a softer touch, relying on more obscure properties the optimal
prices must satisfy instead of an implicit characterization of the prices them-
selves.
2. (Explicit Distributions) The optimal price was easy to characterize via reference
to the valuation distribution F . However in practice the true distribution of
customer valuations is never known, instead only information about the dis-
tribution is known (for example the distributions mean and variance, but not
its higher moments). This information induces a corresponding class of possi-
ble distributions matching the given information, we will refer to this class of
possible distributions as Ω. In Chapter 2 we consider the subtler question of







. Note the outer minimization is over a class of distributions Ω, which implies
that whatever the solution is, it corresponds to a worst case guarantee on the
revenue over all distributions matching the input data. Further, in this setting
the number of parameters jumps from merely p to both p and a functional
dependence on F .
3. (Simple Customer Interaction) Implicit in the characterization of the optimal
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revenue in the previous section was the understanding that customers made
one-time, instantaneous, irreversible decisions. From this assumption, we could
calculate the expected revenue via a single expectation taken over F . In prac-
tice, the customer often has a repeated interaction with the seller, for example
to collect multiple versions of the good or to return goods. In Chapter 3 we
consider more expressive pricing models that allow for repeated interaction be-
tween the customer and seller. In this case the expected revenue is taken with
respect to a stochastic process describing the customers interaction with the
seller.
0.4 Summary of Contributions
We now summarize the main contributions of Chapters 1, 2 and 3. By collecting these
results together, we can better contrast and compare them. Each of the following
chapters will focus on a single emerging e-commerce technology and will be completely
self contained.
In the first chapter we study the power of selling opaque products, i.e., products
where a feature is hidden from the customer until after purchase. We consider models
where traditional items are sold at a single price alongside opaque products corre-
sponding to subsets of items and bench mark our opaque selling strategies against
two common selling strategies: one which charges different prices for the items (dis-
criminatory pricing), and one which charges a single price (single pricing). When
customers are unit-demand and draw valuations exchangeably, we give a sharp char-
acterization for when opaque selling outperforms discriminatory pricing, and charac-
terize the maximal revenue lift opaque products can provide. This chapter is based
on joint work with Adam N. Elmachtoub.
In the second chapter we turn our attention to personalized pricing strategies.
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Access to high-quality customer information has fueled interest in personalized pricing
strategies, i.e., strategies that predict an individual customer’s valuation for a product
and then offer them a customized price. While the appeal of personalized pricing is
clear, it may also incur costs in the form of market research, investment in information
technology, and branding risks. In light of these trade-offs, we study the value of
personalized pricing over simpler pricing strategies, and provide various closed-form
upper and lower bounds on the ratio that depend on simple statistics of the valuation
distribution. This chapter is based on joint work with Adam N. Elmachtoub and
Vishal Gupta.
Finally, in the last chapter we study the pricing and design of loot boxes in online
games. In online gaming markets an increasingly popular way to sell in game items
are via loot boxes, which are (random) bundles of virtual items, the contents of which
are revealed after purchase. We consider how to design and price loot boxes, and
compare their revenue with bundle selling and separate selling. We show that in an
asymptotic regime, carefully designed loot box strategies can garner as much revenue
as grand bundle selling while inheriting many nice properties of separate selling. We
then extend these results to the case of multiple classes of items, in this setting
we characterize the optimal allocation probabilities and prices, and salvage costs,
where we show dominance over separate selling. In both cases we obtain closed form
expressions for the asympotic revenues. Finally, we numerical validate our results for
moderately sized catalogs of items. This chapter is based on joint work with Xiao
Lei, Adam N. Elmachtoub, and Ningyuan Chen.
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Chapter 1
The Power of Opaque Products in Pricing
In this chapter we study the power of selling opaque products, the results of this
section are joint work with Adam N. Elmachtoub. Opaque products are products
where a feature (such as color) is hidden from the customer until after purchase.
Opaque products, which are sold with a price discount, have emerged as a powerful
vehicle to increase revenue for many online retailers and service providers that offer
horizontally differentiated items. In the opaque selling models we consider, each of
the items (colors) are sold at a single common price alongside opaque products which
may correspond to various subsets of the items. We consider two types of customers,
risk-neutral ones who assume they will receive a truly random item from the opaque
product, and pessimistic ones who assume they will receive their least favorite item
from the opaque product. We benchmark opaque selling against two common selling
strategies: discriminatory pricing, where one explicitly charges different prices for
each item, and single pricing, where a single price is charged for all the items.
We give a sharp characterization of when opaque selling outperforms discrim-
inatory pricing. Namely, this result holds for situations where all customers are
pessimistic, or the item valuations are supported on two points. In the latter case,
we also show that opaque selling with just one opaque product guarantees at least
71.9% of the revenue from discriminatory pricing. We then provide upper bounds on
the potential revenue increase from opaque selling strategies over single pricing, and
describe cases where the increase can be significantly more than that of discrimina-
tory pricing. Finally, we provide pricing algorithms alongside a numerical study to
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assess the power of opaque selling under various valuation distributions.
1.1 Introduction
An opaque product is a product where one or more features (such as color, brand, or
location) are hidden from the customer until after the purchase is made. In recent
years, several online retailers have begun selling opaque products. For example,
Amazon.com offers various colors of Swingline staplers alongside a “colors may vary”
option, which is an opaque product over the various colors (see Fig. 1.1). In another
example, SwimOutlet.com offers various styles of Nike swimsuits, as well as a “Grab
Bag” over all the different styles offered (see Fig. 1.2).
Figure 1.1: Swingline offers their “SmartTouch” staplers on Amazon.com tradition-
ally alongside a “colors may vary” option i.e., a single opaque product where the color
of the stapler is hidden until after purchase. The opaque product (right) is offered at
the discounted price of $15.99, which is $1.63 less than the traditional price (left) of
$18.62.
In both of these examples, customers who purchase the opaque product sacrifice
exact knowledge of the item they will receive in exchange for a price discount. This
allows the seller to price discriminate between customers with strong and weak pref-
erences, and therefore earn more revenue. The goal of this work is to showcase the
power of opaque selling compared to more traditional price discrimination tactics,
and quantify the potential extra revenue that a seller can obtain.
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Figure 1.2: SwimOutlet.com offers various styles of Nike brand swim trunks for prices
between $43.00-$50.00 alongside an opaque “Grab Bag” for $23.00.
In our framework, we consider a seller that has N items available for sale, each
of which are similar but may differ in a secondary attribute such as color or style.
Customers draw valuations for each of the items from a joint probability distribution
that is known to the seller. We focus on the class of exchangeable distributions which
naturally represent horizontally differentiated items, as the marginal distribution of
each item is identical. Special cases include i.i.d. valuations, Hotelling model, and
Salop’s circle (when the number of items is fewer than 3). In the absence of opaque
products, customers simply choose the item which maximizes their utility, i.e., their
valuation for the item minus its price. No item is purchased in the case where the
utility from all items is negative.
Interestingly, when the valuation distribution is exchangeable (even i.i.d.), the
optimal pricing strategy in this model may use different prices for different items
(Chawla et al. [30]). This strategy, that we refer to as discriminatory pricing, is a
natural benchmark for our opaque selling strategies. Due to symmetry, discriminatory
pricing arbitrarily chooses some items to have high prices. This may be particularly
problematic when certain items (colors) are correlated with demographic information
such as race or gender. In some settings, the items are often constrained to have the
same price by the manufacturer or by the seller to ensure impartiality to customers.
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Thus another natural benchmark to consider is the best single price strategy.
We now carefully describe our opaque selling strategy, where the seller offers
opaque products in addition to offering the N items. Specifically, an opaque product
is an explicit subset of items from which a customer will receive one item upon
purchase. An opaque selling strategy can offer all possible 2N−N−1 opaque products
in addition to the N original items. For practicality and tractability of the model,
we assume that opaque products corresponding to subsets of the same size must have
the same price. Moreover, we impose a restriction that all prices of the items must
be the same. This exact structure is employed by Eurowings (see Fig. 1.3 and Post
and Spann [90]) which sells round trip tickets to opaque destinations. In this setting,
customers may narrow down the possible destinations in exchange for an increased
price. As a result, an opaque selling strategy is parameterized by N prices, similar to a
discriminatory pricing strategy. However, customers interested in an item or opaque
products of the same size always pay the same price, which prevents the opaque
strategy from arbitrarily discriminating against a particular type of customer. In
essence, an opaque selling strategy balances the impartiality of a single price strategy
with the price discrimination capability of discriminatory item pricing.
In order to study opaque selling strategies, we must also specify how customers
value an opaque product. We consider two approaches motivated by realistic inter-
pretations of opaque products, which we call pessimistic and risk-neutral customers.
In practice, the seller never reveals the probabilities of receiving individual items in
an opaque product, leaving the customers to formulate their valuations based on their
judgment. A customer is said to be pessimistic if they value an opaque product as the
minimum of their valuations among the corresponding subset of items. A pessimistic
customer is risk-averse and essentially wants an ex-post guarantee that purchasing
the opaque product maximizes their utility. Such an assumption is natural when some
of the items are infeasible for the customer (mismatched colors or incompatible des-
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Figure 1.3: Eurowings.com uses an opaque selling strategy to offer airline tickets with
a base price of e66.00. Here the destination of the flight is opaque, with N = 12
possible destinations. The site allows the customer to exclude as many destinations
as they desire, each for a price of e5.00. In the figure above, three destinations are
excluded and the price for the desired opaque product is e81.
tination). Another reason a customer may be pessimistic is that he is fundamentally
mistrustful of the seller’s motives, and believes the seller will allocate the product he
desires least.
A customer is said to be risk-neutral if they value an opaque product as the average
of their valuations among the corresponding subset of items. A risk-neutral customer
is essentially optimistic, and believes that the seller is impartial in the sense that
the probability of receiving any item in an opaque product is uniformly distributed.
Although not always true, it has been the dominant assumption in the literature
and may model customer behavior well in some applications. We study the power
of opaque selling in markets that simultaneously allow a mixture of both customer
types, where α denotes the probability a customer is pessimistic.
We next outline our contributions, which formally describe conditions under which
opaque selling performs well with respect to discriminatory and single pricing strate-
gies.
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1. We give a sharp characterization of when opaque selling dominates the optimal
discriminatory pricing strategy. In particular, opaque selling is guaranteed to
provide more revenue than discriminatory pricing when the valuations are drawn
from an exchangeable distribution and either of the following conditions hold:
(i) the market is homogeneously pessimistic or (ii) the valuations can only take
two values (high or low). When neither condition holds, either strategy may be
superior to the other. One surprising consequence is that the seller may actually
benefit when customers are pessimistic and hence value opaque products in a
worst-case manner.
2. In the important special case when valuations are drawn from an exchangeable
distribution and can only take two values, we show a single opaque product can
always guarantee at least 71.9% of the revenue from discriminatory pricing.
This result is independent of what fraction of the customers are pessimistic and
risk-neutral.
3. We then show that in α-mixed markets, opaque selling can earn up to and
at most a factor of αN more than the best single pricing. When this bound
is tight, this revenue increase is exponentially more than the revenue increase
provided by any discriminatory pricing. We compliment this result by showing
that in the restricted case of i.i.d. valuations, this gap falls to constant factors.
We also show that offering just a single opaque product increases revenue by
up to and at most a factor of 2− (1− α)N−1
N
over the best single pricing.
4. We perform a numerical study which bears out our results for several typical
distributions. To conduct the study we derive an efficient algorithm for finding
the optimal prices when N is small. We empirically observe that the seller earns
more revenue as α, the fraction of pessimistic customers, increases. We also see
up to a 5% increase in revenue using opaque selling compared to discriminatory
pricing. Finally, when N is small, we also observe that a single opaque product
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earns nearly as much revenue as a general opaque strategy.
In summary, our results provide strong evidence that opaque selling is a customer-
friendly alternative to discriminatory pricing, often with comparable or higher rev-
enues. Next, we compare our results to previous work and connect our ideas to related
literature.
Literature Review
Our work connects into several streams of literature across operations, marketing,
economics, and computer science. We first review literature on monopolistic sellers
offering opaque products. For example, the parallel works of Jiang [75] and Fay and
Xie [53] both consider opaque selling frameworks when customers have valuations
drawn from a Hotelling or Salop’s circle choice model. Note that this assumes perfect
correlation between the items, and may not necessarily represent customer behavior
well although it does fall into the exchangeable distribution assumption. Both works
provide conditions for when opaque selling can have strictly positive increase in profit
over single pricing strategies. Fay and Xie [53] also show that opaque products
can be used to hedge against possibly incorrect demand estimation. Our work does
not make any assumption about the valuation distribution, and benchmarks against
discriminatory pricing.
A separate stream of work has shown the power opaque products for managing
capacity and inventory. Gallego and Phillips [59] and Gallego et al. [60] considers
the notion of a flexible product in revenue management, where customers who buy
the flexible option are allocated a product after the completion of the time horizon.
Fay and Xie [54] show how to use opaque products to protect inventory when one
of the two items is strictly preferred over the other by all customers, and Xiao and
Chen [103] provide dynamic programming algorithms to decide when to use opaque
products. Elmachtoub and Wei [50] quantify the value of opaque products in real-
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time inventory management environments, and provides a framework for computing
choice probabilities when N = 2 and customers are pessimistic. In our work, we
avoid any notion of cost and focus purely on the price discrimination effect offered
by opaque products.
There are several works on opaque products when used among competitors
(Shapiro and Shi [96], Jerath et al. [74]), in name-your-own-price channels (Chen
et al. [34], Huang et al. [72]), in empirical analysis (Xie et al. [104], Granados et al.
[63]), and in queueing systems (Xu et al. [105], Geng [62]). Post and Spann [90] and
Post [89] consider settings where multiple opaque products are offered simultaneously.
We also mention a stream of work in economics that considers optimal mechanism
design with opaque products, along the lines of Pavlov [86], Balestrieri et al. [12], and
Balestrieri and Izmalkov [11].
Our results related to purely risk-neutral markets connects to a stream of litera-
ture on pricing with lotteries. A lottery, as described in the literature, is a probability
distribution over the items that is sold by the seller and announced to the customer.
Customers are risk-neutral and use the expected valuation of the lottery when decid-
ing what to buy. If all customers are risk-neutral, then our opaque selling strategy
can be thought of as a special case of lottery pricing where the items are allocated uni-
formly at random. Under arbitrary valuation distributions, Briest et al. [24] and Hart
and Nisan [67] show that lottery pricing can earn infinitely more revenue than any
discriminatory pricing when N ≥ 3 and N = 2, respectively.When customers draw
their valuations independently, Chawla et al. [32] show the optimal lottery pricing
are at most four times discriminatory pricing.
More generally, our work is related to a growing literature in computer science on
algorithmic pricing. When valuations are independent, Chawla et al. [30] and Chawla
et al. [31] give constant factor approximations to the optimal discriminatory pricing by
exploiting a surprising connection to a 1 item, N bidder auction. Cai and Daskalakis
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[26] provide an additive polynomial-time approximation scheme when valuations are
bounded and drawn independently, while Chen et al. [37] show the problem is NP-
Hard even when valuations are drawn i.i.d. or drawn independently and supported on
three points. The class of exchangeable valuations was also considered in Daskalakis
and Weinberg [46] in the context of optimal auction design.
We note that our work resembles that of bundle pricing on the surface due to
the nature in which items are aggregated into opaque products, although bundling
results generally assume customers are interested in purchasing multiple items. The
one exception is that of Briest and Roglin [22] who frame opaque products as ‘unit
demand bundles’ and provide hardness results. Finally, our work fits in parallel to
recent work on simple mechanisms for difficult multi-dimensional problems problems
in auctions (Celis et al. [28]) and bundling (Ma and Simchi-Levi [79], Abdallah et al.
[3]).
1.2 Selling Models
We now formally describe the selling models that we study throughout the work.
We consider a seller who has N ≥ 2 items for sale, described by the set N :=
{1, 2, . . . , N}. The seller may also offer one or more opaque products, each of which
is described by a subset S ∈ 2N where |S| ≥ 2. The seller simultaneously offers
the items and potentially some number of opaque products to a utility-maximizing,
unit-demand customer. (Note that this is equivalent to selling to many customers
with no inventory constraints.) The customer has a nonnegative random valuation
for each item i denoted by Vi, and the joint valuation V = (V1, V2, . . . , VN) is drawn
from a known joint distribution F . For every selling model we consider, the customer
maximizes his own utility, which is the valuation of the item or opaque product
purchased minus its price. If no item or opaque product results in a nonnegative
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utility, then the customer does not purchase anything. In the case where the customer
has multiple options that provide maximum utility, we make the standard assumption,
without loss of generality, that the customer purchases the product with the highest
price (see [37] for detailed discussion of tie-breaking rules in this context). When there
are multiple products with the same price providing maximum utility, we assume the
customer breaks ties arbitrarily.
We note that the notion of valuation and utility described thus far does not extend
in an obvious way to opaque products. That is, the way a customer values an opaque
product depends on the customer’s belief about the seller’s allocation mechanism
and the customer’s risk preferences. Next, we describe two natural frameworks for
capturing valuations of opaque products, and each customer shall behave according
to one of these two frameworks.
Valuations for Opaque Products
We model the customer’s valuation for an opaque product as a function over the
valuations of the items the opaque product can return. We consider two natural
assumptions for how to model customer behavior with respect to opaque products,
which we call pessimistic and risk-neutral. For any subset of items S ∈ 2N , we let
V S denote the random valuation of the opaque product corresponding to S. For
pessimistic customers, V S is the minimum over all the valuations in S, i.e.,
V S = min
i∈S
{Vi}






We assume that a customer is pessimistic with probability α and risk-neutral with
probability 1 − α. We let Xα denote the random variable corresponding to the
customer type.
In practice, the seller never announces the allocation probabilities for an opaque
product, forcing the customer to form his own beliefs. A pessimistic customer be-
lieves the seller will allocate the product that is desired least by the customer. Given
that the allocation probabilities are entirely unknown, this corresponds to a customer
placing a worst-case allocation distribution on the outcome of the opaque product.
The pessimistic preference also captures another important and practical situation
where even if the customers know the opaque allocation probabilities, they are ex-
tremely risk-averse. In other words, the customer wants their purchasing decision to
be ex-post optimal, i.e., there is no regret even after the item in the opaque product is
revealed. This particular situation can arise when customers know that certain items
provide no value, which can happen when particular colors or flight destinations are
completely undesirable (see Figures 1.2 and 1.3).
A risk-neutral customer believes that the seller will allocate the items in the
opaque product uniformly at random, which is an optimistic belief. With respect
to this fair allocation, he is also risk-neutral in his valuation of the opaque product.
Thus, a risk-neutral customer simply averages their valuations across the product,
even though the allocation is most likely not uniformly at random. With limited
information, it is natural for some customers to form this valuation, in particular
when the valuations of each item are reasonably close together (in which case the
difference between risk-neutral and pessimistic is small). We also note that the risk-
neutral assumption has been the primary focus in the literature (Gallego and Phillips
[59], Fay and Xie [53], Jerath et al. [74]), while the pessimistic case has not been
studied to our knowledge.
Finally, we highlight that the delineation between pessimistic and risk-neutral
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customers is quite important from a geometric and technical perspective. Fig. 1.4
illustrates this distinction in the case where N = 2. Note the shape and size of the
valuations regions where customers purchase the opaque product are quite different,
which explains the dependence on α in our analysis.
Figure 1.4: Above are two valuation spaces for opaque selling strategies with prices
(p, p2) = (4, 3). Left is the valuation space for pessimistic customers, right is valua-
tion space for risk-neutral customers. The darkened regions correspond to customer
valuations that yield purchases of an item at a price of 4. The lighter regions cor-
respond to purchases of the opaque product which has a price of 3. The unshaded
regions correspond to valuations that yield no purchase.
Selling Strategies
We now describe four specific selling strategies that we use throughout the work. For
notational convenience and improved exposition of this subsection, we assume that
F is continuous to avoid tie-breaking scenarios (which would go to the highest price
option w.l.o.g.). In the single price selling model (SP), the seller offers all N items all
at the same price. In other words, the price of item i is the same for all i ∈ N . We
refer to this single price as p. We denote RFSP (p) and RFSP as the expected revenue
using single pricing with joint distribution F under price p and the optimal price,
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respectively. More formally,
RFSP (p) = pPr(max
i∈N
{Vi} ≥ p) and RFSP = max
p
RFSP (p).
In the discriminatory pricing model (DP), the prices may differ between the items.
Without loss of generality, we always relabel the indices so that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pN .
We denote the vector of prices as ~p. We note that even when valuations are i.i.d.,
discriminatory item pricing may provide strictly more revenue than single pricing
strategies (Chawla et al. [30]). However, discriminatory pricing may be difficult for
customers to accept (especially when valuations are i.i.d.), and for similar reasons
may be infeasible for the seller due to business constraints. We denote RFDP (~p) and







Vi − pi ≥ max
j 6=i
{Vj − pj, 0}
)
and RFDP = max
~p
RFDP (~p).
Although DP seems at first unnatural and counterintuitive when valuations are i.i.d.,
the revenue function creates a natural tension to segment the market and capture high
valuation customers without sacrificing market size. Every time an item is priced
high, selling another item at a low price becomes more valuable since its market
share will increase. Although DP can provide more revenue in many i.i.d. settings,
including two point (high-low) distributions, it may not be beneficial in other settings.
For example, when i.i.d. valuations correspond to a multinomial logit (MNL) choice
model, the ‘constant markup property’ (Anderson et al. [4]) implies SP is optimal.
We provide a longer primer delving further into DP in Appendix A.1.
In the single opaque selling model (1OPQ), the seller offers only one opaque prod-
uct associated with the set N at a price pN , alongside the traditional items all at
a fixed price p. This model is important and used in practice due to its simplicity,
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impartiality, and ease of implementation. We denote RF,α1OPQ(p, pN) and RF,α1OPQ as the
expected revenue under F , in α-mixed markets, using prices (p, pN) and the optimal
pricing, respectively. Formally,








V N − pN > max
i










V N − pN > max
i












V N − pN > max
i
{Vi − p, 0} ∩ V N − pN ≥ 0}|Xα
)]
and RF,α1OPQ = max
p,pN
RF,α1OPQ(p, pN)
The first equation is derived by considering four events that generate revenue. The
first event is that a customer is pessimistic, which has probability α, and has a
valuation for their favorite item, maxi{Vi−p}, which is larger than the opaque product
and 0, max{V N − pN , 0}. In this event, the customer buys an item and the seller
earns p. The remaining events are similar and enumerate the other cases where an
opaque product is purchased and/or the customer is risk-neutral.
In the general opaque selling model (OPQ), the seller offers all possible opaque
products, alongside the items which are offered at a single price p. For simplicity,
tractability, and impartiality, opaque products of the same cardinality are assigned
the same price (see Figure 1.3 for an example of this exact scenario). That is for all
S, S ′ ∈ 2N s.t. |S| = |S ′| ≥ 2, the opaque products corresponding to the subsets S
and S ′ must have the same price. For subsets of size k, the corresponding price is
pk, and the vector of the N − 1 opaque product prices is denoted by ~p. We denote
RF,αOPQ(p, ~p) and RF,αOPQ as the expected revenue under F , in α-mixed markets, using
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prices (p, ~p) and the optimal pricing, respectively. More formally,






{Vi − p} ≥ max
S∈2N ,|S|≥2







V S − p|S| ≥ max
S′∈2N ,|S′|≥2




and RFOPQ = max
p,~p
RFOPQ(p, ~p).
In this expression, the expectation is taken with respect to the customer type, which
affects the opaque product valuations. The first summand corresponds to the revenue
in the case where an item is bought, and the remaining summands corresponds to
the revenues of the opaque products. Note an opaque product is sold only if it
provides nonnegative utility and has more utility than all of the items and other
opaque products.
We note that implementing the OPQ strategy in practice is simple, despite the
exponentially large number of products (see Figure 1.3). The seller simply displays
the price ladder corresponding to the size of the opaque product purchased, and then
users simply select (click) their top k products if they chose to purchase an opaque
product of size k. We also note that OPQ and 1OPQ are equivalent when N = 2.
For readability we often omit the superscripts F and α when they can be inferred
from context. In general, subscripts always refer to item prices (pi) and superscripts
refer to opaque product prices (p|S|).
Valuation Distributions
In this work we focus on the broad class of exchangeable valuation distributions,
which generalizes i.i.d. valuations to distributions that allow for structured symmetric
correlation between items. The formal definition is presented below.
22
Definition 1.2.1. We call the random valuation vector V = (V1, . . . , VN) exchange-
able if every permutation of the item valuations results in the same joint distribution.
The corresponding distribution is also said to be exchangeable in this case.
Exchangeable valuation distributions are a natural model for horizontally differ-
entiated items as they allow for individual preferences between items, but enforce a
distributional symmetry as the items are all alike. One important example is the
Hotelling model which has been the primary focus of previous works (Fay and Xie
[53], Jerath et al. [74]) which focus on two item scenarios. Salop’s circle is a gener-
alization of the Hotelling model for more than two items, and is a standard choice
model for capturing horizontal differentiation (Salop [93], Fay and Xie [53]). When
N = 3, Salop’s circle model is an exchangeable distribution. For N ≥ 4, a more
general, but complex, notion of exchangeability is needed to capture Salop’s circle.
We provide this definition in Appendix A.2 and note that many of our results extend
to this more general definition. For ease of exposition, we shall focus on Definition
1.2.1 throughout the paper.
1.3 The Power of Opaque Products
In this section, we focus on the revenue from the general opaque (OPQ) strategy
when item valuations are drawn from any exchangeable distribution. In Sections 1.3
and 1.3, we provide conditions for when the expected revenue of OPQ is guaranteed
to exceed that of discriminatory pricing (DP). When neither of these conditions hold,
there is no dominance in either direction, and we supply counterexamples (valuation
distributions) where discriminatory pricing is better. In Section 1.3, we quantify how
much more revenue OPQ selling strategies can potentially earn over single pricing
(SP), and show that the extra revenue garnered by OPQ strategies can be on the
order of αN more than DP. In the special case where item valuations are i.i.d., we
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show this gap collapses to a constant factor.
Benchmarking against Discriminatory Pricing
We now characterize when OPQ is guaranteed to garner more revenue than DP. In
particular, we show that when all customers are pessimistic or when valuations can
take only two values (high or low), opaque selling is guaranteed to earn more revenue
than discriminatory pricing. In Example 1.3.1, we give a valuation distribution where
neither condition holds and RDP > ROPQ. This counterexample assumes valuations
can take three values, and assumes that 0 ≤ α ≤ .85. Next, we formally state our
result in Theorem 1.3.1 and defer the proof to Section 1.3.
Theorem 1.3.1 (When OPQ dominates DP). Assume customers are α-mixed and
draw their valuations from an exchangeable distribution. If (i) α = 1 or (ii) the
item valuations take only two values, then opaque selling dominates discriminatory
pricing, i.e.,
ROPQ ≥ RDP .
Interpretation and Implications of Theorem 1.3.1: While restricted, both
cases of Theorem 1.3.1 where the dominance result holds represent situations of sig-
nificant interest. When α is near 1, most customers assume a worst-case behavior
with respect to opaque product allocation. This situation arises in markets where
opaque products have been recently introduced and there is no information for cus-
tomers to be had. For markets where customers tend to value a particular item (color
or destination) as unacceptable, this pessimistic behavior may also be common. A
trivial implication of Theorem 1.3.1(i) is thatROPQ ≥ αRDP , which follows from sim-
ply ignoring the revenue from all risk-neutral customers. Thus in highly pessimistic
markets where α is close to 1, an opaque selling strategy is guaranteed to preserve
almost all the gains from discriminatory pricing, and potentially earn even more.
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Further, we show in Corollary A.2.1 that Theorem 1.3.1(i) extends to another
important class of distributions for horizontally differentiated items known as Salop’s
circle, often used as a standard tool in the literature. We provide a short primer on
Salop’s circle model along with the proof of Corollary A.2.1 in Appendix A.2.
When valuations are supported on two points, the market is highly differentiated
and has binary ‘high/low’ valuations for the items. This setting has been the subject
of Fay and Xie [53], Huang and Yu [71] in the literature on opaque selling. Note that
the case of binary valuations is exactly when discriminatory pricing is most profitable
compared to single pricing: Dutting and Klimm [49] shows that for every N , there




)RSP and that this
is the largest possible revenue gap. Thus in markets where retailers would be most
inclined to consider discriminatory pricing strategies, an opaque selling strategy is
even more profitable.
It is important to note that when the conditions of Theorem 1.3.1 do not hold,
that either DP or OPQ may be preferred depending on the market assumptions.
Thus it is worth noting that OPQ may have other advantages over DP. For example,
discriminatory selling can be unnatural and undesired by customers in particular in
the settings we consider where the items only differ superficially (hence exchangeable
distributions). Charging different prices for what are essentially equivalent products
may increase revenue, however it may be perceived as unfair by customers (and cause
strategic behavior) or even disallowed by manufacturers altogether. In contrast, the
OPQ strategy is impartial and will never result in a customer paying more simply
for liking a particular item (color). Collectively, we believe these arguments show
that opaque selling should always be considered as an alternative to discriminatory
pricing, and in many cases may result in more profit.
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Sharpness of Theorem 1.3.1. Both the exchangeability and sufficient conditions
(α = 1 or two point valuations) for Theorem 1.3.1 are critical for the result to hold.
In Example 1.3.1, we construct a simple three-point distribution from which item
valuations are drawn i.i.d. and RDP > ROPQ for any α ≤ .85. Thus Example 1.3.1
precludes generalizing Theorem 1.3.1 for situations beyond two point valuations and
purely pessimistic markets. Surprisingly, it also implies that when α = 1, the revenue
from OPQ may be higher than when α = 0. In other words, the seller may actually
benefit from customers adopting a pessimistic attitude towards opaque products, as
this helps segment the market more favorably. In Example 1.3.2, we describe a
valuation distribution that is not exchangeable and results in RDP > ROPQ
Example 1.3.1 (When Assumptions (i) and (ii) Do Not Hold). For N = 2, we
construct a three point distribution F where, when customers are risk-neutral, the
optimal discriminatory selling strategy earns strictly more revenue than an opaque
strategy. Let α = 0 and suppose i.i.d valuations for two items drawn according to,
Vi =

0 : w.p 8/27
.1 : w.p 2/3
.9 : w.p 1/27
Then using the algorithm described in Theorem 1.5.1 we can compute RSP = ROPQ =
0.091220... < 0.0913 achieved by pricing both items at 0.1. However RDP (0.9, 0.1) =
0.1, 11% more revenue than the optimal opaque selling strategy.
Further, it can be computed that when α > .69231, the optimal opaque pricing
switches from (.1,.1) to a mixed pricing (.1,.9) earning revenue ≈ α(1.08779) + (1−
α)(.0517146). The revenue from this optimal mixed opaque selling strategy overtakes
the revenue from discriminatory pricing when α > .846. Thus for α < .69231,
RSP = ROPQ < RDP . For α ∈ (.69231, .846), RSP < ROPQ < RDP . For α > .846,
RSP < RDP < ROPQ. 
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Example 1.3.2 (When Exchangeability Does Not Hold). Consider a market where
N = 2 and α = 1, and where valuations for two items are drawn independently
from V1, which is two times a Bernoulli r.v. with probability 1/2, and V2 which is
distributed as a Bernoulli r.v. with probability 1/2. Since V1 and V2 are independent
but not identical, the market is therefore not exchangeable. However, by a simple
enumeration, one can see that RDP (2, 1) = 54 whereas R1OPQ ≤ 1. 
Geometric Proof of Theorem 1.3.1 when N = 2 and α = 1. Before delving
into the formal proof in Section 1.3, we provide some geometric intuition in the
special case when N = 2 and α = 1. Suppose the optimal discriminatory pricing
uses prices (p1, p2) with p1 > p2. We show that an opaque selling strategy with
prices (p, p2) = (p1, p2) exceeds the revenue of the optimal discriminatory pricing.
Fig. 1.5a and Fig. 1.5b show the different purchase behaviors under OPQ and DP,
respectively, where a darker color corresponds to a more expensive customer purchase.
Due to exchangeability, it is then visually clear that the following are all equal: (i)
the revenue of OPQ conditioned on V1 ≥ V2, (ii) the revenue of OPQ conditioned
on V2 ≥ V1, and (iii) the revenue of DP conditioned on V1 ≥ V2. To complete the
proof, we claim that the revenue of DP conditioned on the event V1 ≥ V2 is at least
the revenue of DP conditioned on the event V2 ≥ V1. If this were not the case,
then reducing p1 to p2 would increase the revenue in the event that V1 ≥ V2 without
changing the revenue in the event V2 ≥ V1, which would contradict the optimality of
(p1, p2).
One interesting consequence of this geometric argument is that, when N=2 and
α = 1, RDP ≤ ROPQ+RSP2 . Suppose that RDP = (1 + γ)RSP , for some γ > 0. Then
rearranging RDP ≤ ROPQ+RSP2 gives




(a) Valuation space for pessimistic cus-
tomers facing a OPQ strategy with
(p, p2) = (5, 3). Note the purchasing be-
havior is symmetric across the line V2 =
V1.
(b) Valuation space for a customer facing
a DP strategy with (p1, p2) = (5, 3). Note
that below the line V2 = V1, the purchas-
ing behavior in (a) and (b) are identical.
Figure 1.5: The valuation space and purchasing behaviors for a pessimistic customer
facing OPQ and DP selling strategies respectively. Customers with valuations in the
darkened regions buy at price 5 in both figures. Customers with valuations in the
lightly shaded regions buy at price 3 (i.e., purchase the opaque product or item 2,
respectively). Customers in the unshaded region do not purchase.
which implies the inequality in Theorem 1.3.1 is strict whenever RDP > RSP . In
Corollary 1.3.1 we expound on this observation to show more generally, whenever the
conditions of Theorem 1.3.1(i) are met, and RDP > RSP , it follows that ROPQ >
RDP .
When the conditions of Theorem 1.3.1(ii) hold, no such result can be shown. When
α is small, there are cases when RDP = ROPQ even if RDP > RSP , see Fig. 1.6c
for an example. Instead we show an analogous result for when the conditions of
Theorem 1.3.1(ii) are met, RDP > RSP , and when α is sufficiently large, it follows
that ROPQ > RDP . The proof can be found in Appendix A.4.
Corollary 1.3.1. Assume customers are α-mixed and draw their valuations from an
exchangeable distribution. Suppose DP earns more than SP and let γ > 0 denote the
gap, i.e., RDP = (1 + γ)RSP .
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(N − 1)(1 + γ)
)
RDP .
Proof of Theorem 1.3.1.
Proof of Theorem 1.3.1. We will consider the two cases separately.
Case (i): Let α = 1, F be the exchangeable distribution over N items, and w.l.o.g.
let p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pN be the optimal prices corresponding to RDP . For ease of expo-
sition we assume F is continuous and ignore ties, although the same argument follows
when F is not continuous and one carefully considers the tie-breaking procedure. Let
Σ be the set of permutations σ : [N ] → [N ], and σ(i) the mapping of index i under
σ. For every σ ∈ Σ, define the event Eσ := {Vσ(1) ≥ Vσ(2) ≥ . . . ≥ Vσ(N)}. Note that
each {Eσ}σ∈Σ is equally likely by exchangeability. We define qi|σ to be the probabil-
ity of a customer purchasing i under the DP strategy (p1, . . . , pN) conditioned on the
event Eσ. We define Rev(p1, . . . , pN |σ) to be the expected revenue of the DP strategy
conditioned on the event Eσ, i.e.,




Define σ∗ such that Rev(p1, . . . , pN |σ∗) ≥ Rev(p1, . . . , pN |σ) over all σ ∈ Σ, i.e., Eσ∗
is the event that leads to the most revenue. This implies that Rev(p1, . . . , pN |σ∗) ≥
RDP .
Now consider an opaque selling strategy OPQ that uses prices pi = pσ∗(i). (Note
that p1 is the price of the items.) We shall show that this opaque strategy has expected
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revenue of at least Rev(~p|σ∗). Under our opaque strategy, we call the probability of
a customer buying an opaque product of size i to be qi and the probability of a
customer buying an item to be q1. We let V (i) be the ith order statistic such that





{V S − pi} ≥ max
j 6=i,|S′|=j




V (i) − pi ≥ max
j 6=i




V (i) − pi ≥ max
j 6=i




Vσ∗(i) − pσ∗(i) ≥ max
j 6=i
{Vσ∗(j) − pσ∗(j), 0}|Eσ∗
)
= qσ∗(i)|σ∗ .
The first equality follows from the definition of OPQ strategies and qi. The second
equality follows from noting that a customer only needs to consider the best opaque
product of each possible size i = 2, . . . , N and the best item. The best opaque
product of size i has a valuation of the minimum of the top i valuations, which is
the i’th order statistic. The third equality follows from the fact that the valuations
are exchangeable, and thus an event on the order statistics is independent of Eσ for
all σ ∈ Σ. The fourth equality follows from our pricing rule and the definition of σ∗.
The last equality follows from the definition of qi|σ∗ . Combining our findings yields






pσ∗(i)qσ∗(i)|σ∗ = Rev(p1, . . . , pN |σ∗) ≥ RDP . 
Case (ii): Fix a distribution F supported on two points {a, b} where a < b. Note
for distributions, the optimal discriminatory pricing uses prices ~p = (a, a, . . . , a),
(b, b, . . . , b) or a mixed pricing where exactly one price (since F is exchangeable it
doesn’t matter which price) is low (a, b, b, . . . , b). If either (a, a, . . . , a) or (b, b, . . . , b)
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are the the optimal discriminatory pricing given F , then RSP = RDP and the claim
follows automatically. Suppose RDP > RSP , then the optimal pricing is the mixed
strategy and under a mixed pricing, a discriminatory selling strategy always sells
an item. Further we will restrict ourselves to opaque pricings where pN = a, and
thus always sell the item. Since the item is always sold in both strategies, we may
normalize the support of F to {1, 1 + δ} without changing the ratio RDPROPQ . Now let U
be a random variable representing the number of valuations that are equal to 1 + δ.






and 1 otherwise. (The customer buys the cheap item
when they value it at 1 + δ.) Then for i ≥ 1,
E[RDP |U = i] = 1 + N − i
N
δ. (1.1)
Consider the following opaque pricing where for i ∈ N we let pi = 1+ N−i
N
δ. When
U = 0, the customer buys the opaque product of size N at price 1, paying the same in
the corresponding case in DP. When U = i ≥ 1, we claim that regardless of whether
the customer is pessimistic or risk-neutral, they will purchase an opaque product of
size i (or item if i = 1) earning revenue 1 + N−i
N
δ, which is the same revenue in the
corresponding case in DP and therefore would complete the proof. First suppose the
customer is pessimistic, then when U = i the customer values the size i product as
1 + δ and garners utility i
N
δ. For j < i, the customer values the opaque product the
same but has to pay a higher price, while for j > i the customer values the opaque
product at 1 and does not buy. Thus a pessimistic customer yields revenue 1 + N−i
N
δ
when U = i.
When the customer is risk-neutral and U = i, they again value the size i product
as 1 + δ and garners utility i
N
δ for purchasing it. Products of size j < i have the
same valuation, but at a higher price, and thus offer less utility. For products of size
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j > i, the utility of the size j opaque product is
i(1 + δ) + (j − i) · 1
j










which is strictly less than i
N
δ. Finally, the above expression also shows that the
utilities of the opaque products of size i and N are the same, in which case the
customer buys i (since we have assumed w.l.o.g. that ties are broken in favor of
the more expensive option). Thus both pessimistic and risk-neutral customers have
the same purchase behavior under this opaque pricing, and yield the same expected
revenue as RDP .
In the proof of Theorem 1.3.1(i), one natural thought is to view opaque selling
with pessimistic customers as discriminatory pricing where the ordering of the item
valuations is known a priori to the seller. That is, the valuations for the best item
and opaque products take on exactly the valuations of the original items. It is then
tempting to assume that OPQ is trivially more profitable than DP, where the ordering
of the item valuations is not known to the seller and hence “less information” is
available. However, this false argument would easily extend to other settings where
our result does not hold (see Example 1.3.2) and thus the argument is invalid. The
extra information offered by OPQ comes with an additional constraint: the highest
valued item is sold at the highest price, the second highest valued item is sold at the
second highest price, and so on, which need not be optimal.
Benchmarking against Single Pricing
In this section, we seek to quantify the potential gains that opaque selling offers over
a simple single pricing strategy. This question has also been studied in the context of
discriminatory pricing. For example, when valuations are drawn i.i.d., Chawla et al.
[30] shows that discriminatory pricing can earn at most 2− 1
N
more than single price
32
strategies, and Dutting and Klimm [49] shows that this bound is tight. Interestingly,
in the same setting of i.i.d. valuations, opaque selling can also earn up to a constant
factor of single pricing. In Theorem 1.3.2, we describe this upper bound as a function
of α and N . A direct consequence of this theorem is that when valuations are i.i.d.,
OPQ and DP are always within a constant factor of each other. We provide the proof
in Section 1.3.
Theorem 1.3.2 (Revenue Upper Bound when Valuations are I.I.D.). Assume cus-
tomers are α-mixed and their item valuations are i.i.d. Then,
ROPQ ≤
(






In the more general case of exchangeable distributions, no results comparing DP
to SP are available to the best of our knowledge. In Theorem 1.3.3, we show that
DP earns at most 1 + log(N) more than SP, while OPQ earns at most N times more
than SP. This implies that OPQ can earn up to (order of) N
1+log(N)
more revenue than
DP, which we also show is indeed possible in Theorem 1.3.3 and Example A.3.1. We
defer the proof to Appendix A.4
Theorem 1.3.3 (Revenue Upper Bound when Distribution is Exchangeable). As-
sume customers are α-mixed and draw their valuations from an exchangeable distri-
bution. Then, (i) RDP ≤ (1 + log(N))RSP , (ii) ROPQ ≤ NRSP , and (iii) there
exists a distribution F such that ROPQ ≥ α2 N1+log(N)RDP .
Proof of Theorem 1.3.2
We divide the proof of Theorem 1.3.2 into two lemmas. Lemma 1.3.1 states that
when customers are purely pessimistic ROPQ ≤ 3RSP . Lemma 1.3.3 states that when




)RSP . To obtain Theorem 1.3.2, we
relax OPQ to observe Xα and price pessimistic and risk-neutral customers separately.
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Using Lemmas 1.3.1 and 1.3.3, we get that ROPQ ≤
(
α · 3 + (1− α) (4− 2
N
))RSP
which is the desired result.
Lemma 1.3.1. Assume all customers are pessimistic. Then when item valuations
are i.i.d.,
ROPQ ≤ 3RSP .
The proof of Lemma 1.3.1 below relies on connecting the revenue generated by
OPQ to a Myerson auction, and makes use of the following lemma.
Lemma 1.3.2 (Chawla et al. [31] Theorem 8). Let RM be the expected revenue from
the Myerson auction for one item, run on N bidders with i.i.d. valuations. Then
RM ≤ 2RSP .
Armed with this lemma we can now prove Lemma 1.3.1.
Proof of Lemma 1.3.1. Let (p, ~p) denote the prices of an optimal OPQ strategy under
F , where p is the price of items and ~p are the prices of the opaque products. The
proof follows by separately bounding revenue from items priced at p and the the
revenue from opaque products. Let V (k) be the kth order statistic (counting so that
V (1) = maxi{Vi}), and note that the highest valuation a customer has for opaque
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products of size k is just V (k). Then,
ROPQ = pP(V (1) − p ≥ max
k=2,...,N
{V (k) − pk, 0}) +
N∑
k=2
pkP (buys opaque product of size k)
≤ pP(V (1) − p ≥ 0) +
N∑
k=2
pkP (buys opaque product of size k)
≤ pP(V (1) − p ≥ 0) + E[V (2)]
≤ RSP + E[V (2)]
≤ RSP +RM
≤ 3RSP .
The equality follows from the definitions of ROPQ, p, and ~p. The first inequality
follows from non-negativity of maxk=2,...,N{V (k)−pk, 0}. The second inequality follows
from realizing that the highest valued opaque product is valued at V (2), and thus
customers pay at most V (2) when buying an opaque product. The third inequality
follows from the optimality of RSP . The fourth inequality follows from the fact that
E[V (2)] is the revenue of a second price auction, which is dominated by the Myerson
auction. The final inequality follows from Lemma 1.3.2.
We now consider the case of risk-neutral customers in Lemma 1.3.3.








The proof of Lemma 1.3.1 bounds the revenue from exponentially many opaque
products by the highest valuation any opaque product could receive from a pessimistic
customer. We noted that the highest valuation for an opaque product is bounded by
the expected value of a second price auction, which allowed us to apply Lemma 1.3.2.
Such an argument fails for risk-neutral customers since valuations for opaque products
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can be higher than V (2), the second order statistic of V . To circumvent this difficulty,
we recast opaque selling with risk-neutral customers in the language of lotteries.
Definition 1.3.1. A lottery over N items denoted by (p, ~q) consists of a price p and
probabilities qi for receiving each item i, s.t.
∑N
i=1 qi ≤ 1.
A customer with valuation vector ~v values a lottery (p, ~q) as
∑n
i=1 viqi − p. Note
that selling lotteries can simulate deterministic item pricing by defining N lotteries
where lottery li = (p, ei), where ei is the i
th unit vector. An opaque product over
a set S can be cast as a lottery with price p|S| and allocation probabilities qi = 1|S|
for each i ∈ S and qi = 0 for each i /∈ S. We call a collection of offered lotteries
a lottery pricing, denoted by L. Using this framework, we can prove that OPQ can
obtain at most 4− 2
N
times more revenue than SP. The proof can be found in Appendix
A.4, draws on lottery pricing results of Chawla et al. [32], who proved an upper bound
of 4 in their setting.
1.4 The Power of One Opaque Product
In this section, we study the revenue gained by using a strategy with a single opaque
product (1OPQ), where the seller offers all N items at a single price alongside a single
opaque product corresponding to the set N . 1OPQ represents the easiest use-case for
opaque selling, simply offering one opaque option made up of all N items. Fig. 1.1
shows an example of 1OPQ for staplers on Amazon.com.
We note that since the 1OPQ strategy only offers two prices, then a comparison to
discriminatory pricing which offers N prices becomes significantly more challenging.
Nevertheless, we show in Section 1.4 that 1OPQ guarantees 71.9% of the revenue of
DP in the special case of two-point distributions. In comparison to single pricing,
we show that 1OPQ can earn at most a factor of
(
2− (1− α) 1
N
)
more than SP in
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Section 1.4. When N = 2, our upper bounds are tight and the revenue increase can
be larger than that of DP.
Benchmarking against Discriminatory Pricing
In Theorem 1.4.1 we show that 1OPQ guarantees at least 71.9% of the revenue that
DP provides when the distribution is exchangeable and valuations are supported on
two points (low or high). As previously mentioned, such distributions are a natural
and well-studied model of customers with binary preferences, and may be used to
approximate bimodal distributions. Further, as seen in Example A.3.2 and Chawla
et al. [30], two point distributions represent natural best cases for price discrimination
for both 1OPQ and DP strategies. We emphasize that Theorem 1.4.1 is a strict
improvement on the approximation possible byRSP , which is 0.50RDP in this setting.
Specifically, Chawla et al. [30] give a two point distribution such that when scaling
the number of items N , limN→∞ RSPRDP = .5.
Theorem 1.4.1 (When 1OPQ Approximates DP). If customers are α-mixed and
draw their valuations from an exchangeable distribution supported on two values, then
R1OPQ ≥ .719RDP .
Our proof follows from observing that when the probability of customers having
high valuations is large, a single pricing strategy is a good approximation. Otherwise,
if the probability of customers having high valuations is small, we show that augment-
ing single price strategies with a single opaque product is a good approximation of
the optimal discriminatory pricing. We defer the complete proof to Appendix A.4.
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Benchmarking against Single Pricing
In this section, we show that the addition of a single opaque product over the set N
can increase the revenue by at most
(
2− (1− α) 1
N
)
. Although our bound holds under
all exchangeable distributions, Examples A.3.2 and A.3.3 shows that our analysis is
tight in the special cases of α = 0 and α = 1, even when customers are restricted to
have i.i.d. valuations. We defer the proof to Appendix A.4.
Theorem 1.4.2 (Revenue Upper Bounds for 1OPQ). Assume customers are α-mixed
and draw their valuations from any distribution. Then,
R1OPQ ≤
(




Further, when α = 0 or α = 1 there exists an i.i.d valuation distribution such that
the bounds are tight.
Theorem 1.4.2 fully describes the possible revenue increase a seller could hope
to garner using a single opaque product. It is of interest to note that when N = 2
and α = 1, Theorem 1.4.2 implies the existence of a valuation distribution such that
R1OPQ = 2RSP . However by Theorem 1.3.3(i), RDP ≤ (1 + log(2))RSP for any
distribution. Together these results show that 1OPQ can sometimes achieve higher
revenue lifts than DP.
1.5 Numerical Experiments
In this section we conduct numerical experiments to demonstrate the possible rela-
tionships between RSP ,R1OPQ,RDP ,ROPQ for various valuation distributions. To
perform the experiments, we must solve for the optimal prices for any of these strate-
gies. That is given the distribution F , and α, we must solve for the price vector that
maximizes revenue. However, in general solving for the optimal prices in multi-item
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settings is quite difficult. Even in the special case when the valuations are i.i.d.,
solving for the optimal discriminatory pricing strategy is NP-Hard Chen et al. [37].
Although not the focus of this work, in Section 1.5 we address this issue by
developing a simple enumerative algorithm which is computationally efficient in the
special case when the support of the valuations is discrete and the number of items
is not large. Note that a simple brute force search over the support is not sufficient,
as optimal prices do not necessarily lie on the support (Chawla et al. [30], Chen et al.
[35, 37]). Given any distribution F , our approach is to first discretize the distribution
and then run Algorithm 1. When the number of items is large, one can employ a
standard MIP approach along the lines of Hanson and Martin [66].
We emphasize that carefully discretizing the support and then solving still yields
near-optimal solutions for the true underlying distribution. Indeed, Hartline and





discrete points and solving obtains prices that garner revenue within a factor of 1 + 
of the optimal revenue. In Section 1.5, we conduct our experiments by using the
discretization approach alongside our enumerative algorithm.
An Enumerative Algorithm for Finding Optimal Pricings
In this section, we describe an algorithm for finding the optimal pricing in the special
case when the support of the distribution is discrete. (As mentioned previously, we as-
sume that we have approximated the original distribution by a discrete distribution.)
When the number of items is small, this algorithm is relatively efficient. Specifically,
we show that if N is assumed to be (a small) constant, then the optimal prices for
any strategy (SP, DP, OPQ, or 1OPQ) can be found in time that is polynomial in
the size of the support of the valuation distribution.
We let m denote the number of points (valuation vectors) in the support of
F . Each point j corresponds to a customer type with a valuation vector ~vj =
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(vj,1, vj,2, . . . , vj,N). When referring to DP, vj,i denotes type j’s valuation for item
i. When referring to OPQ, vj,i denotes type j’s valuation for the opaque product of
size i.
Note that opaque valuation vectors can easily be generated given a discretized
distribution by computing the opaque valuations for pessimistic and risk-neutral cus-
tomers directly. The type vector can also be made to correspond to the type vector
for SP by replacing each vector in the DP case with (maxi vj,i), and 1OPQ by replac-
ing each vector in the OPQ case with (vj,1, vj,N). In Theorem 1.5.1 we show that the
optimal prices can be found in time O(mN). The idea of Algorithm 1 is to identify a
set of (m + 1)N candidate prices, which is guaranteed to contain the optimal price.
The algorithm then enumerates over the set of candidate prices and returns the price
that yields the highest revenue. We defer the details to Appendix A.4.
Theorem 1.5.1 (Algorithm for Computing Optimal Prices). Let F be an exchange-
able distribution over m customer types. Then both the optimal opaque pricing and
discriminatory pricing can be computed in O(mN) time by Algorithm 1.
Computational Results
In this section we conduct numerical experiments on three typical valuation distri-
butions which bear out the relationships between RSP ,RDP ,ROPQ, and R1OPQ that
we have studied in the previous sections. We shall assume item valuations are drawn
i.i.d. from the following distributions: (i) a triangular distribution supported on [1, 7]
with mode 3, (ii) a normal distribution with mean 3 and standard deviation 2 trun-
cated on [1, 7], and (iii) a Bernoulli distribution supported on {1, 7} with probability
of a 7 being 1/9. In order to apply Theorem 1.5.1, we discretize these distributions
by rounding valuations to their nearest integer value. We compute the revenue of SP,
DP, OPQ, and 1OPQ for every value of α from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.05. Fig. 1.6
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displays our results when N = 2 (in which case OPQ is equivalent to 1OPQ) and
Fig. 1.7 displays our results when N = 3.
(a) Triangular distribution. (b) Normal distribution. (c) Bernoulli distribution.
Figure 1.6: Illustrates the relationship between RSP (dashed line),RDP (dotted line),
and ROPQ (solid line) as the proportion of pessimistic customers increases.
Each of the three distributions we study result in fundamentally different be-
haviors. In Fig. 1.6(a) we note that RDP > RSP , and further when α < 0.3,
RDP > ROPQ. However as α increases towards one, the relationship between
RDP and ROPQ reverses. When α is close to 1, ROPQ significantly outperforms
RDP , garnering up to approximately 5% more revenue. In Fig. 1.6(b) we note that
RSP = RDP , meaning that discriminatory pricing alone does not add value over a
single price. However, OPQ can earn strictly more revenue than either strategy when
α > 0.5. Finally in Fig. 1.6(c), ROPQ ≥ RDP for any value of α, which is known
directly from Theorem 1.3.1(ii). The gap is positive and increasing when α > 0.5,
which is implied by Corollary 1.3.1. Interestingly, for all three distributions ROPQ is
a non-decreasing function in α. This is counterintuitive: as the number of pessimistic
customers increase, more customers have lower values for the opaque products but the
overall revenue from OPQ increases. This suggests that the revenue non-monotonicity
noted in Section 1.3 is quite pervasive.
In Fig. 1.7(a), we see that that lifting the problem from N = 2 to N = 3 collapses
the revenue gap between RSP and RDP , but does not diminish the impact of opaque
products. Further we note that a single opaque product performs just as well as the
general opaque strategy does. In Fig. 1.7(b), we observe that when α > 0.8, 1OPQ
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(a) Triangular distribution. (b) Normal distribution. (c) Bernoulli distribution.
Figure 1.7: Illustrates the relationship between RSP ,RDP ,R1OPQ and ROPQ as the
proportion of pessimistic customers increases.
and OPQ can outearn DP. As α approaches 1, eventually there is a revenue gap
between 1OPQ and OPQ. Finally in Fig. 1.7(c), we see that when α < 0.5, DP and
OPQ are equivalent and outperform 1OPQ. When α > 0.5, 1OPQ and OPQ become
equivalent and outperform DP. We believe these experiments demonstrate a wide
range of behavior, but generally the OPQ and 1OPQ strategies tend to outperform
DP in almost all cases, and tend to improve as α increases.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied opaque selling strategies in the context of selling horizontally
differentiated items to unit-demand, utility-maximizing customers. We considered
mixtures of two practical models of customer behavior corresponding to pessimistic
and risk-neutral customers, motivated by the customer’s lack of knowledge about how
opaque products are allocated by the seller. When the valuation distribution is ex-
changeable and either customers are pessimistic or have binary preferences, we showed
that opaque selling dominates discriminatory pricing. We also explicitly quantified
the best possible revenue lift from using opaque products, which can be significantly
higher than discriminatory pricing. Finally, we considered the practical case where
only one grand opaque product is offered, and offered theoretical and numerical evi-
dence of the strength of this simplified strategy.
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We believe our results provide strong theoretical motivation for using opaque prod-
ucts as a vehicle for price discrimination, especially in online sales channels. Since
our opaque model imposes a single price for opaque products of the same size, it
is impartial to customers with particular preferences. It is also particularly advan-
tageous in situations where discriminatory pricing could be effective, but disallowed
due to business constraints and poor customer perception. It would interesting for fu-
ture research to consider the impact of competition and finite inventory constraints on




The Value of Personalized Pricing
In this chapter we study personalized pricing strategies. The contents of this section
are joint work with Adam Elmachtoub and Vishal Gupta.
Increased availability of high-quality customer information has fueled interest in
personalized pricing strategies, i.e., strategies that predict an individual customer’s
valuation for a product and then offer a customized price tailored to that customer.
While the appeal of personalized pricing is clear, it may also incur large costs in
the form of market research, investment in information technology and analytics
expertise, and branding risks. In light of these tradeoffs, our work studies the value of
idealized personalized pricing over a spectrum of pricing strategies varying in pricing
flexibility and prediction model accuracy.
We first provide tight, closed-form upper and lower bounds on the ratio between
the profits of an idealized personalized pricing strategy and a single price strategy.
These bounds depend on simple statistics and/or shape assumptions of the valuation
distribution and shed light on the types of markets for which personalized pricing has
the most potential. Next, we consider two stylized price discrimination strategies that
isolate the key assumptions underlying idealized personalized pricing: (i) a feature-
based pricing strategy, where the firm can charge a continuum of prices, but does not
know the customers valuations precisely (ii) a k-market segmentation strategy where
the firm knows all customer valuations precisely but can only charge customers one
of k prices. For each strategy we bound the ratio of idealized personalized pricing
profits to the profits of that strategy. We then synthesize these results to study a
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more realistic personalization strategy in which the seller neither knows customer
valuations precisely nor is able to offer a continuum of prices. These bounds quantify
the value of the operational capability of charging distinct prices and the value of
additional predictive accuracy, respectively.
Finally, we generalize our work in two directions: (i) we show how to extend
bounds on the value of personalized pricing to stronger bounds on the ratio of feature-
based pricing and a single price strategy and (ii) how to obtain bounds on the value
of personalized pricing that depend on arbitrary moments via infinite dimensional
linear programming duality.
2.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, increased availability of high-quality customer information has
fueled interest in personalized pricing strategies. At a high-level, these strategies
combine customer data with machine learning and optimization tools to predict an
individual customer’s willingness to pay and then customize a price for that customer.
This customized price can be delivered as a discount via a mobile application or other
channel.
The appeal of personalized pricing is clear – If a seller could accurately predict
individual customer valuations, then it could (in principle) charge each customer ex-
actly their valuation, increasing profits and market penetration. Given this appeal,
grocery chains [40], department stores [47], airlines [101], and many other indus-
tries [83] have begun experimenting with personalized pricing. Moreover, within the
operations community, there has been a surge in research on how to practically and
effectively implement personalized pricing strategies (e.g., Aydin and Ziya [7], Phillips
[87], Bernstein et al. [18], Chen et al. [36], Ban and Keskin [13]).
Unfortunately, implementing any form of price discrimination, including person-
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alized pricing, may be costly and/or difficult. A firm would need to engage in price
experimentation and market research, invest in information systems to store cus-
tomer data, and build analytics expertise to transform these data into a personalized
pricing strategy (see Arora et al. [6] for an extensive discussion). Moreover, price
discrimination tactics involve serious branding risks and potential customer ill-will,
and, in some markets, may be of questionable legality. Finally, personalized pricing
may impact competitors’ [108] and manufacturers’ [78] behavior.
In light of these tradeoffs, in this work we complement the existing operations
literature on how to implement personalized pricing by quantifying when personal-
ized pricing offers significant value. Specifically, for a single-product monopolist, we
bound the profit ratio between idealized personalized pricing (PP), i.e., charging each
customer exactly their willingness to pay, and a spectrum of various simpler pricing
strategies. The spectrum of strategies vary on the degree of pricing flexibility as well
as prediction model accuracy. Thus, these bounds can guide managers in assessing
the potential upside of the above tradeoffs, and provide a fundamental understanding
of the value of offering more prices and of the value of reducing prediction error.
With full-information about the customer valuation distribution, computing the
exact ratio between idealized personalized pricing over simpler pricing strategies is
straightforward; there is no need for bounding. However, in our opinion, a firm
not currently engaging in personalized pricing is unlikely to know the full valuation
distribution. Indeed, it is not necessary to learn this distribution to price effectively
[21, 20] and learning it may be difficult since real-world distributions are typically
complex and irregular (see, e.g., Celis et al. [28] for a discussion in an auction setting).
Consequently, we focus instead on parametric bounds that depend on a few statis-
tics of the valuation distribution. On the one hand, we believe these statistics are
more easily estimated by a seller not currently engaging in personalized pricing than
the full valuation distribution. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly,
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parametric bounds based on these statistics provide structural insights into the types
of markets where the value of personalized pricing is potentially large. In particular,
we leverage these structural insights to disentangle the contributions from increased
operational flexibility (offering many distinct prices) and improved prediction accu-
racy (gathering additional data) in personalized pricing strategies.
More specifically, in the first part of the paper, we bound the profit ratio between
idealized personalized pricing and posting a single price (SP) for all customers. We
call this ratio the value of personalized pricing over single-pricing. Notice that ide-
alized personalized pricing as we define it is often called first-degree price discrim-
ination in the economics literature, and observe that it upper bounds the profit of
any other price discrimination strategy. Thus, the value of personalized pricing over
single-pricing also upper bounds the potential gains of any other price discrimination
strategy over single pricing.
We prove bounds that are tight, closed-form and depend on three unitless statis-
tics of the valuation distribution: (i) the scale, which is the ratio of the upper bound of
the support to the mean, (ii) the margin, which we define as the margin of a unit sold
at a price equal to the mean valuation, and (iii) the coefficient of deviation, which
is the mean absolute deviation over twice the mean. Knowing these three quanti-
ties is equivalent to knowing the mean, support, and mean absolute deviation of the
distribution. Our bounds are tight in the sense that we give an explicit valuation
distribution for which the value of personalized pricing over single-pricing matches
the bound. The precise form of the tight distribution depends on the relevant param-
eters, but consists of a mixture of Pareto and two-point distributions. These results
generalize folklore results that the Pareto distribution (a.k.a. “equal-revenue” distri-
bution) represents the worst-case for single-pricing. Perhaps surprisingly, we also find
that our bound is maximal for intermediate values of the coefficient of deviation and
approaches one as the coefficient deviation increases with all other parameters fixed.
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We complement our upper bounds with novel lower bounds depending on the coef-
ficient of deviation and a mild shape assumption, together our bounds yield strong
conditions when personalized pricing is necessary or superfluous.
Of course, idealized personalized pricing is not achievable in practice. It hinges
on two assumptions: First, the monopolist has the ability to charge a potentially
distinct price to each customer. Second, the monopolist is omniscient and can per-
fectly predict each customer’s valuation. In the second part of this paper, we study
price discrimination strategies that relax these two assumptions and more closely
model personalized pricing strategies used in practice. To this end, we first compute
the value of personalized pricing over two stylized price-discrimination strategies:
k-market segmentation and feature-based pricing.
In the k-market segmentation (kP) strategy, we assume the monopolist is still
omniscient, but can charge at most k distinct prices, relaxing the assumption of a
continuum of prices. Thus, the value of personalized pricing over k-market segmen-
tation quantifies the value of the operational capability of charging a continuum of
prices, which is equivalent to the case where k → ∞. Under a mild assumption, we
show that this value is at most 1 + C 1
k
, where C is an explicit constant depending
on distributional parameters. We prove theoretically that this worst-case dependence
on k is tight and provide numerical evidence that it is in fact typical of many dis-
tributions. This analysis yields a natural rule of thumb; to half the gap to the ideal
personalized pricing profits, one needs to double the number of prices offered.
By contrast, in the feature-based pricing (XP) strategy, we assume the monopolist
can in principle offer a continuum of prices, but is no longer omniscient. Rather, she
observes a feature vector (sometimes called a context) for each customer which she can
use to (imperfectly) predict the customer’s valuation. Thus, the value of personalized
pricing over feature-based pricing quantifies the value of additional information, i.e.,
a richer set of features that would enable perfect prediction. Leveraging our earlier
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results, we prove that this value is bounded by an explicit factor that depends on
the coefficient of deviation of the error in the valuation prediction model. Thus, our
bound quantifies the degree of prediction accuracy necessary to guarantee a certain
percentage of profits. Again, we provide numerical evidence suggesting our worst-
case analysis is qualitatively typical of many valuation distributions. Our result
yields another natural rule of thumb; to half the gap to the ideal personalized pricing
profits, one needs to quadruple the the prediction accuracy.
We use the above results on these stylized pricing strategies as building blocks
to study a more realistic feature-based market segmentation (kXP) strategy . In this
strategy, we assume the monopolist is neither omniscient nor operationally able to
offer a continuum of prices. Rather, as in the feature-based pricing strategy, she
observes a feature for each customer. Based on this feature, she then offers the cus-
tomer one of k prices. Bounding the relative difference between idealized personalized
pricing and feature-based market segmentation quantifies the impact of both limited
price flexibility and prediction error on the profit of personalized pricing strategies.
We believe that feature-based market segmentation also closely resembles data-driven
price discrimination strategies commonly used in practice. Under mild assumptions,
we show that one can decompose the value of personalized pricing over feature-based
market segmentation by separately considering the profit loss from prediction inaccu-
racy and the profit loss from limited price flexibility on a related, “de-noised” market.
These two losses can be analyzed directly using the previously discussed bounds. Im-
portantly, our decomposition is constructive and yields an algorithm for generating a
feature-based market segmentation strategy with a provable performance guarantee.
In Fig. 2.1 we visualize the relations between all of our various pricing strategies.
Finally, we show how to generalize our work beyond idealized personalized pricing
and beyond the coefficient of deviation. Specifically, we prove a novel extension theo-
rem that generalized bounds on the ratio between idealized personalized pricing and a
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Figure 2.1: We represent our pricing models in terms of their price flexibility (y-axis)
and prediction accuracy (x-axis).
single price strategy to bounds on the ratio between feature-based pricing and a single
price strategy. Further, all of our bounds depends on the margin, scale and coefficient
of deviation of the valuation distribution. It is possible to generate similar bounds
for other statistics. In this vein, we provide an algorithmic procedure to compute an
essentially tight bound on the value of personalized pricing over single-pricing given
any generalized moment of the valuation distribution, e.g., its variance or geometric
mean. The key ideas leverage continuous linear optimization duality and a careful
discretization to construct a near-optimal dual feasible solution. The algorithm is
provably computationally tractable under mild assumptions on the function defin-
ing the generalized moment. These assumptions are satisfied by the usual typical
moments encountered in practice. We show our procedure significantly outperforms
the best-known bound for the geometric mean, and has a similar behavior as our
closed-form bound when using coefficient of variation.
To summarize our contributions:
1. We prove closed-form, tight upper and lower bounds for the value of personalized
pricing over single-pricing when the scale, margin, and coefficient of deviation
of the valuation distribution are known (cf. Theorem 2.3.1) or when the dis-
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tribution is unimodal and left-skew (cf. Theorem 2.3.2). These bounds yield a
sharp characterization when personalized pricing is necessary or superfluous.
2. We prove closed-form bounds on the value of personalized pricing over k-
market segmentation which are tight in their dependence on k, and describe
a distribution-agnostic segmentation procedure that achieves this bound (cf.
Theorem 2.4.2). We provide numerical evidence that this worst-case depen-
dence is in fact typical. Thus, the bound quantifies the operational value of
being able to charge infinitely many prices over k prices.
3. We further prove closed-form bounds on the value of personalized pricing over
feature-based pricing (cf. Theorem 2.4.1). The bound gives an explicit relation-
ship between the accuracy in predicting valuations and value of personalized
pricing. Thus, these bound help quantify the value of additional consumer data.
4. We analyze the value of personalized pricing over feature-based market segmen-
tation by synthesizing our results on k-market segmentation and feature-based
pricing. We show that the feature-based market segmentation strategy’s profit
loss can be bounded by the sum of the profit loss from feature-based pricing and
the profit loss of k-market segmentation on a related, “noiseless” market (cf.
Theorem 2.4.3). Thus, the decomposition yields a useful, rigorous paradigm for
tuning personalized pricing strategies by explicitly identifying the impact on
revenue due to limited price flexibility and prediction error.
5. We generalize our above bounds in two ways (i) we provide a novel extension
theorem transforms bounds on the ratio between idealized personalized pricing
and single price strategies to stronger bounds on the ratio between feature-based
pricing and a single price strategy (cf. Theorem 2.5.1) and (ii) we provide
a general methodology for computing essentially tight upper bounds on the
value of personalized pricing over single-pricing when the scale, margin, and a
generalized moment of the valuation distribution other than the coefficient of
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deviation are known (cf. Theorem 2.5.2).
Connections to Existing Literature
The study of price discrimination tactics has a long history in economics dating
back at least to Robinson [92]. Historically, the economics literature has focused on
how various forms of price discrimination affect social welfare (see, e.g., Narasimhan
[82], Schmalensee [94], Varian [102], Shih et al. [97] or Bergemann et al. [17], Cowan
[45], Xu and Dukes [106] for more recent results). In contrast to these works, we take
an operational perspective, focusing on the individual firms relative profits under
first-degree price discrimination and other forms of pricing.
That said, we are not the first to study the value of personalized pricing over
single pricing. Previous authors have also studied the value of personalized pricing
over single pricing under different distributional assumptions. Barlow et al. [14] prove
that if the valuation distribution has monotone hazard rates, the value of personalized
pricing is at most Euler’s constant e ≈ 2.718. Similarly, Tamuz [99] prove that if
the ratio of the geometric mean over the mean is at least 1 − δ, then the value of
personalized pricing is at most (1 − 2 43 δ 13 )−1. Our single-pricing results differ from
these existing results in two critical ways. First, our bounds are tight in the input
parameters. Indeed, we show numerically they can be significantly stronger than these
existing bounds. Second, since our bounds explicitly depend on simple statistics of
the valuation distribution such as the scale and coefficient of deviation, we argue
that is easier to use them to assess the effects of various operational decisions. In
particular, the parametric dependence on the support and mean absolute deviation of
the distribution directly enables us to study personalization strategies which segment
markets and leverage features to reduce valuation uncertainty, respectively. It is less
clear how to use existing techniques to develop similar results for such strategies.
In Muoz Medina and Vassilvitskii [81] they develop upper bounds that are equiva-
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lent to bounds on the value of personalized pricing over single pricing given knowledge
of the standard deviation of the valuation distribution. However, the bounds they
derive are not tight in contrast to our bounds which are tight for all input parameters
we consider. Moreover, Muoz Medina and Vassilvitskii [81] does not consider the
roles of price flexibility and prediction accuracy which are central to our paper.
As mentioned above, idealized personalized pricing (first-degree price discrimina-
tion) is an idealized strategy. In practice, firms implement some form of third-degree
price discrimination. While approaches differ widely, most implicitly or explicitly
leverage some form of market segmentation – either segment customers directly or
incentivize them to self-segment, and then offer different prices to each segment. In-
deed, the operations literature contains many examples of such strategies including
intertemporal pricing (Su [98], Besbes and Lobel [19]), opaque selling (Jerath et al.
[74], Elmachtoub and Hamilton [51]), rebates/promotions (Chen et al. [38], Cohen
et al. [43]), markdown optimization (Caro and Gallien [27], O¨zer and Zheng [84]),
product differentiation (Moorthy [80], Choudhary et al. [39]), dynamic pricing and
learning (Cohen et al. [42], Qiang and Bayati [91], Javanmard and Nazerzadeh [73]),
and many others.
By contrast, the focus of our work is not on “how to price discriminate” but rather
the value of price discrimination. Nonetheless, our bounds on the value of personal-
ized pricing over feature-based market segmentation do provide insight into the above
strategies. Since the strategy relaxes the two key assumptions of first-degree price
discrimination, our bounds help establish guarantees on the performance of imper-
fect personalized pricing strategies. Perhaps more importantly, by characterizing the
types of valuation distributions for which the value of personalized pricing is high, our
bounds highlight the settings in which it is most important that the above strategies
perform well and inform their analysis.
Finally, we contrast our work to several recent works that study how to set a
53
single-price near-optimally given limited distribution information such as the support
[41], mean and variance [33, 8], or a neighborhood containing the true valuation
distribution [15]. Indeed, these works support our earlier claim that it is not generally
necessary to learn the whole valuation distribution in order to price effectively, but
are very different in perspective from our work.
2.2 Model and Preliminaries
We consider a profit-maximizing monopolist selling a product with per unit cost c. A
random customer’s valuation for the product is denoted by the non-negative random
variable V ∼ F . The mean valuation E[V ] is denoted by µ. Since it is never profitable
to sell to customers with valuations less than c, assume without loss of generality,
that V ≥ c almost surely. We consider a spectrum of five pricing strategies for the
monopolist:
1) Single Pricing (SP): In the single pricing strategy, the monopolist offers the
product to all customers at the same price p. Thus, the probability that a customer
purchases is given by the complementary cumulative distribution function (cCDF)
F (p) := 1 − F (p), and the seller’s corresponding expected profit is (p − c)F (p). Let
RSP (F, c) := maxp{(p − c)F (p)} denote the seller’s maximal expected profit under
single-pricing.
2) Feature-Based Pricing (XP): In the feature-based pricing strategy, the mo-
nopolist observes a feature vector X supported on X for each customer before offering
a price, but does not directly observe her valuation V . Based on X, she offers a cus-
tomized price p(X), and the customer purchases with probability Pr(V ≥ p(X) | x).
Note that unlike k-market segmentation, if X is continuous, the seller can in principle
offer a continuum of prices, one for each possible value of X. Given a joint distri-
bution FXV of (X, V ), let RXP (FXV , c) ≡ maxp(·) E [(p(X)− c)I(V ≥ p(X))] denote
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the optimal profit under feature-based pricing.
3) k-Market Segmentation (kP): In the k-market segmentation strategy,
the monopolist partitions the valuation space into k + 1 disjoint intervals
[s0, s1), [s1, s2), . . . , [sk−1, sk), [sk, sk+1) with s0 = c and assigns distinct prices pi ∈
[si, si+1) to each segment i ≥ 1. When a customer with valuation V ∈ [si, si+1)
arrives, she is offered the product at price pi. Given F and c, let RkP (F, c, s,p) de-
note the profit from this strategy with partition s and prices p, and let RkP (F, c) ≡
maxs,pRkP (F, c, s,p) denote the optimal profit for this strategy.
4) Feature-Based Market Segmentation (kXP): In the feature-based market-
segmentation strategy, the monopolist observes a feature X for each customer, but
again does not directly observe her valuation V . Based on X, she offers one of k prices,
p(X) ∈ {pi}ki=1, and the customer purchases with probability Pr (V ≥ p(X)|X). The
monopolists choice of pricing function naturally induces a partition of the market
into k segments Xi = {x ∈ X |p(x) = pi}, and yields expected profit
∑k
i=1(pi −
c) Pr (V ≥ pi|X ∈ Xi) Pr (X ∈ Xi). Given a joint distribution FXV of (X, V ), let
RkXP (FXV , c) ≡ maxp1,...,pk,X1,...,Xk
∑k
i=1(pi − c) Pr (V ≥ pi|X ∈ Xi) Pr (X ∈ Xi) de-
note the optimal profit for this strategy.
5) Idealized Personalized Pricing (PP): In the idealized personalized pricing
strategy, the monopolist can potentially offer a different price to each customer and
has full knowledge of each customer’s valuation. Since V ≥ c, it is optimal to offer
each customer precisely her valuation. Let RPP (F, c) := µ − c denote the seller’s
maximal expected profit under idealized personalized pricing.
By construction, RSP (F, c) ≤ RkXP (FXV , c) ≤ RkP (F, c) ≤ RPP (F, c) and
RSP (F, c) ≤ RkXP (F, c) ≤ RXP (FXV , c) ≤ RPP (F, c). However, in general the
ordering between RkP (F, c) and RXP (FXV , c) is instance dependent. Given F and
c, we define the value of personalized pricing over single-pricing as RPP (F,c)RSP (F,c) . The
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value of personalized pricing over k-market segmentation, feature-based pricing and
feature-based market segmentation are each defined similarly. When F , FXV , and c
are clear from context, we sometimes omit them and write, e.g., RPPRSP .
The Lambert-W Function
Many of our closed-form bounds involve W−1(·), the negative branch of the Lambert-
W function. Although the Lambert-W function is pervasive in mathematics, it is
less common in the pricing literature. We refer the reader to Corless et al. [44] for a
thorough review of its properties and provide only a brief summary below.
Recall, the general (multi-valued) Lambert-W function W (x), is defined as a
solution to
W (x)eW (x) = x.
When x ∈ [−1/e, 0), this equation has two distinct real solutions. The branch W−1(·)
gives the solution that lies in (−∞,−1]. The other branch W0(·) gives the solution
in [−1,∞), but will not be needed in our work. Both branches are illustrated in the
left panel of Fig. 2.2.
Figure 2.2: The left panel shows the two real branches of the Lambert-W function,
W0(·) (solid black), andW−1(·) (dashed). Our bounds depend upon theW−1(·) branch
(rescaled), as shown in right panel, and which can be upper and lower bounded via
Chatzigeorgiou [29] (dotted).
To build intuition, we encourage the reader to think of W−1(·) as analogous to
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the natural logarithm, log(·) Indeed, like W−1(x), log(x) is defined as a solution to
an equation, namely,
elog(x) = x.
For a handful of values, both W−1(·) and log(·) can be evaluated exactly. For example,
W−1(−1/e) = −1, log(1) = 0, and limx→0W−1(x) = limx→0 log(x) = −∞. For
most values, however, both functions must be evaluated numerically. Fortunately,
evaluating an expression using W−1(·) is numerically no more difficult than evaluating
a similar expression using log(·).
Moreover, the natural logarithm provides simple bounds on W−1(·). Indeed,
Chatzigeorgiou [29] proves that for 0 < x ≤ 1,
− 1−
√











(Recall W−1(·) is defined on [−1/e, 0), so that this inequality spans its domain.) The
right panel in Fig. 2.2 illustrates these bounds and shows they are quite tight.
2.3 The Value of Personalized Pricing over Single
Pricing
In this section, we provide tight upper and lower bounds on the value of personalized
pricing over single pricing using simple statistics and/or shape assumptions on F .
We begin by upper bounding the value of personalized pricing using the scale (S),
and margin (M), defined respectively as:
S :=
inf{k | F (k) = 1}
µ




These two statistics are unit-less and can be thought of as (rescaled) measurements
of the maximal valuation and per unit cost. More specifically, S is the ratio of the
largest valuation in the market to the average valuation. By construction, S ≥ 1, and
measures the maximal dispersion of valuations. By contrast, M = µ−c
µ
∈ [0, 1], and
can be interpreted as the margin of a unit sold at a price equal to the mean valuation.
Before stating our tight bound, we introduce a transformation that reduces the
problem of bounding the value of personalization for a product with c > 0 and µ > 0
to an equivalent problem with c = 0 and µ = 1. This reduction is used repeatedly
throughout the paper.
Lemma 2.3.1 (Reduction to Zero Costs and Unit Mean). Let V ∼ F , and let the
distribution of 1
µ−c(V − c) be denoted by Fc. Then,
RPP (F, c)
RSP (F, c) =
RPP (Fc, 0)
RSP (Fc, 0) .
Moreover, if the scale and margin of F are S and M , respectively, then the mean,
scale, and margin of Fc are µc = 1, Sc =
S+M−1
M
, and Mc = 1, respectively.
The key to the following bound is that RSP (F, 0) directly yields a bound on the
tail behavior of F . Indeed, for any price p > 0, pF (p) ≤ RSP (F, 0) by definition, and
thus F (p) ≤ RSP (F, 0)/p. We use this result repeatedly in what follows, terming it
the pricing inequality :
F (x) ≤ RSP (F, 0)
x
, ∀x > 0. (Pricing Inequality)
This inequality drives the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.2 (Bounding RPPRSP using the Scale and Margin). For any F with scale S
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and margin M , we have
RPP (F, c)
RSP (F, c) ≤ −W−1
( −M
e(S +M − 1)
)
.
Moreover, this bound is tight.
Proof. First, suppose c = 0 and µ = 1. Then, RPP = 1 and M = 1. Since µ = 1,















dx (Pricing Inequality) (2.4)






(since RPP = 1).
Rearranging this inequality yields
RPP





















∈ [−1/e, 0) and the function W−1(·) is non-increasing on this range, applying








which proves the bound when c = 0 and µ = 1, since M = 1.
To prove tightness, it suffices to construct a nonnegative random variable V ∼ F
with µ = 1 and scale S, such that RSP (F, 0) = −1W−1(−1eS ) . For convenience, define
α = −1
W−1(−1eS )


























Next consider a random variable with cCDF
F S(x) =

1 if x ∈ (0, α]
α
x
x ∈ (α, S]
0 otherwise.

















by Eq. (2.8). By inspection, FS has scale S. Finally, for any x ∈ (α, S], xF S(x) = α,
and for any other x, xF S(x) ≤ α. Hence, RSP (F, 0) = α, and, thus, the bound is
tight for FS.
For a general c > 0 and µ 6= 1, use Lemma 2.3.1 to reduce to the case that c = 0,
µc = 1, Mc = 1, and Sc =
S+M−1
M









. Replacing Sc proves the upper bound. Create a
tight distribution by scaling FSc (defined above) by µ− c and shifting by c.
The described tight distribution is a truncated Pareto distribution on [α, S] for
some α ∈ [c, S], which satisfies F S(x) ∝ 1/x on its support (see left panel Fig. 2.3).
In the auction literature, this distribution is sometimes called the “equal-revenue”
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Figure 2.3: The left panel shows the tight distribution of Lemma 2.3.2 when M = 1
and S = 5. The middle panel shows the bound in Lemma 2.3.2 when M = 1 and as
S varies between 1 and 10. The right panel shows the bound in Lemma 2.3.2 when
S = 5 and as M varies between 0.1 and 1.0.
distribution, since all prices in [α, S] yield the same single-pricing profit. Thus, one
optimal pricing strategy for this distribution is to price at p = α and sell to all
customers.
In the middle and right panels of Figure 2.3, we plot the bound of Lemma 2.3.2
versus M and S. Intuitively, as the scale increases, valuations become more dispersed
and personalization offers greater potential value, as seen in the middle panel. On the
other hand, increasing the margin with a fixed mean is equivalent to decreasing the
cost per unit. As discussed above, an optimal single-pricing strategy has the same
market share as idealized personalized pricing under the tight distribution. Thus, in
the right panel, as margin increases, the profits of both idealized personalized pricing
and single pricing increase at the same rate, and their relative ratio decreases. We
stress that this behavior crucially depends on the properties of the tight distribution.
Remark 2.3.1. Many of our subsequent proofs utilize techniques similar to the proof
of Lemma 2.3.2. Consequently, we highlight some of its high-level features before
proceeding. First, the proof is centered around an integral representation of a moment
of V (in this case µ) in terms of the cCDF F (cf. Eq. (2.2)). The key step is to point-
wise upper bound F (x) at each x. For x ≤ RSP , the tightest bound possible is simply
1 (cf. Eq. (2.3)). For x ≥ RSP , we use the Pricing Inequality (cf. Eq. (2.4)). The
tight distribution is constructed by constructing a valid cCDF F that simultaneously
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makes each of these point-wise bounds tight. The remaining steps are simple algebraic
manipulation. Thus, the three key elements are an integral representation in terms
of the cCDF, point-wise bounds on the cCDF, and identifying a single distribution
which simultaneously matches all point-wise bounds. 
Bounds Incorporating the Coefficient of Deviation
A drawback of Lemma 2.3.2 is that the bound becomes vacuous as the scale S →∞.
The issue is that S, alone, cannot distinguish between markets where most customers
have relatively similar valuations (which may be relatively low or high) and markets
where customer valuations vary widely. We next provide more descriptive upper
bounds on the value of personalized pricing by incorporating a measure of the market’s
heterogeneity, i.e., the typical dispersion in valuations. Specifically, we define the





By construction, D ∈ [0, 1] since E[|V − µ|] ≤ E[|V |] + µ = 2µ by the triangle
inequality. Intuitively, D is the (rescaled) mean absolute deviation of V . Mean
absolute deviation (or MAD) is a common measure of a random variable’s dispersion,
similar to standard deviation. Intuitively, when D is small, we expect most valuations
to be close to µ, and, hence, the value of personalization to be small. By contrast,
when D is large, we expect there to be larger dispersion in valuations, and, hence,
the potential value of personalization to be much larger.
This intuition is not entirely correct as we shall see below. In fact, when D is
very large and S is finite, there is a boundary effect; F is approximately a two-
point distribution concentrated near c and µS, and single-pricing strategies are very
effective. A single price can be used to capture the high valuation customers, while
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the low valuation customers are simply ignored since their potential profitability is
near zero. Consequently, for very large D, the value of personalization is, in fact, low.
This qualitative description is formalized in Theorem 2.3.1 which upper bounds
the value of personalization in terms of S, M , and D. The theorem partitions the
space of markets into three distinct regimes depending on the magnitude of D and
provides distinct bounds for each regime. Specifically, we define the three regimes by
(L) Low Heterogeneity: 0 ≤ D ≤ δL
(M) Medium Heterogeneity: δL ≤ D ≤ δM
(H) High Heterogeneity: δM ≤ D ≤ δH ,

















) , δH := M(S − 1)
S +M − 1 .
The following lemma proves these regimes form a true partition:
Lemma 2.3.3 (Partitioning the Range of D). Given F with scale S and margin M ,
the coefficient of deviation of F satisfies 0 ≤ D ≤ δH . Moreover, 0 ≤ δL ≤ δM ≤ δH .
Equipped with Lemma 2.3.3, we can state Theorem 2.3.1, the main upper bound of
this section.
Theorem 2.3.1 (Bounding RPPRSP using D). For any F with scale S, margin M , and
coefficient of deviation D, we have the following:
a) If 0 ≤ D ≤ δL, then
RPP (F, c)












b) If δL ≤ D ≤ δM , then
RPP (F, c)








c) If δM ≤ D ≤ δH , then
RPP (F, c)










Moreover, for any S,M,D there exists a valuation distribution F with scale S, margin
M and coefficient of deviation D such that the corresponding bound is tight.
Theorem 2.3.1 gives a complete, closed-form upper bound on the value of per-
sonalized pricing for any distribution in terms of its scale, margin, and coefficient of
deviation. The bound is defined piecewise, but is continuous (cf. Fig. 2.4). Note
that the bound captures the intuition that the value of personalization increases as
D increases for small to moderate D, but also captures the boundary behavior as D
becomes very large. The maximal point in Fig. 2.4, at the transition between the low
and medium regimes, corresponds exactly to the bound in Theorem 2.3.2. When S is
infinite, δL = 1 and Theorem 2.3.1 reduces to simply Theorem 2.3.1(a). The bound
is neither convex nor concave as a function of D.
We also observe that our bound in Figure 2.4 can be significantly above or be-
low e, the uniform bound proven for monotone hazard rate (MHR) distributions in
Barlow et al. [14] and Hartline et al. [69]. Further, although the value of personal-
ized pricing can be infinite, our refined analysis characterizes precisely when classes
of distributions lead to a low values of personalized pricing. Finally, the bound can
easily be further upper-bounded using the approximations in Eq. (2.1) to avoid the
Lambert-W function, but at the cost of tightness. The approximate bound is:
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Figure 2.4: The left panel plots the bound from Theorem 2.3.1 as a function of D
with S = 4 and M = .9. The right panel plots the inverse of this bound, which we
note is convex.
a) If 0 ≤ D ≤ δL, then
RPP (F, c)


















b) If δL ≤ D ≤ δM , then
RPP (F, c)








c) If δM ≤ D ≤ δH , then
RPP (F, c)



















Single-Pricing Guarantee: An alternative interpretation of Theorem 2.3.1 is that
the reciprocal of the bound is a tight guarantee on the performance of single-pricing
relative to idealized personalized-pricing. In other words, the single-pricing strategy is
guaranteed to earn at least the given percentage of the idealized personalized pricing
profits. This perspective, i.e., interpreting single-pricing as an approximation to
idealized personalized pricing, is common in the approximation algorithm literature.
We plot this guarantee, i.e., the reciprocal of the bound in Theorem 2.3.1, in
the right panel of Fig. 2.4. Perhaps surprisingly, the reciprocal appears convex as a
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function of D. We prove this formally in Lemma 2.3.4 and leverage this observation
later in Section 2.4.
Lemma 2.3.4 (Convexity of the Single-Pricing Guarantee). For any S, M ,and D,
let α(S,M,D) denote the reciprocal of the bound on the value of personalized pricing
in Theorem 2.3.1. Then α(S,M,D) is a convex function in D.
Tight Distributions: Like Lemma 2.3.2, Theorem 2.3.1 is a tight bound. The
distribution which achieves the bound depends on the regime but is not unique. See
Fig. 2.5 for typical examples and Lemma B.2.4 in the appendix for explicit formulas.
In all three regimes, a worst-case distribution can be constructed from a mixture of a
two-point distribution and truncated Pareto distributions; what differs between the
regimes is the placement and sizes of these components. We show in the course of
proving Theorem 2.3.1 that any price along the truncated Pareto section is an optimal
price for the single-pricing strategy. These results generalize a folklore result from
the auction literature that the Pareto distribution represents the worst-case valuation
distribution (where S and D are unrestricted).
Although the forms of the tight distributions differ by regime and are not unique,
it is instructive to consider a class of them as a function of D and, in particular,
study how they evolve as D increases with all other parameters are fixed. We focus
on c = 0 and µ = 1 as in Fig. 2.5.
• When D = 0, the bound of Theorem 2.3.1 is 1 and the unique tight distribution
is a point-mass on µ. For D > 0 but small, this point mass stretches into two
Pareto curves above and below the mean. Every point along the Pareto curve
below the mean is an optimal point at which to price, whereas no point along
the Pareto curve above the mean is optimal (cf. Fig. 2.5a).
• As D grows towards δL, the Pareto curve above the mean rises to meet the
curve below the mean. They join when D = δL as illustrated in Fig. 2.5b.
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Figure 2.5: Tight distributions for Theorem 2.3.1 in each regime when S = 4, µ = 1
and M = 1.
(a) D = δL2 (b) D = δL (c) D =
δL+δM
2
(d) D = δM (e) D = δM+δH2
(f) D = δH
Every point along the resulting single curve is an optimal price, and we recover
the tight distribution of Lemma 2.3.2. This point is the transition between the
low and medium regimes, and yields the greatest value of personalized pricing.
• As D grows past δL, boundary effects force mass to begin to pool at zero, and
the single Pareto curve begins to shrink with the left most end point tending
away from 0 and back towards µ. Again, every point along the Pareto curve is
an optimal point at which to price (cf. Fig. 2.5c).
• When D = δM , all mass below µ is contained in a point mass on 0. The Pareto
curve extends from µ to µS, and pricing at any point along it is optimal (cf.
Fig. 2.5d).
• As D grows past δM , boundary effects intensify and force mass to pool on both
zero and µS. Past µ is an increasingly short, flat Pareto curve, along which
every point is optimal (cf. Fig. 2.5e).
• Finally, the distribution converges to a two-point distribution on 0 and µvmax
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as illustrated in Fig. 2.5f.
Asymptotics Finally, from a theoretical point of view, one might seek to charac-
terize the value of personalized pricing as D approaches its extreme values D → 0 or
D → δH . In particular, we will see in Section 2.4 that the first limit also provides in-
sight into the performance of certain third-degree price discrimination tactics. These
limits are below:
Corollary 2.3.1 (Asymptotic Behavior). For any S, M , D, let 1/α(D,M, S) denote
the bound from Theorem 2.3.1. Then,
































In both cases, 1
α(S,M,D)
approaches its limit like the square root of the difference
from the boundary.
Lower Bounds on the Value of Personalized Pricing
In this subsection, we complement our upper bounds on the value of personalized
pricing with closed form lower bounds. Such lower bounds are helpful in identifying
when personalized pricing techniques are necessary to achieve strong revenue guar-
antees. Unfortunately when only S, M , and D are given, no non-trivial lower bound
can be derived on the value of personalized pricing over single pricing. It can easily
be seen that there exists a two point distribution with one point on zero that obtains
any arbitrary, fixed S, M , and D, but for which the value of personalized pricing
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over single pricing is 1. To avoid these pathological two point distributions, we will
require two impose two additional assumptions about the distributions shape, namely
that the distribution is unimodal and left-skew.
Definition 2.3.1. A distribution F is unimodal if there exists some α such that F
is a convex function on (−∞, α] and concave function on (α,∞).
Definition 2.3.2. A unimodal distribution is left-skew if it’s mode α precedes it’s
mean µ i.e. if α ≤ µ.
We note that the class of left-skew distributions subsumes the more commonly
studied class of symmetric distributions. Further, many natural distributions includ-
ing uniform, normal, exponential and others are unimodal and left-skew. We will lean
on these two shape assumptions to give lower bounds on the value of personalized
pricing over single pricing. To the best of our knowledge, this bound is the first of its
kind, yielding generic separation between the revenue of a single price strategy over
a general class of distributions.
Theorem 2.3.2 (Lower Bounding RPPRSP ). For any unimodal, left-skew distribution F
with margin M, and coefficient of deviation D,
RPP (F, c)
















Remark 2.3.2. Theorem 2.3.2 follows by leveraging the tail convexity of the cCDF
of unimodal distributions via the following geometric fact: the area of any rectangle
inscribed in a right triangle is no more than half the total area of the triangle. For
example, consider Fig. 2.6(a) which gives a visual representation of RSP (area of
shaded rectangle) in relation to RPP (total area under the curve). By unimodality,
the cCDF is convex on [α,∞). If (SP) uses a price p∗ which is greater than the mode
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Figure 2.6: The left panel shows the revenue of a single price strategy (dark colored
square) in relation to the supporting lower bound (light colored trapezoid) for a
unimodal cCDF. The right panel plots the guarantee of Theorem 2.3.2 (green) against
the upper bound of Theorem 2.3.1 (red).
α, the revenue a single price strategy earns from customers with valuations higher
than α is exactly the area of the center rectangle in Fig. 2.6(a), which is inscribed in
the right triangle made by the supporting line of the convex curve of F , and our simple
geometric fact applies. Finally, the additional assumption of left-skewness enforces
that a non-trivial amount of the mass exists above the the mode where separation
between RSP (area of the rectangle) and RSP (area under the curve) applies.
We note that Theorem 2.3.2 is tight as function of a technical parameter, λ :=∫ α
0 F (x)dx
µ
, and tightness is achieved by an appropriately shifted uniform distribution.
This tightness in the parameter lambda translates to tightness in the input parameter
D when the valuations are symmetric via an application Lemma B.2.1. Further,
Theorem 2.3.2 exhibits the correct dependencies as D → 0, where the bound tends
to 1 as expected. When D → 1, the bound tends to 2 which is best possible for the
class of symmetric distributions and corresponds to the case when the cCDF is fully
convex. For comparison, in Fig. 2.6(b) we plot the lower bound in Theorem 2.3.2
against the upper bound Theorem 2.3.1(a) when D ∈ [0, .5].
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2.4 From Third-Degree to First-Degree Price
Discrimination
As mentioned in the introduction, idealized personalized pricing is a strategy that
hinges on two assumptions: 1) the firm can charge potentially distinct prices to every
customer and 2) the firm is omniscient. In this section, we analyze how each of
these assumptions contributes to the value of personalized pricing. In particular, we
compute the value of personalized pricing over k-market segmentation and feature-
based pricing. We then use both of these results to bound the value of personalized
pricing over feature-based market segmentation. Our bounds yield insight into how
these strategies “converge” to idealized personalized pricing as k →∞ or predictive
accuracy increases. Said another way, they quantify both the value of the operational
capability to charge a continuum of prices and the value of additional predictive
accuracy.
Feature-Based Pricing
In this section, we study the value of personalized pricing over feature-based pricing.
From a practical point of view, feature-based pricing approximates a host of third-
degree price discrimination strategies in common use. For example, student discounts
are a form of feature-based pricing where X is a binary indicating that the customer is
a student. More generally, in online retailing settings, sellers often have access to rich
contextual information for each customer from her cookies, such as demographics,
browsing history, etc., that can be used to personalize the offered price via a custom
coupon.
Clearly, if one can perfectly predict V from X, feature-based pricing is equivalent
to idealized personalized pricing. Typically, however, X is not rich enough to predict
V perfectly, entailing some loss in profits. Thus, from a theoretical point of view,
71
RPP
RXP quantifies the benefits of additional information, i.e., the benefit of observing
a richer set of features that enable perfect prediction. We will be most interested
in the rate at which RPPRXP → 1 as the information in X increases. Loosely speaking,
this rate describes the predictive accuracy needed from a model to guarantee a given
percentage of idealized personalized pricing profits.
Formally, we assume that the seller has trained a prediction model using historical
data such that for any realization of X, the seller knows the conditional distribution
V | X ∼ FV |X. Let µ(X) ≡ E[V | X], and define the residual  of the model by
V = µ(X) + . Note, by construction, E[ | X] = 0 almost surely.
As an example, suppose the valuations follow the well-known logit model, i.e., a
customer’s valuation is a linear combination of that customer’s features, the offered
price and an idiosyncratic error with a logistic distribution. For this model, the
conditional distribution is known precisely, and
P(V − c ≥ p | X) = 1
1 + e−(β0p+β>X)
.
Our assumption is that the seller has learned the coefficients β0,β.
A first, perhaps obvious, observation is that given X, it is not optimal to price at
E[V
∣∣X]. To the contrary, one should price at the optimal price for the conditional
distribution FV |X. This essentially proves Lemma 2.4.1.
Lemma 2.4.1 (Relating Feature-Based Pricing and Single-Pricing). For any joint
distribution FXV , we have RXP (FXV , c) = E[RSP (FV |X, c)].
In Theorem 2.4.1, we use this observation in conjunction with our previous bounds
onRSP to bound the value of idealized personalized pricing over feature-based pricing
under mild assumptions on the form of the valuation distribution.
Theorem 2.4.1 (Idealized Personalized Pricing vs. Feature-Based Pricing). Suppose
that V = E[V | X] +  where the residual  satisfies E [|| | X] = E [||]. Suppose
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further that there exists δ with 0 < δ < 1 such that µ(X) ≥ c
1−δ almost surely. Then,
RPP (F, c)











Interestingly, when the coefficient of deviation of V is in the ‘low heterogeneity’
regime, the bound in Theorem 2.4.1 has same form as the one in Theorem 2.3.1,
except that the MAD of V is replaced by the MAD of the residual noise. (The scale
does not appear in either bound.) This implies that the value of additional feature
information in this regime can be directly measured by how much the residual MAD
is reduced.
We consider the assumption in Theorem 2.4.1 that E [|| | X] = E [||] to be quite
mild. This assumption underlies many predictive models used in practice, including
the logit model described above. Indeed, for the logit model,  is a (centered) logistic
random variable, independent of X, so the above assumption holds directly. Similar
remarks hold for other regression-based models with independent errors.
Similarly, we also consider assumption that µ(X) ≥ c
1−δ almost surely to be
mild. It holds, e.g, whenever F (c + δ(µ − c)) = 1, i.e., the effective support of V
is well-separated from c. We stress that when D is in the low-heterogeneity regime,
α(S,M,D) does not depend on S. Thus, even if δ is very small (causing S to be very
large), the above bound is unaffected.
Intuitively, one can think of  as the residual in the non-parametric regression
V = µ(X) + . If X is very informative for V , we expect , and hence, E[||]
2µ
to be
small. As we acquire more features, E [||]→ 0 and valuations can be predicted more
accurately from these features. Simultaneously, the value of personalized pricing over
feature-based pricing tends to 1. In sum, Theorem 2.4.1 provides a simple formula
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for benchmarking the quality of a predictive model for pricing and understanding the
benefit of additional features.
We next provide numerical experiments to demonstrate that the bound in The-
orem 2.4.1 is reasonably accurate in terms of magnitude and shape, as a function
of the coefficient of deviation of the residual . Specifically, we generate valuations
according the model
V = 10 +
10∑
i=1
Xi +  (2.10)
where each Xi ∼ N(0, 1), and  is either a (centered) Logistic, Gumbel, or (shifted)
Exponential distribution with standard deviation of 1 and mean zero.
In our experiment, we suppose the seller only knows the first k features, and thus
µ(X1, . . . , Xk) = 10 +
∑k
i=1Xi. The corresponding error term, k, has distribution
of Xk+1 + . . .+X10 + . In Fig. 2.7, we plot the actual value of personalized pricing
as a function of the number of features available to the seller and the bound from
Theorem 2.4.1. Observe the bound is quite illustrative in both magnitude and shape.
Figure 2.7: Illustrates the decreasing benefit of idealized personalized pricing over
feature-based pricing as the number of incorporated model features increases. The
numbers above the curve denote the scaled MAD of the unexplained noise, E[||]
2µ
, for
every other k. We plot Logistic (left), Gumbel (middle), and Exponential (right)
noise, respectively.
Finally, Theorem 2.4.1 can be used prescriptively to determine the accuracy of a
predictive model needed to guarantee a given percentage of idealized personalized-
pricing profits. In particular, if a monopolist seeks (1 − β)-fraction of the idealized
personalized pricing profits, it suffices to construct a predictive model with enough
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features so that α(S¯,M, E[||]
2µ






2). Although this analysis is based on an upper-bound,
Fig. 2.7 suggests the general dependence on E [||] is correct, i.e., to halve the gap
(between RPP and RXP ), one needs 4 times the predictive accuracy for small β.
Market Segmentation
In the section, we study the value of personalized pricing over k-market segmenta-
tion. From a practical point of view, k-market segmentation approximates settings in
which the monopolist’s ability to predict customer valuations is good, but her ability
to charge different prices to different customers is limited. For instance, the monop-
olist may be constrained to only offer 10%, 20%, or 30%-off coupons (rather than a
continuum of prices), but can identify the valuation of a customer accurately enough
to place them in one of these buckets.
From a theoretical point of view, RPPRkP quantifies the benefit of an operational
capabililty – the ability to offer a continuum of prices rather than a finite set. Intu-
itively, RPPRkP → 1 as k → ∞. We will be most interested in the rate at which this
convergence occurs. Intuitively, this rate characterizes how many segments one must
use to guarantee a given percentage of idealized personalized pricing profits.
We first establish a simple lemma on the structure of the optimal segmentation.
Lemma 2.4.2 (Structure of Optimal Segmentation). There exists an optimal segmen-
tation s0, . . . , sk+1 and pricing p1, . . . , pk for RkP such that si = pi for i = 1, . . . , k.
Proof. If si < pi, then increasing si to pi does not affect revenue in segment [si, si+1)
and can only increase revenue in segment [si−1, si).
Using this simple observation, we can explicitly compute the value of personalized
pricing over k-market segmentation for uniform random variables.
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Lemma 2.4.3 (k-Market Segmentation and Uniform Valuations). Let V ∼ F be a










which matches the uniform case (up to logarithmic factors). The second
part shows that with a mild assumption on F , i.e., its support is well-separated from
c, we can additionally drop these logarithmic factors. Thus, in light of Lemma 2.4.3
the worst-case rate of convergence of Theorem 2.4.2 is essentially tight.
Theorem 2.4.2 (Idealized Personalized Pricing vs. k-Market Segmentation). For
any valuation distribution F with scale S and margin M , and for any k ∈ N,
a) If F has coefficient of deviation D, then
RPP (F, c)

















b) If there is some δ > 0 such that F (c+ δ (µ− c)) = 1, then
RPP (F, c)








The proof of Theorem 2.4.2 constructs a (suboptimal) segmentation strategy by
geometrically partitioning the valuation space. In each segment, we then leverage our
previous bounds on the value of personalized pricing over single-pricing to bound the
profit.





appears typical for many distributions.
In Figure 2.8, we plot the exact ratio RPPRkP − 1 for three different distributions, as
well as our bound from Theorem 2.4.2 with c = 0 and δ = 1
µ
. Specifically, the
first panel considers shifted Beta distributions, i.e., V ∼ Beta(α, 3) + 1 for α =
0.1, 1.325, 2.55, 3.775, 5.0. The second panel considers truncated exponential distri-
butions, i.e., V ∼ max(min(Exp(α), 2), 1) for α = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0. Finally, the third
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(a) Beta (b) Truncated Exponential (c) Truncated Normal
Figure 2.8: Illustrates the decreasing benefit of idealized personalized pricing over
optimally segmenting into k groups for particular distributions (dotted lines), and
our distribution-agnostic bound (solid line). Note the log-scales.
panel considers truncated normal distributions, i.e., V ∼ max(min(Norm(1, α), 2), 1),
for α = 1, 2, 3, 4. Note the log-scales.
In each case, the dependence on k appears similar, and matches the dependence
in Theorem 2.4.2. Intuitively, this behavior can be explained in the following way. As
we segment into smaller pieces, any distribution with a continuous density appears
locally uniform on each segment. Example 2.4.3 establishes that the convergence rate
for a uniform matches Theorem 2.4.2 up to constant factors, suggesting that, at least
for large k, the rate should also be approximately tight for many distributions.
Further, Theorem 2.4.2 can be used prescriptively to determine the number of
segments necessary to guarantee a specific percentage of idealized personalized pricing
profits. Namely, a monopolist seeking to guarantee 1 − β-fraction of the idealized
personalized pricing profits needs to use k ≥ (1/β − 1) log(S
δ
) = O(1/β) by part (b)
of Theorem 2.4.2. While this upper bound does not provide a tight analysis, Fig. 2.8
suggests the dependence on k is approximately tight for small β, i.e, to halve the
relative gap to idealized personalized pricing, one needs twice as many segments.
Finally, we note that when F is given and discretely supported on N points, the
optimal k-market segmentation strategy can be efficiently computed via a simple
dynamic programming algorithm. We defer the details to Appendix B.3 and shall
return to this observation in Section 2.4.
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Feature-Based Market Segmentation
In this section, we study the value of personalized pricing over feature-based market
segmentation. Feature-based market segmentation closely resembles real-world data-
driven personalization strategies where sellers are both constrained by the number
of the prices they can offer, and must predict customer valuations from data. In
this way, feature-based market segmentation synthesizes the two previous models of
personalized pricing discussed in this section. Formally, feature-based market seg-
mentation is equivalent to feature-based pricing with the restriction that the seller
can offer only k distinct prices. As in the previous section, we assume the seller has
learned the conditional distribution FV |X from data, and we let µ(X) = E[V | X]
and define the residual  by V = µ(X) + .
We bound the value of personalized pricing over feature-based market segmen-
tation by separately considering the loss from limited price flexibility and the loss
from the prediction error in the valuation model. We measure loss as the difference
in profit between a personalized pricing strategy ((kP), (XP), or (kXP)) and ideal-
ized personalized pricing. The following theorem states that one can bound the loss
of feature-based market segmentation by the loss of two more powerful strategies:
feature-based pricing, and k-market segmentation on a noiseless market.
Theorem 2.4.3 (Idealized Personalized Pricing vs. Feature-Based Market Segmen-
tation). As above, let V = µ(X) + , and suppose X and  are independent. Then
RPP (F, c)−RkXP (FXV , c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss of kXP
≤ RPP (F, c)−RkP (Fµ(X), c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss of kP on noiseless market
+ RPP (F, c)−RXP (FXV , c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss of XP
.
If RkP (Fµ(X)) +RXP (FXV , c) > RPP (F, c), this implies
RPP (F, c)
RkXP (FXV , c) ≤
RPP (F, c)
RkP (Fµ(X), c) +RXP (FXV , c)−RPP (F, c)
.
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Unlike Theorem 2.4.1, Theorem 2.4.3 requires that  is independent of X. This
is a stronger assumption, but, as discussed previously, is satisfied by many common
valuation models, such as the logit model.
We emphasize that Theorem 2.4.3 is tight when the firm can offer an infinite
number of prices, or when the prediction error of the valuation model vanishes.
To see this note that for any market F , when a firm has infinite price flexibility
limk→∞RkXP (FXV , c) = RXP (FXV , c) and limk→∞RkP (Fµ(X)) = RPP (Fµ(x), c) =
RPP (F, c). When the firm’s valuation model has perfect prediction accuracy, i.e.
 ∼ 0, RkXP (FXV , c) = RkP (Fµ(X)) and RXP (FXV , c) = RPP (F, c). In general
Theorem 2.4.3 forms a theoretical framework through which a firm can analyze the
performance of personalized pricing strategies. In particular, the bound neatly de-
couples the profit loss from limited price flexibility, through analyzing (kP) strategies
on the noiseless market Fµ(X), and the prediction error through analyzing the (XP)
strategy.
Operationally, a monopolist may use Theorem 2.4.3 to guide the tuning of per-
sonalized pricing strategies. Consider a firm that learns a valuation model µ(·) from
customer data. Suppose µ(X) is supported on n points (one can imagine that µ(·)
is trained on n sampled data points), then the optimal (kP) pricing strategy on the
noiseless market Fµ(X) can be computed in time O(kn
2) by dynamic programming,
using the algorithm in Appendix B.3. Thus RkP (Fµ(X)) can be computed exactly by
a firm after training the model. Since valuations are not observable, the distribution
of  is not obtainable. Instead, we can use the basic statistics of  (typically given as
output after training the prediction model) and then boundRXP using Theorem 2.4.1
and Theorem 2.3.1. With an exact computation of RkP (Fµ(X)) and a bound on RXP ,
the firm can apply Theorem 2.4.3 to study the performance of the feature-based mar-
ket segmentation strategy. This allows the seller to reason about where exactly the
inefficiency is arising, and decide whether to increase the number of prices/segments,
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or invest in additional data gathering to reduce the prediction error, or both.
Finally, we note that the proof Theorem 2.4.3 is constructive, and implies a
heuristic for setting feature-based market segmentation strategies: compute the
optimal k-market segmentation {si}k+1i=1 for the noiseless market Fµ(X), use it to
generate the segments Xi, then perform price experimentation to learn the prices
that maximize pi Pr (si +  ≥ pi), and offer that price on each segment. While
both the partition into segments {Xi}ki=1, and the prices offered on each segment
{pi}ki=1 may be sub-optimal, such a strategy is guaranteed to earn more than
RXP (FXV , c) +RkP (Fµ(X), c)−RPP (F, c) by Theorem 2.4.3.
2.5 Extensions
In Section 2.3 we developed upper and lower bounds on the ratio RPP (F,c)RSP (F,c) that de-
pended on the margin, scale, and coefficient of deviation and some shape assumptions.
In this section we extend those bounds in two directions: (i) Idealized personalized
pricing is, as the name suggests, unobtainable. For many practitioners feature-based
pricing strategies is the more relevant model of personalized pricing. In these cases,
deciding whether or not to invest the time and resources necessary to implement so-
phisticated feature-based pricing strategies boils down to understanding the possible
revenue lift over setting a single price i.e., RXP (F,c)RSP (F,c) , not
RPP (F,c)
RSP (F,c) . To address these
concerns we prove a novel extension theorem that transforms bounds on RPP (F,c)RSP (F,c) into
tighter bounds on RXP (F,c)RSP (F,c) . (ii) We provided bounds on the value of personalized
pricing over single-pricing in terms of the valuation distribution’s coefficient of devi-
ation. Although the coefficient of deviation enjoys properties that make it amenable
to closed-form analysis, in principle, any statistic might be used. In the second half
of this section, we show how to compute bounds on the value of personalized pricing
over single-pricing for other natural statistics such as the variance, geometric mean,
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and quantiles via infinite dimensional linear programming duality.
Extending Bounds on RPP (F,c)RSP (F,c) to
RXP (F,c)
RSP (F,c)
In this subsection we turn our attention to the ratio between feature-based pricing
and a single price strategy. Following the notation in Section 2.4, we will show how to
transform the upper and lower bounds from Section 2.3 on the value of personalized
pricing into bounds RXP (F,c)RSP (F,c) . Intuitively, the performance of a feature-based pricing
strategy will depend on how close the trained model µ(X) is to the true conditional
valuations, V |X. When the prediction is relatively noiseless, we expect RXP ≈ RPP
and the bounds in Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 can be applied without modification. On
the other hand, when the model error  is impactful, the relative power of feature-
based pricing compared to single price strategies should be diminished. Theorem 2.5.1
formalizes this intuition under the same mild assumptions discussed in Sections 2.4
and 2.4.
Theorem 2.5.1 (Feature-Based Pricing vs. Single Pricing). Suppose V = µ(X) + ,
µ (X) is supported on [c,∞),  is unimodal, left-skew, supported on [−c,∞) and
E[] = 0. Further suppose µ(X) and  are independent. Let Vµ+ = E[µ(X)] +  and
























equal 1 when Dµ+ = 0, and are less than 1 when Dµ+ > 0. This matches
our intuition, when Dµ+ = 0, RXP (F, c) = RPP (F, c). As the coefficient of deviation
of the error increases, the relative power of feature-based pricing decreases resulting
in tighter upper bounds and weaker lower bounds on the ratio between feature-based
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pricing and a single price strategy. Next, note that Theorem 2.5.1 allows for generic
transformations between bounds on the value of personalized pricing and RXP (F,c)RSP (F,c) ,
any upper or lower bound on RPP (F,c)RSP (F,c) can be plugged into Theorem 2.5.1. In the
next two subsection we show to compute generic bounds on the value of personalized
pricing.
Upper Bounds Based upon General Moments
In Section 2.3 we derived tight, closed form upper bounds on the value of personal-
ized pricing over single-pricing in terms of the valuation distribution’s coefficient of
deviation, in this subsection we will show how to compute bounds for other moments.
Specifically, we seek to upper bound the value of personalization in terms of the scale,
mean, and a specific moment E[f(V )] of F , where f(·) is a known fixed function. For
example, when f(v) = |v−µ|
2µ
, this moment is equal to the coefficient of deviation D of
F . When f(v) = (v−µ)
2
µ2
, this moment equals the squared coefficient of variation of F .
Finally, when f(v) = I(v ≥ pˆ), this moment equals the fraction of the market that
purchases at price pˆ, e.g., an incumbent price, under F . By possibly redefining f , i.e.,
shifting by a constant, we can with out loss of generality assume that E[f(V )] = 0.
The key idea of our approach is to formulate a continuous mathematical opti-
mization program that explicitly computes the value of personalized pricing over
distributions which satisfy the above constraints. To build intuition, we first consider
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dPv = 1, dPv ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ [0, S]∫ S
0






I(v ≥ p)dPv ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ [0, S].
The optimization variables above are Pv, which represents the measure of V , and y, which
represents the single-pricing profit. The first constraint ensures that Pv is a valid probability
measure. The second constraint ensures the mean of the distribution is 1. The third
constraint ensures that E[f(V )] = 0. Finally, the last family of (infinite) constraints ensures
that y is at least the revenue achieved by pricing at p for any p ∈ [0, S]. At optimality, y will
equal the optimal single price revenue by choice of objective, and Pv will be the distribution
with smallest possible single price revenue. Therefore, (2.11) computes a tight upper bound
on the value of personalized pricing.
Unfortunately, with both infinite constraints and infinite variables, problem (2.11) ap-
pears computationally challenging. Theorem 2.5.2 below provides an alternate mathemat-
ical program with a finite number of variables and infinite number of constraints that
provides an upper bound on the value of personalized pricing (and the solution value of
(2.11)). We present the theorem in the case of general c > 0 and µ > 0 for completeness.
Theorem 2.5.2 (General Bound on Value of Personalized Pricing). Let F be any distribu-
tion with scale S, margin M and mean µ that satisfies E[f(v)] = 0 for a fixed, known f(·).











Qj = 1, Qj ≥ 0, j = 0, . . . , N,
θ + λ1v + λ2f(vµM + µ(1−M)) ≤
k−1∑
j=0
pjQj , ∀v ∈ [pk−1, pk), k = 1, . . . , N
θ + λ1






Then, RPPRSP ≤ 1/z∗.
The proof of Theorem 2.5.2 involves three steps: (i) rewriting (2.11) as a minimiza-
tion over z, (ii) applying continuous linear optimization duality, and (iii) discretizing the
resulting dual program. We defer the details to Section B.2.
Unlike our previous bounds, Eq. (2.12) depends on the mean µ. For moment functions
f(·) that are scaled relative to µ, however, this dependence often disappears. For example,
in the case of coefficient of deviation where f(V ) = |V−µ|2µ − D, f(vµM + µ(1 −M)) =
|M(v−1)|
2 −D which does not depend on µ.
The tractability of Eq. (2.12) depends crucially on the function f(·). We argue that
despite the infinite number of constraints, this problem can be solved efficiently, both the-
oretically and practically, as long as one can efficiently identify an optimizer of
max
v∈[pk−1,pk]
λ1v + λ2f(vµM + µ(1−M)) (2.13)
for every k and every λ1, λ2. Indeed, if one can identify such an optimizer, it is possible to
separate over these constraints efficiently.
Namely, given a candidate solution (θ, λ1, λ2), solve Eq. (2.13) for each k and let v
∗
k





kµM + µ(1−M)) ≤
k−1∑
j=0
pjQj , k = 1, . . . , N. (2.14)
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If all these constraints are satisfied, (θ, λ1, λ2) is feasible for the original set of infinite
constraints. Otherwise, if the kth constraint is violated, it defines a separating hyperplane
that separates (θ, λ1, λ2) from the feasible region.
Using standard machinery, the above separation routine can be used in conjunction with
the ellipsoid method to prove polynomial time tractability of Eq. (2.12) whenever finding
an optimizer to Eq. (2.13) is polynomial time. Alternatively, this separation routine also
yields a constraint generation procedure that can be combined with the dual simplex method
for a practically efficient, but not necessarily polynomial time, algorithm. Specifically, we
sequentially add violated constraints by checking Eq. (2.14) and resolving. If after some
iteration no constraints are violated, we terminate. Otherwise, we repeat. If desired,
we can terminate the algorithm early by computing the maximum constraint violation s in
Eq. (2.14) for the current solution, and observing that (θ−s, λ1, λ2) is feasible in Eq. (2.12).
Thus, 1/(θ+ λ1− s) is a valid upper bound on RPPRSP . We employ this constraint generation
procedure with early termination in Section B.1 and Section B.1 in the appendix.
In summary, the tractability of Eq. (2.12) hinges on the ability to optimize Eq. (2.13).
We highlight three important cases where an optimizer to Eq. (2.13) can be found efficiently:
• f(·) is convex In this case, whenever λ2 ≥ 0, then the objective of Eq. (2.13) is
convex, and the optimizer is one of the end points pk−1 or pk. If λ2 < 0, then
Eq. (2.13) is a univariate, concave maximization problem which can be solved with
standard techniques.
• f(·) is concave This case is similar to the above case.
• f(·) is piecewise linear When f(·) is a piecewise linear function with a known,
small number of pieces, the optimizer of Eq. (2.13) occurs either at one of these knots
or at an endpoint of the interval [pk−1, pk].
We stress Eq. (2.12) is thus tractable whenever f(·) has one of these forms.
Finally, we discuss choosing the number of discretization points N in Eq. (2.12). Notice
for any N ≥ 1, Theorem 2.5.2 provides a valid upper bound on the price of personalization.
By contrast, an alternate approach might be to discretize Eq. (2.11) directly, i.e., restrict at-
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tention to measures Pv supported on p0, . . . , pN . While the optimal value of this discretized
problem does not yield a valid bound on personalized pricing, it does provide a lower bound
on the optimal value to Eq. (2.11), and, thus, bounds the potential value of increasing N .
Consequently, a heuristic approach to choosing N might be to increase N until the relative
gap between 1z∗ and the optimal value of this discretized problem is sufficiently small, say,
less than 1%. We apply this approach in Fig. B.1 to study the sensitivity of our approach
to the choice of N .
Lower Bounds Based upon General Moments
In Section 2.3 we derived tight, closed form lower bounds on the value of personalized
pricing over single-pricing in terms of the valuation distribution’s coefficient of deviation
under a shape assumption, namely that the distribution was symmetric and left-skew. As
in Theorem 2.3.1 with upper bounds, Theorem 2.3.2 depended on particular properties
of the coefficient of deviation that make it amenable to closed-form analysis, however in
principle, any statistic might be used. In this subsection, we describe an efficient procedure
to generate lower bounds on the value of personalized pricing over single-pricing in terms
of more general moments, under the same shape assumptions (namely unimodality and
left-skewness) mirroring the approach in Section 2.5.
Specifically, our approach will be to derive upper bounds on the revenue of a single
pricing strategy in terms of the mean, a specific moment E[f(V )] of F where f(·) is a
known fixed function, over the class of unimodal, left-skew distributions. We will follow the
approach of Popescu [88] who show how to solve general moment bound problems over the
class of unimodal distributions using semi-definite programming. The only new idea will
be to show how to appropriately discretize the space of possible prices so as yield bounds
efficiently.
Suppose µ = 1, c = 0, we are given an upper bound S, and fix a price p ∈ [0, S].
Then the revenue of a single price strategy using price p, over the class of distributions
which are unimodal, left-skew, and satisfy E[f(X)] = q, is upper bounded by the following
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optimization problem:









vdPv = 1∫ S
0
f(v)dPv = q∫ S
0
dPv = 1, dPv ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ [0, S], P unimodal, left-skew
The optimization variables above are Pv, which represents the measure of V . The first
constraint ensures the mean of the distribution is 1. The second constraint ensures that
the moment condition E[f(V )] = q is met. Finally, the last family of (infinite) constraints
ensures that dPv is a valid distribution in the class of unimodal, left-skew distributions. In
order to obtain valid upper bounds we may solve O( S
δ2
) problems for prices pi = (1 + δ)
i -
1. Then defining ∆ := maxi ∆pi , the following lemma will show (1 + δ)∆ is a valid upper
bound on RSP (F ) for any F in the class.
Lemma 2.5.1. Let F be some class of distributions which is contained in the class superset
of all distributions supported on [0, S] with mean 1. Fix δ < 1 and let ∆ = {(1+δ)i−1|(1+
δ)i ≤ S + 1}. Then,
sup
F∈F




RSP (F, 0, p)
Thus obtain valid lower bounds on RPPRSP it suffices to solve a number of programs (Pp)
for fixed p. Unfortunately, we do not know how to directly solve (Pp). Instead, we apply the
general framework of Popescu [88] (namely the results in Section 4.3, Lemma 4.3) to obtain a
dual representation of (Pp) that can be solved in polynomial time via semi-definite program-
ming techniques as long as f satisfies a piece-wise polynomial (pp) condition. Specifically
the results of Popescu [88] hold when the both the objective and the moment constraints
are pp, however one can easily observe that for the objective in (Pp), E[p1{X ≥ p}] is
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piece-wise constant. For completeness we state the dual problem of (Pp):
(Dp) zp = min
λ1,λ2




xλ1 + f(x)λ2 − p1{x ≥ p}dx ≥ 0 ∀ t ∈ [1, S]
tλ1 + f(t)λ2 − p1{t ≥ p} ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ [0, 1]
All together, for any desired accuracy parameter δ > 0, we may obtain an near optimal
upper bound on the revenue ofRSP which implies near optimal lower bounds on the value of
personalized pricing over single pricing. Following Popescu [88], we note that can be solved
exactly as a semi-definite program (SDP). However, as SDPs can be quite complicated
and are not commonplace in all solvers, we believe it is useful to show how to solve as
a linear program for a special subclass of moment functions f(·). In particular, if f is is




tλ1 + f(t)λ2 − p1{t ≥ p} (2.17)
Further, since the first set of constraints is the integration of Eq. (2.17), there are most
two critical points in [1, S] where the function could be minimized, call them c1, c2. Taking
these points a long with the boundary points reduces checking feasibility of a candidate
solution over the first infinite set of inequalities to checking at most four constraints. From
there we can apply standard machinery Theorem 2.5.2 to get a solution. The following
proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 2.5.1 (General Lower Bounds on Value of Personalized Pricing). Let F be
any unimodal, left-skew distribution, distribution with scale S, and mean 1 that satisfies
E[f(v)] = 0 for a fixed, known convex/concave function f(·). Let c1, c2 be solutions to
tλ1 + f(t)λ2 − p1{t ≥ p} = 0 and c3 be a solution to ddt tλ1 + f(t)λ2 − p1{t ≥ p} = 0. Fix
δ < 1 and let ∆ = {(1 + δ)i − 1|(1 + δ)i ≤ S} be a discretization of the interval [0, S] and
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define
(Dp) zp = min
λ1,λ2




xλ1 + f(x)λ2 − p1{x ≥ p}dx ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, cI(1≤c1≤S)1 , cI(1≤c2≤S)2 , S}
tλ1 + f(t)λ2 − p1{t ≥ p} ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {0, c3I(0 ≤ c3 ≤ 1), 1}
Then, RPPRSP ≥ 1(1+δ) maxp∈∆ zp .
2.6 Conclusions
Increasingly rich consumer profiles and choice models enable retailers to personalize
to consumers at finer and finer levels. However, building such tools comes at an
investment cost in the form of technology, data scientists, marketing, etc. Motivated
by this trade-off, we provide a framework to quantify the benefits of personalized
pricing in terms of the features of the underlying market. In particular, we exactly
characterized the value of personalized pricing over posting a single price for all
customers in terms of the scale, coefficient of deviation, and margin of the valuation
distribution in closed-form.
Using our closed-form bound, we are also able to bound the value of personalized
pricing over certain third-degree price discrimination tactics that more closely mirror
current practice. Specifically, we first provide an order optimal bound on the value
of personalized pricing over k-market segmentation. Intuitively, this bound quanti-
fies the benefit of the operational ability to set a continuum of prices rather than
k fixed prices. We then provide a bound on the value of personalized pricing over
feature-based pricing strategies. Intuitively, this second bound quantifies the bene-
fit of obtaining additional market information or improving one’s predictive model.
Finally we leveraged these two bounds to study the performance of feature based mar-
89
ket segmentation, a strategy which closely models popular, data-driven personalized
pricing strategies.
Overall, we believe that our results provide a rigorous foundation for analyzing
pricing strategies in the context of personalization. Our results can be used both by
researchers attempting to design algorithms for personalized pricing, as well as by
managers seeking to implement or improve their pricing strategies.
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Chapter 3
Pricing and Design of Loot Boxes
In this chapter we study the use of loot boxes in online video games. The contents
of this section are joint work with Adam Elmachtoub, Xiao Lei, and Ningyuan Chen.
Online video games represent a multi-billion dollar industry, where more than
half of revenue is from “micro-transactions” - small exchanges of real life currency
for virtual items to be used in the game. One popular way to sell virtual items
are via loot boxes, which are random bundles of virtual items, where the contents
are revealed after purchase. In this work we consider how to design and price loot
boxes, and compare their revenue against standard bundle selling and separate selling
strategies. We show that when the number of items is large, carefully designed loot
box strategies can asymptotically garner as much revenue as grand bundle selling
while inheriting many nice properties of separate selling.
In particular, in online environments where the game client has full information of
the players current collection, we show unique loot box strategies that always allocate
unique items to the player are asymptotically revenue optimal. In contrast, we show
that loot box strategies that allocate items uniformly at random earn only 1
e
of the
optimal revenue asymptotically. We then extend these results to the case where there
are multiple classes of items, where both prices and allocation probability need to be
specified. We also show that when there are salvage costs,loot box selling dominates
separate selling strategy. In both cases we obtain closed form expressions for the
asymptotic revenues. Finally, we numerically validate our results for moderately
sized catalogs of items, and propose heuristic policy with good performance.
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3.1 Introduction
With the recent explosion of mobile gaming over the last decade, the video game
industry standard has shifted towards the freemium model, where access to the game
is freely given to customers and in-game virtual items can be acquired via micro-
transactions. In other words, purchases of virtual items that help players in the game
are made in exchange for small amounts of real currency (Forbes [58]). In many of
these games, micro-transactions are conducted via a randomized mechanism known
as a loot box. A loot box is a randomly filled bundle of virtual items, the contents
of which are revealed after purchase. See Fig. 3.1 for an example. In online games
such as Dota 2, PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds, Brawlhalla and many others, loot
box sales are a core source of revenue. In these games players purchase loot boxes
which contain a random subset of virtual items such as character costumes, cosmetic
upgrades, virtual cards, etc. In 2018 alone, more than $30 billion dollars in sales were
conducted via loot boxes (JuniperResearch [76]).
Figure 3.1: Depicted is a loot box offered by the popular video game Dota 2, which
is called ”treasure” in the game. The customer may purchase the loot box for $2.49,
after which they will receive one of the five items depicted on the screen.
More generally, the online gaming market is a particular rich area worthy of
academic study. When selling virtual items for in-game use, the seller (typically the
designer for the game) does not merely control the supply of items, but also conceives
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of their existence and their value in the game. The seller has complete information
and control in several interesting ways. Since the items are virtual, once the item
is developed there is zero marginal cost for producing more units. Since the items
only have value within the context of a particular game, the seller is allowed to fully
control the resale market for the items. Since the customer interacts with the seller to
play the game, the seller is fully aware of each customers’ current inventory of items.
Furthermore, sellers are essentially unrestricted in their choice of selling strategy. In
light of these freedoms, it is then natural to ask: why does the gaming industry
overwhelmingly choose to employ loot boxes to generate sales?
It is also important to note that, while popular and lucrative, loot box systems
have been the subject of some recent controversy (Fingas [56]), where loot boxes
have been characterized as a form of gambling and been subjected to regulatory
investigation (Tassi [100]). In light of this negative publicity, in this work we study
loot boxes as a revenue management tool and set out to understand why loot box
selling has been so popular and successful. Specifically, we wish to understand why
sellers would choose to implement loot box mechanisms over simple and effective
selling mechanisms like separate selling, where every virtual item is sold at a single
fixed price, or grand bundle selling where customers pay a fixed amount up front for
all in-games items.
Towards this end, we propose the first rigorous revenue management framework for
studying loot box strategies. We suppose that customers are utility maximizing, and
characterize the revenue of two natural loot box strategies, as well as the underlying
loot box pricing policies that achieve them. The two loot box policies we study
are (i) unique box strategies, where the loot boxes are designed to always allocate
an item the customer does not yet own, and (ii) traditional box strategies, where
items are allocated uniformly at random regardless of whether or not the customer
already owns a copy. As the number of items grows, we show, asymptotically, that
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unique box strategies are fully revenue extracting and traditional box strategies are
sub-optimal. Further, our asymptotically optimal loot box pricing policies are quite
robust, depending only on the mean and variance of the valuation distribution. We
then extend our results to capture many important and practical settings.
Our contribution can be described as follows:
1. We propose a natural model for loot box selling, which includes characterizing
a rational customer’s optimal purchasing policy. When the number of items
is small, we show that there is no dominance relations between unique box,
traditional box, grand bundling and separate selling strategies.
2. To overcome the general incomparablility in the finite item setting, we consider
the case where the number of items is large, an assumption which is often
satisfied in the mobile gaming industry. We show that the revenue of an optimal
unique box selling strategy asymptotically matches the revenue of an optimal
grand bundle strategy (which is best-possible). On the other hand, the revenue
of the popular traditional box strategies achieves only 1
e
of the optimal revenue,
and may earn even less than separate selling.
3. We then extend our loot box model to capture practical extenstions including
multiple item classes, loot boxes containing multiple items, and loot box strate-
gies incorporating salvage systems. For loot boxes with multiple item classes,
we exactly characterize the optimal loot box allocation policy, and show this
policy has a natural form. We then show that previous revenue guarantees con-
tinue to hold when loot boxes are allowed to contain multiple items. Finally,
when salvage systems are introduced, we show that both loot box strategies
dominate separate selling, and get a complete order of the selling strategies
asymptotically.
4. We conduct a set of numerical experiment which confirm the efficacy of loot
box selling, even outside the asymptotic regime of our theoretical results. In
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particular, for moderate sized catalogs of items and various valuation distribu-
tions, our loot box strategies achieve almost as much revenue as grand bundle
selling, even when implementing heuristic prices based on our analysis.
Literature Review
As the gaming industry shifts towards mobile markets (Forbes [58]), loot box selling
has come under increased scrutiny from the media, industry players, and regulators
(Forbes [57], Apple [5], Tassi [100]), with some law makers asserting that loot box
selling is a form of gambling (BusinessInsider [25]). In spite of this negative publicity,
loot box selling is as popular and profitable as ever (GamesIndustry [61]). While
media coverage has been extensive, there is comparatively little academic literature
explaining why loot box selling has been so profitable. An emerging stream of liter-
ature in psychology has attempted give behavioral explanations for the effectiveness
of loot box selling by connecting loot boxes with the larger literature on gambling
(Drummond and Sauer [48], Zendle and Cairns [107]). We instead take operations
approach and initiate the first rigorous mathematical treatment of loot boxes. While
loot box selling has not, to the best of our knowledge, directly appeared in the rev-
enue management literature, our work draws from and fits into several areas across
operations management, computer science, and economics.
In the operations literature our work connects with the dual streams of papers
on opaque selling and bundle selling. Opaque selling is the practice of selling goods
where some feature of the product is hidden from the customer until after purchase, in
loot box selling the allocation of the loot box is whats “opaque”. While traditionally
opaque selling has been studied an inventory management tool, recent works Jerath
et al. [74], Elmachtoub and Wei [52], Elmachtoub and Hamilton [51] have focused on
opaque selling as tool to increase revenue by mitigating competition, and utilizing
customer heterogeneity. Our work departs from these in two key ways, first in our
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model the customer interacts with the mechanism sequentially, and the second there
is no notion of customer between items. Our work also resembles and references
the work on bundling. We compare our loot box selling mechanisms explicitly with
the grand bundle mechanisms studied in the seminal work of Bakos and Brynjolfsson
[10], who show that pure bundling extracts almost all of the consumer surplus. Mixed
bundle strategies have been considered in recent work of Abdallah [1], Abdallah et al.
[2]. In a sense, a loot box can be thought of as bundle of possible goods, of which
only a single item is allocated. Mechanisms of this form are considered in Briest and
Roglin [22] who study so called ‘unit demand bundles’, but in a static model, and
with the aim of providing computational hardness results.
Next, there is a large and robust literature in the algorithmic game theory commu-
nity which focuses on simple, approximately optimal selling strategies. In this vein,
Hart and Nisan [67], Hart and Reny [68] study separate selling and grand bundle
selling in a general static model, and show such strategies can approximate the opti-
mal deterministic mechanism for buyers with additive valuations. In follow up work,
Babaioff et al. [9] show that the better of these two strategies is a 6 approximation
of the optimal deterministic mechanism. In our work we instead compare loot box
selling against these simple mechanisms, and in a related sequential model. Further,
Briest et al. [23] show how to set optimal prices for randomized mechanisms, which
are menus of lotteries over the items, and prove the revenue of such mechanisms can
greatly exceed the revenue of optimal deterministic mechanisms. Building on this
work, Hart and Nisan [67], Briest et al. [24] show that lottery pricing can earn in-
finitely more revenue than any deterministic mechanism when the number of items
is finite. Loot boxes are an inherently a randomized mechanism, and can be thought
of a restricted lottery over subsets of the item, but the focus of our work is different.
We are interested in comparing loot box selling against other practically prevalent
mechanisms, not approximating the optimal mechanism in some class.
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Finally, our work connects with the literature on dynamic mechanism design and
sequential selling. In dynamic mechanism design, the agent interacts repeatedly with
the seller over multiple periods, where typically some information about the state of
the system is changing over time. In this literature, the focus tends to be strategic
interaction between the buyer and seller, see for instance Pai and Vohra [85] or the
excellent survey of Bergemann and Valimaki [16]. In this sense, loot box selling is
a dynamic mechanism with trivial strategic interaction. In the computer science
Chawla et al. [32, 31] study so called sequential posted price mechanisms, where
an multiple agents arrive one at the time to the mechanism and are offered a price
for a good. Along similar lines, in the operations literature Ferreira and Goh [55]
study the dynamic assortment problem with strategic customer interaction. Our work
sits between static and sequential mechanism design, where a single agent repeated
interacts with the mechanism but all features of the mechanism are fixed over the
course of the period.
3.2 Model and Preliminaries
We consider a profit maximizing monopolist selling N distinct, non-perishable, virtual
items. A random customer’s valuation for the items are described by a set of non-
negative random variables {Vi}Ni=1, where Vi are drawn i.i.d from F . The mean and
variance of Vi are denoted by µ and σ
2, respectively. Each customer has knowledge
of all items in the seller’s catalog, and every customer privately knows their own
valuations Vi for i = 1, . . . , N . No customer desires more than one unit each item,
meaning a customer’s valuation for a second unit of item i is 0.
We now describe the sequence of events in our model. In each period t, let St ⊂ [N ]
denote the set of unique items that the customer owns. The seller offers a loot box
with price and allocation rule specified at period 0, and then at each period, customer
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decides whether or not to purchases based on their valuations of items in [N ]\St. We
assume customers are utility maximizing and will purchase if their expected utility
is non-negative, otherwise the customer will not purchase and permanently leave the
system. We discuss customer behavior more in details in Section 3.2.
We now highlight and justify some key assumptions in the model.
1. Valuations for the items are i.i.d..
The assumption of i.i.d. valuations is reasonable when the items are cosmetic
and do not affect the balance of the game i.e. character skins/customization’s,
or when items are of similar impact i.e. cards of the same rarity, which is the case
in many games that deploy boxes. The uniform retailing price in Figure 3.3b
verifies this assumption to some extent. That said, there are situations when
items are natural heterogeneous and can be separated into multiple classes
based on rarity/game impact. We extend the model to address this case in
Section 3.4.
2. Goods are allocated by the loot box uniformly at random, and the allocation
probabilities are known to the customers.
The assumption of uniform allocation probabilities for loot boxes is natural for
i.i.d. valued items, and is currently in practice for many loot box applications,
i.e., Figure 3.2a. Still, one can imagine a seller manipulating the allocation
probabilities for different items. We address this case in Section 3.4 and show
that a revenue maximizing sellers optimal strategy is always to announce uni-
form allocation probabilities. The assumption that allocation probabilities are
announced by the sellers is commonly satisfied in practice. Often sellers are
forced to announce the allocation probabilities, either by government issued
customer protection regulations [100], or by edict of the games distributor [5].
3. A customer’s valuation for a duplicate item is zero.
The assumption that customer gain zero utility from duplicates of an item is
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reasonable in the context of virtual items. For example in the case of duplicate
cosmetic items, perhaps two of the same character skin, a second item offers no
advantage over first. In some applications the seller includes a salvage mech-
anism i.e. a mechanism through which the customer can obtain value from
duplicate items by trading them in for (possibly in game) currency. We discuss
this case in Section 3.4.
4. The seller is a monopolist.
The seller, which is often the game designer, has the full control to the items
in the game, including the quality and value. Also, items in a video game has
zero value outside the game. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the seller
is a monopolist.
We consider four selling strategies in this framework: two forms of loot box selling,
grand bundle selling, and separate selling.
1) Unique Box (UB): In the unique box strategy, the monopolist offers a loot box
for a static price p, with the guarantee that after each purchase yields a new item that
the customer does not yet own. The probability of receiving an item is 0 if i ∈ St,
and 1|[N ]\St| for i ∈ [N ]\St, i.e., uniform over all the items not currently owned by the
customer. Fig. 3.2a shows an example of a unique box in a real game. We let RUB(p)
be the normalized revenue of a unique box strategy that uses price p, i.e.,
RUB(p) := p× E[# Unique Loot Box Purchases]
N
and let RUB = maxpRUB(p).
2) Traditional Box (TB): In the traditional box strategy, the monopolist offers a
loot box for a static price p with the guarantee that the item allocated by the loot box
is chosen with replacement, uniformly at random from the set [N ]. This allows for
the possibility that a customer receives duplicate items. Fig. 3.2b shows an example
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of a traditional box in a real game. We let RTB(p) be the normalized revenue of a
unique box strategy that uses price p, i.e.
RTB(p) := p× E[# Traditional Loot Box Purchases]
N
and let RTB = maxpRTB(p).
(a) Unique Box (b) Traditional Box
Figure 3.2: The left panel shows an implementation of a loot box in the popular
online game Dota 2. The red square highlights that it is a unique box as the loot box
always allocates a unique item. The right panel shows an implementation of a loot
box in the online game PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds. It allows duplicates and is a
traditional box.
It is not clear which loot box strategy is better at first glance. Intuitively, cus-
tomers may have higher valuation to a unique box, which induces a high retailing
price. On the other hand, customer may purchase more than one traditional box to
get a new item, which induces high selling volume. We shall compare and contrast
these loot box models against two classic selling models: grand bundle selling and
separate selling.
3) Grand Bundle (GB): In the grand bundle strategy, the monopolist offers a
single bundle containing all N items for a static price Np. The normalized revenue









Fig. 3.3a shows an example of grand bundle in practice.
4) Separate Selling (SS): In the separate selling strategy, the monopolist sells
all items individually at the same price p. Since we assume the valuation Vi are
i.i.d, the normalized revenue of an optimal separate selling strategy is then RSS =
maxp pPr (V ≥ p). Fig. 3.3b shows an example of separate selling with uniform prices.
(a) Grand Bundle (b) Separate Selling
Figure 3.3: The left panel shows an implementation of grand bundle selling in the
online game Brawlhalla. All items may be unlocked for a one time payment of $19.99
via the All Legends Pack (although customers may also buy “Mammoth coins” and
subsets of the items). The right panel shows an implementation of separate sell-
ing in the online game Arena of Valor. In this game each item (character) can be
individually unlocked for a single payment.
While there are many more possible strategies in which to sell virtual items, we
restrict our attention to these four as they capture the spirit of almost all strategies
observed in practice. In Section 3.4, we confide a variety of extensions such as budget
constraint, multi-class item valuation, loot boxes that allocate multiple items, and
loot box selling with salvage system. Further, when the budget is infinite, it has been
shown in Bakos and Brynjolfsson [10] that the grand bundle selling is fully revenue
extracting, as N goes to infinity. Hence grand bundle selling provide a natural upper
bound for asymptotic analysis. On the other hand, separate selling is also important
because the loot boxes may be subject to regulation, and grand bundle with huge
size and expensive price is unrealistic in practice.
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Customer Behaviour
In order to have a sensible model for loot box selling, one must model how a customer
values the random allocation, and how a customer valuation for the loot box adjusts
after multiple purchases. Four factors affect the customer purchase behavior: the
pre-announced probabilistic allocation, the valuation function of the box, the cus-
tomer decision strategy, and the realized sample paths. As mentioned previously, the
probability allocation is uniform, and this fact is known to the customers. We further
assume that customer is risk-neutral, meaning they value a loot box at its expected
value. For the two loot box types, the utility for a loot box at price p is:
(Unique Box) Ut =
∑
i∈[N ]\St Vi





Given these utilities, the customers will follow some strategy to decide when to
purchase. In theory, the customer may solve a backward Bellman equation to make
optimal decision that maximizes their cumulative expected utility. However, this is
impractical and unrealistic for general customers as the state space increases combi-
natorially in the number of items. Instead, we make the natural modeling assumption
that customers are myopic, i.e., they purchase if and only if their expected utility for
a loot box is non-negative. We note, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, that the myopic
purchasing behavior is an assumption of our model and not necessarily the optimal
strategy for maximizing expected utility. In particular, when considering unique loot
boxes there are scenarios in which a rational customer should purchase a loot box
even if their expected utility for the purchase is negative. The following example
Example 3.2.1 below demonstrates such scenario.
Example 3.2.1. Suppose that N = 2, and the price of the unique box is p = 1.6.
Further suppose the customers valuation for each item is drawn from a two-point
distribution, which is either 1 or 2 with probability 1
2
. Consider a myopic customer
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with valuation profile (V1, V2) = (1, 2) or (2, 1). Such a customer will not buy the first
box, because their expected utility for a purchase 1+2
2
− 1.6 is negative. However there
is a strategy by which the customer with valuation profile (1,2) or (2,1) can garner
positive utility in expectation. Buy the first box. If he receives the item with valuation
2, stop. Otherwise buy the second box and receive the other item. With probability
1
2
, the customer will receive an item valued at 2, at which point he stops and garners
utility 2 − 1.6 = 0.4. If instead he gets an item that value at 1, he then purchases
the second unique box, which is then guaranteed to allocate the item they value at 2.
In this second case the net utility loss is only 1+2-2*1.6 = -0.2. The total expected
utility under this strategy is 0.5 ∗ 0.4− 0.5 ∗ 0.2 = 0.1 > 0, thus the customer can gain
in expectation even if their expected utility their first loot box purchase is negative.
Fortunately, we will show that as the number of possible items N tends to infinity,
the normalized expected utility loss suffered by a random customer following a myopic
strategy instead of an optimal one tends to zero. Further, myopic behavior is always
optimal for a customer considering traditional boxes.
Theorem 3.2.1 (Myopic Purchasing Behaviour is Nearly Optimal). Suppose valua-
tions are drawn i.i.d. for N goods from a distribution F , and loot box strategies use
a fixed price p. Then for any F and p:
a) For unique loot box selling, the myopic purchasing policy is asymptotically op-
timal i.e, the average net utility under the myopic strategy converges to the
average net utility of the optimal strategy as N →∞.
b) For traditional loot box selling, the myopic purchasing policy is optimal.
Due to the complexity/impracticality of computing the customers optimal pur-
chasing policy, and the near optimality of the myopic purchasing rule, we believe
Theorem 3.2.1 provides compelling evidence that restricting to myopic purchasing
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behaviour does not degrade the predictive power of our models. For the remainder
of this paper we will assume customers behave myopically. However, theorems The-
orem 3.3.1(a) and Corollary 3.4.1, regarding lower bounds on the revenue of unique
box are also valid for strategic customers. This is because customers following a my-
opic strategy leads to the most conservative estimation of the selling volume i.e. the
number of loot boxes purchased. In the cases where the optimal purchasing strategy
differs from the myopic strategy, that customer purchases more loot boxes. Thus the
revenue of a loot box strategy under the assumption of myopic customer behaviour
is a lower bound on the revenue when customers purchase optimally.
Relations between (UB), (TB), (SS) and (GB) for finite N .
In this work we aim to understand when loot boxes are an effective revenue manage-
ment tool. In particular we would like to establish relations between the revenues of
(UB), (TB), (SS), and (GB). Unfortunately when the number of items N is fixed,
only a single relationship exists for all valuation distributions. Specifically, a unique
loot box strategy can never exceed the revenue of a grand bundle strategy.
Observation 3.2.2. RGB ≥ RUB for any N and distribution V ∼ F .
This is because the condition for purchasing a grand bundle at price Np is the





p ≡∑i Vi ≥ Np. However, under a unique box strategy it may be the case that the
customer ends up purchasing less than N loot boxes which implies the relation. This
relation does not extend to grand bundle selling and traditional loot box selling. The
condition for purchasing the first traditional box remains the same, however in this
case a customer may buy multiple traditional boxes before obtaining a new item. In
fact, for any other proposed order relation between two of the four strategies, there
exists a distribution for which it holds and vice versa. We list the nine remaining
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possible revenue relations along with distributions for which these order relation holds
in Table 3.1. These distributions were found by numerically searching over the space
of two-point and three-point valuation distributions, and enumerating the possible
prices and customer valuations.
Table 3.1: Possible Relations Between (UB), (TB), (GB) and (SS).
Relation N Valuation
GB > UB > TB > SS 3 P (Vi = 0.98) = 1/2, P (Vi = 2.02) = 1/6, P (Vi = 3.01) = 1/3
GB > UB > SS > TB 10 P (Vi = 1) = P (Vi = 2.75) = 1/2
GB > TB > UB > SS 3 P (Vi = 1.01) = 1/2, P (Vi = 1.98) = 1/6, P (Vi = 3.03) = 1/3
GB > TB > SS > UB 2 P (Vi = 1) = 1/2, P (Vi = 2.02) = 1/6, P (Vi = 3) = 1/3
GB > SS > UB > TB 2 P (Vi = 1) = P (Vi = 2.3) = 1/2
GB > SS > TB > UB 2 P (Vi = 1) = P (Vi = 2.75) = 1/2
SS > TB > GB > UB 2 P (Vi = 1) = P (Vi = 100) = 1/2
SS > GB > UB > TB 10 P (Vi = 1) = 3/10, P (Vi = 10) = 7/10
SS > GB > TB > UB 4 P (Vi = 1) = 3/10, P (Vi = 10) = 7/10
Motivated by the inconsistency of the four strategies when N is finite, for the rest
of this paper we will focus on asymptotic analysis. As it turns out, in an asymptotic
regime a consistent ordering emerges.
3.3 Asymptotic Analysis of Loot Box Pricing
In this section we will study loot box strategies in an asymptotic regime. The need for
asymptotic analysis is justified by Theorem 3.2.1, and by the general incomparablility
of the various selling strategies in the scope of this study, see Section 3.2. Further, an
asymptotic regime is well motivated in practice where N , the number of items sold in
the video game, is often in the thousands. For example, in the popular online games
Dota 2 or Overwatch, the number of cosmetic items sold through loot boxes exceeds
3500.
In this asymptotic regime we will show that unique box strategies earn normalized




expected normalized revenue of any selling strategy cannot exceed µ, this result proves
that unique box and traditional box strategies are asymptotically optimal and sub-
optimal, respectively. Further, we can compare the performance of these two loot box
strategies with the performance of grand bundle selling and separate selling in this
regime. By an easy application of the strong law of large numbers, it is known that
grand bundle also obtains normalized revenue of µ (see [10] for a detailed discussion of
grand bundle strategies). On the other hand, the revenue of separate selling strategies
depends explicitly on the distribution of customer valuations, and can earn anywhere
between 0% and 100% of the normalized revenue.
Theorem 3.3.1 (Asymptotic Revenue of (UB), (TB)). Suppose valuations are drawn
i.i.d. for N goods from a distribution F with finite mean µ, and variance σ2.
a) Then unique loot box selling strategies are guaranteed to earn,
RUB ≥ µ(1−N−1/5)
(











































− log (N) − γ, and
p¯N = µ/exp(1 + log(1−N− 13 )− ζN).
Moreover, letting N tend to infinity we have:
lim
N→∞






This result has a number of important implications for a monopolist considering
loot box strategies. First, Theorem 3.3.1 highlights an important design aspect of
loot boxes, namely that the ability to monitor a customers current inventory and ap-
propriately control their allocation can hugely increase revenue. With information of
a customers inventory, a seller can implement unique boxes which are asymptotically
revenue optimal and enjoy a host of additional benefits (see Section 3.4). With this
information, the seller is restricted to traditional loot box designs that, while guar-
anteed to garner a constant fraction of the revenue, are also fixed to that constant,
always earning only 1
e
of the optimal revenue regardless of the valuation distribution.
Together, Theorem 3.3.1 yields a compelling rebuttal to the seemingly sound wisdom
that traditional boxes induce enough additional purchases to offset their inherently
lower prices. As we show, it is in fact the opposite. In an asymptotic regime with
optimally chosen prices, both loot box strategies will induce the same number of ex-
pected purchases. Specifically, in expectation under the optimal prices, a customer
will purchase traditional boxes until they have collected 1 − 1
e
fraction of the cata-
log of items, requiring on average e
e−1 purchases per item. On the other hand, when
faced with optimally priced unique boxes, a customer will collect almost all the items.
Thus the expected normalized number of loot box purchases under optimal prices are
equal.
We also emphasize that the revenue guarantees provided by Theorem 3.3.1 are
based on explicit prices for the loot boxes, namely p = µ(1− 1
N1/5
) for unique boxes,
and p = µ
e
for traditional boxes, respectively. It is interesting to note that these prices
do not depend on the customers actual valuation distributions, except through depen-
dence on the mean. Such a guarantee is called a distribution-free ([33]) bound on the
revenue, since it does not depend on the distributions themselves but merely statistics
of them. The distribution free nature of the lower bounds from Theorem 3.3.1 imply
that the revenue guarantee extends to the case where customers have heterogeneous
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valuation distributions, and assures that simultaneously all customers types are well
handled by a common loot box price.
Further, we can compare the rates of convergence in Theorem 3.3.1 against the
known rates of convergence for grand bundle selling. For unique boxes, the rate at
which the expected revenue tends to µ is O(N−1/5), whereas for grand bundle selling,
the convergence rate to µ is Θ(N−1/3) (as shown in [10]). While it is not surprising
that unique box strategies tend to µ slower (recall by Observation 2 the revenue of a
grand bundle always dominates unique box for every N), it is interesting that their
convergences are comparable even when unique boxes must be bought one at a time.
Further, if the valuations Vi are bounded, a reasonable assumption for a virtual item
in a video game, then one can easily strengthen the convergence rates for unique
box strategies using Chernoff’s inequalities. When valuations are bounded one can
achieve sub-Gaussian convergence rate to µ for both unique box selling and grand
bundle selling.
In light of Theorem 3.3.1, it is worthwhile to discuss why traditional loot boxes
are popular, given their substantially lower expected revenue. We propose a number
of possible explanations. First, traditional boxes such as Gachapon and Pokemon
card packs exist even before the digital age (and subsequently video games), and may
continue as a hold over from those times. Second, traditional boxes may be easier for
customers to understand but intuitively, and from the perspective of Theorem 3.2.1
in which we showed the simple myopic policy is optimal. Third, when N is small, it is
possible that traditional box selling has relatively good performance (c.f. Table 3.1).
Fourth, our analysis assumes an unlimited budget. When there is a finite budget,
unique box, traditional box and separate selling all have the same expected revenue
since all three strategies extract all the budget in the limit. Fifth, the behaviour of
possibly irrational customer not captured in our model may have a large impact on
revenue. It is possible that a fraction of customers, so called whales, may wish to
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collect all of the items regardless of cost (e.g., to flaunt their collection or to compete
with other customers), and hence violates the risk-neutral assumption. In this case,
the revenue from traditional boxes may increase dramatically, and outperform other
selling strategies. Lastly, the presence of salvage systems may increase the revenue
of a traditional box strategy, we will study this possibility in detail in Section 3.4.
Finally, we discuss the insights on customers’ surplus. From a customers perspec-
tive, one might naturally assume that since unique boxes always allocate unique items,
it may benefit them when compared to traditional boxes. We show this assumption
is unfounded. It follows from Theorem 3.3.1 that a profit maximizing monopolist
using unique boxes can garner all utility. On the other hand, under traditional boxes
the limiting normalized net utility it is ((1− 1/e)Nµ−Nµ/e) /N = (1− 2/e)µ, thus
even when prices are optimally chosen a customer still obtains positive expected util-
ity. Hence a customer is actually worse off when facing unique boxes over traditional
boxes.
3.4 Loot Box Design Problem
In the previous section we studied the loot box pricing problem in a simplified model.
Recall our loot box models assumed that the valuations for all items were i.i.d.,
that the probability an item is allocated by a loot box is uniformly random, that all
customers are myopic utility maximizers, and that customers obtain no value from
duplicate items. In practice many of these assumptions are violated, in this section
we extend the results of the previous section to these cases, and derive insight into
how loot box strategies should be designed, and increasing the applicability of our
results.
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Joint Allocation and Pricing for Multiple Classes of Items
In the previous section, we assumed that valuations for all items were i.i.d., and
that each item (unowned item in the case of unique boxes) was equally likely to
be allocated by the loot box. In practice, both these assumptions may be grossly
inaccurate. Often in online games the items are explicitly grouped based on rarity
or effectiveness, e.g., in the online popular game PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds,
customers may get Mythic, Legendary, Epic, or Rare items from a loot box (see
Fig. 3.4). In these cases items of the same group may be represented by draws from
the same distribution, but between groups the items value will differ wildly. In this
subsection we will extend our model to allow for M classes of items, where each item
in class m ∈ [M ] is drawn from a distribution V m ∼ Fm.
The introduction of multiple item classes allows for some items to significantly
more valuable than others, it is then possible in this case that non-uniform allocation
probabilities may be reasonable. We will denote the proportion of the items in each
class m as βm, where
∑
m∈[M ] βm = 1. For asymptotic results we will suppose each
the number of items in each class grows proportionally to N i.e. βmN . Further,
we will allow the allocation probabilities for each class of items by the loot box to
be determined by the seller. A loot box strategy is now characterized by a price p
and a set of allocation probabilities. Our goal is to characterize the revenue optimal
combination of price and allocation probabilities for loot boxes over multiple classes
of items.
For unique box strategies, the optimal non-uniform allocation probabilities are dy-
namic and depend on the customers current set of items. It is thus difficult to explain
such policies to customers, let alone characterize the optimal allocation probabilities.
Thankfully, for unique boxes the most natural extension to the multi-class case is
asymptotically optimal. We will define a uniform unique box strategy as one which
allocates items by choosing an item which the customer does not yet own uniformly
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at random, regardless of class. Note that this is the same allocation rule as in Theo-
rem 3.3.1, each item initially appears in the loot box with probability 1
N
. For uniform
unique boxes, the analysis of the allocation probabilities and prices is straightforward.
When M << N one can simply apply the analysis of Theorem 3.3.1(a) with a slight
modification. We encapsulate this observation in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4.1 ((UB) with Uniform Allocations are Asymptotically Optimal). Sup-
pose there are M classes of items, and valuations in class m ∈ [M ] are drawn i.i.d for





























Figure 3.4: In the game PlayerUnknown’s Battlegrounds, the traditional box contains
four classes of items: Mythic, Legendary, Epic, and Rare. The allocation probability
for items of different classes varies, however items within the same class have the
same probability.
Our main focus in this section is to understand how non-uniform allocation rules
affect traditional box strategies. The most pressing question in this vein is whether
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or not the additional flexibility in allocation rules can increase the revenue of tradi-
tional box strategies beyond the µ/e guarantee of Theorem 3.3.1(b). Let {qi}Ni=1 be
a strategies allocation probabilities, where qi is the probability of allocating item i,∑N
i=1 qi = 1. Fixing a price p, the allocation problem is to find the best vector of
probabilities q∗ ∈ Q = {qi|
∑N
i=1 qi = 1} that maximizes the revenue. The joint pric-
ing and allocation problem is to find the optimal price p∗ and allocation probabilities
q∗ which yield the maximum revenue. To simplify the problem, we will restrict our
attention to class level allocation probabilities, i.e., allocation rules where all items in
the same class have the same allocation probabilities. We emphasize that class level
allocation rules are common in practice (e.g., Figure 3.4).
For a class level allocation rule, we will let dm =
∑
j∈Class m qj = βmNqj be
the probability of allocating an item in class m, and d = (d1, . . . , dM). Further,
let QNd (p) and RTB(p,d) be the normalized number of loot boxes purchased by a
customer (i.e. E[# Purchases]
N
), and the normalized expected revenue, under price p and
class allocation probabilities d, respectively. To enable our study of traditional boxes
with non-uniform allocation rules we first show useful relationship between price,
allocation probability and the limiting selling volume.
Lemma 3.4.1. Suppose there are M classes of items, and valuations in class m ∈ [M ]
are drawn i.i.d for βmN goods from a distribution Fm with mean µm and variance σm.














Armed with Lemma 3.4.1, we find that as N tends to infinity, the optimal solu-
tion for the joint pricing and multi-class allocation problem has a surprisingly simple
structure. Namely, proportional multi-class allocation probabilities with the same
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prices as in Theorem 3.3.1(b) garners more revenue than any other pricing and allo-
cation rule, and again the normalized revenue converges to µ
e
. Thus answering the
question of whether exotic allocation probabilities can greatly increase the revenue of
traditional boxes firmly in the negative.
Theorem 3.4.1 ((TB) with Proportional Allocations are Asymptotically Optimal).
Suppose there are M classes of items, and valuations in class i ∈ [M ] are drawn i.i.d




















, (β1, . . . , βM)
)
.
Theorem 3.4.1 provides a natural generalization of Theorem 3.3.1(b) to the multi-
class case. The proportional allocation strategy with price µ/e is asymptotically
optimal, for any (finite) number of classes, and with any class-wise distributions. In
this sense Theorem 3.4.1 makes a traditional loot box sellers decision simple, instead
of designing complicated allocation structures, simply use proportional allocations
and focus on the price. Further, Theorem 3.4.1 extends the asymptotic dominance
of unique box strategies over traditional boxes to the case of multiple item classes;
varying the allocation probabilities cannot close the gap in revenue between the two
strategies.
Finally, while Theorem 3.4.1 provides a simple solution to the joint allocation
and pricing problem for traditional loot boxes, this simplicity depends critically on
the seller using the revenue optimal price. However there are situations where a
seller may use a price that differs from the theoretical optimum. Market pressures,
platform stipulations, promotional rounding (i.e. the “optimal” price may be $1.07,
which is then rounded to $0.99), and other factors may entice sellers to offer a price
other than µ/e. In these cases, when the price is fixed and sub-optimal, the optimal
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class allocation probabilities may not be proportional. In such cases we may lean on
Lemma 3.4.1 to compute nearly optimal allocation probabilities. To do so, suppose
the target selling volume kN is fixed and exogenous, then the maximum possible
price (and thus revenue, since volume is fixed) which achieves this selling volume can












dm ≥ 0, ∀m.
The objective function for (OPTkN) is quasi-concave, and the constraints are linear,
thus it can be solved efficiently (see [77]). A seller may then search for the maximum
selling volume k by performing exponential search on [0,∞), and solving (3.1) at each
iteration to see if k is feasible to the given price.
Multi-item Loot Boxes
In the previous section we assumed each loot box allocated only a single item, however
in many games and almost all offline versions of traditional boxes (for example packs
of cards), the loot box contains multiple items. Figs. 3.5a and 3.5b shows examples of
size-j boxes in practice. In this section we will show that Theorem 3.3.1 easily extends
to the case where loot boxes are of sizes larger than 1 by imagining the sequence of
valuations as a sequence of k fold convolutions of the random variables. That is, by
replacing the sequence of valuations for items allocated, {Vi}Ni=1, by {
∑ki+k
j=ki Vj}∞i=1
and applying Theorem 3.3.1. Further, by independence, the mean and variance of
the k-fold convolution is µk = kµ, and σk = kσ respectively and the the same rates
of convergence apply with Nk = N/k. We formalize this observation in the following
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corollary.
Corollary 3.4.2 (Multi-Item Loot Boxes). Suppose valuations are drawn i.i.d. for
N goods from a distribution F with finite mean µ, and variance σ2, and each loot box
is of some fixed size k. Then,
lim
N→∞





(a) Size 4 Box (b) Random Size Box
Figure 3.5: The left panel shows an implementation of a loot box in the mobile game
Rise of the King. Each box outputs 4 items. The right panel shows an implementation
of a loot box in online game League of Legends. Customers are guaranteed to get one
item, with the chance to get at most 2 bonus items within one box.
Salvage Costs
In previous sections we assumed that customers had no value for duplicate items, and
that a customer could not trade in low valued items back to the seller. In practice
however, many loot box marketplaces are equipped with salvage systems, mechanisms
by which a customer can trade in unwanted items for currency. Salvage systems are
a ubiquitous method for managing customer satisfaction under loot box policies, of-
fering customers a form of recourse against unlikely or unfortunate outcomes, and
mitigating worst case allocations from the loot box. In Fig. 3.6 we provide one exam-
ple. In this section we will consider loot box selling strategies that allow customers
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to trade in or salvage items for some amount of virtual currency c. For simplicity we
will restrict our attention to the case when the number of items in the loot box is 1
and there is only a single class of items; extensions beyond these assumptions follow
from applying the analysis in Sections 3.4 and 3.4. We will also assume that when a
customer receives an item they value at less than c, they will immediately salvage the
item before continuing to purchased new loot boxes.
Figure 3.6: In the game Dota 2, players can trade in 6 unwanted items for a new loot
box, plus 2000 shards, a form of in-game currency.
The main insight will be in understanding the two competing affects that intro-
ducing salvage systems have on loot box revenue. On the one hand, the presence of
a salvage cost c increases the minimum valuation of any item to at least c, increasing
the expected valuations (from E[V ] to E[max{V, c}]) and inducing more purchases.
On the other hand, salvage systems return currency to the customer diluting the
revenue garnered from customer purchases. The main results in this section will be
characterize and extend the revenue guarantees of Theorem 3.3.1 to the case when
items can be salvaged for some cost c.
We will use the notation Rc to denote the optimal revenue of a strategy with
fixed salvage cost c. Note that in the presence of a salvage system, the allocation
mechanism for unique box strategies is no longer well specified. Specifically, should
unique box strategies allocate items that a customer does not currently own, or items
that a customer has never owned? That is, should items that a customers has salvaged
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previously be allowed to be allocated to a customer again. For our results we will
assume the latter, that customers are never allocated an item they had previously
salvaged.
The additional richness in strategies introduced by considering salvage systems
also allows us to pin down the precise relationships between loot box strategies and
separate selling. Specifically, by treating the salvage cost c as a parameter of a loot
box strategy, the revenue of either an optimal unique box or traditional box strategy
can be guaranteed to dominate the revenue of separate selling.




RcUB ≥ RSS and max
c
RcTB ≥ RSS.
Note that this result is valid for finite N . It is well known that grand bundle is
not guaranteed to outperform separate selling for finite N , even though grand bundle
selling is asymptotically optimal. This further explains the power and popularity of
loot box in practice.
We now investigate the revenue of salvage systems in the asymptotic scheme. The
following theorem gives the limiting revenue with respect to a fixed c.
Theorem 3.4.2 (Revenue of Loot Box Strategies with Salvage Costs.). Suppose
valuations are drawn i.i.d. for N goods from a distribution V ∼ F , with mean µ and
variance σ2. Let c be the salvage cost, γ = F (c) be the probability of salvage, and
η = E[V |V > c].
a) Unique loot box selling strategies asymptotically earn normalized revenue,
lim
N→∞
RcUB = η(1− γ).
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b) Traditional loot box selling strategies asymptotically earn normalized revenue,
lim
N→∞
RcTB = (1− γ)(η − c)
(
c





This result carries through a number of the same insights from Theorem 3.3.1 to
the case with salvage costs. First, note that like before the (asymptotic) revenue of
unique box strategies dominates the (asymptotic) revenue of traditional box strategies
for any valuation distribution F and salvage cost c. To see this note since 0 < c ≤ η,
we may substitute c by c = qη, for some q ∈ [0, 1]. Plugging in this substitution and
rearranging yields the upper bound,
lim
N→∞
RcTB ≤ (1− γ)η max
q∈(0,1]
(
q + (1− q)e− 11−q
)
≤ (1− γ)η, (3.2)
where the final equality comes from noting q+(1−q)e− 11−q is monotone increasing and
tends to 1 as q → 1. Thus limN→∞RcUB ≥ limN→∞RcTB. Further, the monotonicity
in the maximum in Eq. (3.2) implies when c
η
is large (close to 1), the gap in expected
revenue between unique box strategies and traditional box strategies is small and
generally shrinks from a factor of e ( c
η
= 0) monotonically down to 1 ( c
η
= 1). Thus
when salvage costs are relatively large, the additional value of employing unique box
strategies decreases. Moreover, note that for unique boxes, (1−γ)η ≤ µ, with equality
achieved only when c = 0. Lastly, by combining Proposition 3.4.1 and Theorem 3.4.2,













Finally, recall salvage systems are primarily used to improve customer outcomes
and overall satisfaction with the system. Formally, the expected normalized customer
surplus under a revenue maximizing unique box with salvage cost c is (1−γ)η+γc−
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(1 − γ)η = cγ, since customers will purchase almost all goods. Thus the expected
normalized customer surplus is monotonically increasing in c. The salvage system
thus enables the seller to balance allocate the revenue and customer surplus to their
desired proportion.
3.5 Numerical Tests
In this section we conduct numerical experiments to demonstrate the efficacy of
unique box and traditional box selling in the large but finite N regime. In par-
ticular, for a set of typical valuation distributions, we will compute and compare the
revenue of (UB), (TB), (GB), and (SS) strategies as N increases. For (UB) and (TB)
strategies we will also use the heuristic prices motivated by Theorem 3.3.1, specifically
for (UB) we will use price µ(1 − N−1/5) and for (TB) we will use the price µ
e
. Note
the (TB) price differs from the price described in Theorem 3.3.1(b), we instead use µ
e
due to the overly poor performance of the rule in the theorem when N is small, and
because the price in the theorem quickly converges to µ
e
anyway. Further, numerically
we demonstrate that the instance optimal prices quickly converge to these heuristic
prices.
In our experiments we will assume the customers valuation is drawn from one
of three distributions: Uniform between 0 and 2, Log-normal with log-mean 0 and
log-variance 1, and Exponential with mean 1. These distributions are commonly
used to model customer valuation, and have been previously studied in [1]. Under
each valuation distribution, and for N ranging from 3 to 3000, we will consider the
revenue of 7 selling strategies: (i) traditional box with optimal price (TB Optimal),
(ii) traditional box with price µ/e (TB Heuristic), (iii) unique box with optimal price
(UB Optimal), (iv) unique box with price µ(1−N−1/5) (UB Heuristic 1), (v) unique
box with the optimal price of grand bundle (UB Heuristic 2), (vi) grand bundle selling
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(GB) and (vii) separate selling (SS). Computation of the revenues will be done via
simulation, by generating 50000 customer sample paths and using brute force to
search the optimal prices (at 0.01 accuracy).
In Figure 3.7, we plot how the optimal price changes as N increases. Note the
optimal price of a traditional box strategy quickly converges to µ/e, and is nearly
indistinguishable for N ≥ 50 while the optimal price of unique box strategy converges
to µ, albeit somewhat slower. Further, the optimal price for unique box strategies
are much higher than µ(1−N−1/5), indicting a more aggressive pricing heuristic may
perform better than the overly conservative heuristic prices we used to construct a
lower bound. Interestingly, the optimal prices for unique box strategies and grand
bundle strategies are quite similar, lending further evidence that (UB Heuristic 2) by
be an effective strategy in practice.
Figure 3.7: Normalized Prices for Uniform (left), Log-normal (middle) and Exponen-
tial (right) Valuations.
In Figure 3.8, we plot the normalized revenues for each strategy. For traditional
boxes, both the optimal and heuristic policy quickly converge µ/e. For unique boxes,
although both heuristic strategies earn less than the optimal grand bundle strategy,
they appear quite effective, in all three cases garnering 70% of the maximum rev-
enue when N ≥ 100. We can also see that unique box with grand bundle price (UB
Heuristic 2) gives almost the same revenue as the optimal price, while the less aggres-
sively priced strategy (UB Heuristic 1) lags markedly behind. Recall the intuition
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behind (UB Heuristic 1)in Theorem 3.3.1 was to use a price and always maintained
the lower bound of normalized selling volume that was close to 1. As it turns out,
(UB Heuristic 1) is too conservative, because in most cases, the selling volume will be
much higher than the theoretical lower bound. Finally, we emphasize that in practice
(UB Heuristic 2) is easy to implement, because computing the optimal price of grand
bundle is computational less difficult than that of unique box.
Figure 3.8: Normalized Revenue for Uniform (left), Log-normal (middle) and Expo-
nential (right) Valuations.
In Figure 3.9, we show the normalized surplus for different strategies. While the
surplus of traditional box and separate selling converges to a constant, the surplus of
unique box and grand bundle converges to 0.




In this paper we analyze the revenue of loot box selling strategies, which are among
the popular, profitable, and controversial selling strategies in the video game indus-
try. We first show that myopic behavior is reasonable for customers, and investigate
pricing and design problems under this assumption. Motivated by the generally in-
compatibility in the finite N setting, we shifted our attention to an asympotic regime
where we then proved that the unique loot box strategies are fully revenue extracting,
whereas the traditional box design can garner only a fixed factor, 1/e, of the maxi-
mum revenue. We then extended our framework to analyze three aspects of loot box
design. First, we considered the case of multiple item classes, and showed that simple
proportional allocations with an appropriate price are asymptotically optimal under
any risk-preference. Second we show that our results can be extended to multi-item
boxes. Finally, we considered salvage systems and showed they may further increase
revenue, while simultaneously enjoying customer friendly guarantees.
Our work implies a host of managerial insights for sellers, customers, and regula-
tors of loot boxes. For sellers, we give a thorough analysis for the profitability of loot
boxes and encouraging numerical results, yielding guidelines for how to design and
price loot boxes so as to maximize revenue. For customers, we confirm that myopic
purchasing behavior is a nearly optimal purchasing policy. Further, we clarify many
common misconceptions about loot boxes. Namely, that unique boxes cost more and
when optimally priced, leave less surplus for customers. Moreover, while customers
may regard salvage systems as treaties from the seller, we show that such designs are
a method to augment the revenue. Finally, for regulators, we show that although
unique boxes are less random and thus inherently less like gambling, such boxes ac-
tually lower customer surplus. We also highlight the importance of supervision with
regard to a sellers allocation rule, as sellers may gain extra revenue by using even a
random perturbation strategy.
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While the buzz around loot box selling is booming in the media, there is a distinct
lack of academic work which evaluates this simple selling strategy in the broader
context revenue management systems for selling multiple items sequentially. While
our work breaks ground on this topic, there are number of avenues yet unexplored by
our work. In particular we focuses on comparisons between loot box selling and other
simple, popular mechanisms. One particularly fruitful avenue of potential research
would be to study loot boxes via the lens of optimal mechanism design, with the aim
of characterizing precisely under what conditions loot box selling is the best possible
mechanisms, or if not, identifying better alternatives. Further, a number of natural
extensions of loot box could be considered. For instance, personalized and dynamic
allocation rules utilizing information about the customers current inventory. Finally,
connecting with current media, it would be interesting to consider loot box pricing
and design problems under more legal constraints or fairness considerations.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 A Primer on Discriminatory Pricing
In this work, we consider pricing strategies for customers with valuations drawn
from an exchangeable distribution. Due to the symmetry of exchangeable valuation
distributions, it is natural to assume that the optimal pricing strategy would be to
offer an identical price for each item. Surprisingly, this is not the case; discriminatory
pricing where some items are priced higher than others can yield significantly more
revenue. (Note any permutation of the prices is also optimal.) Consider the following
simple example where N = 2, and customers draws their item valuations from an
i.i.d. distributions V1 and V2:
V1, V2 ∼
 2 : w.p. 1/31 : w.p. 2/3
The optimal single price strategy offers both items at price 2, and earns revenue
of RSP = 2 · P (max{V1, V2} ≥ 2) = 109 . Now consider a discriminatory pricing
where item 1 is sold at a price of 1 and item 2 is sold at a price of 2, then
RDP (1, 2) = 1 · (P (V1 = 1, V2 = 1) + P (V1 = 2, V2 = 1)) + P (V1 = 2, V2 = 2)) + 2 ·
P (V1 = 1, V2 = 2) = 119 (note that the higher price item is purchased in the event
of a tie w.l.o.g.). This extra 1
9
is from two opposing forces at play. The low price
of 1 allows the discriminatory strategy to extract revenue from customers with low
valuations for both items, an additional expected revenue of 4
9
. The downside of the
133
low price is that it cannibalizes sales from the high priced item when V1 = 2, resulting
in a loss of 1
3
. Overall, the upside outweighs the downside and increased revenue can
be had by offering different prices for these i.i.d. valued items.
Given that the revenue from discriminatory pricing can exceed single pricing, a
natural question is then how much more can revenue can discriminatory pricing earn.
In i.i.d. settings, the question has been fully resolved.
Lemma A.1.1 (Dutting and Klimm [49] Theorems 3 and 4). Let N be the number







Further, this bound is tight for each N .
In addition to being theoretically interesting, discriminatory pricing strategies are
common in online marketplaces, even for basic retail goods. In Fig. A.1, two nearly
identical shirts are offered for different prices on Amazon.com.
(a) Dark blue shirt for $17.88. (b) Light blue shirt for $14.99.
Figure A.1
A.2 An Extension of Exchangeability
Here we describe Salop’s circle model, a core model for horizontally differentiated
items, and discuss how Theorem 1.3.1(i) can be extended to this case. In Salop’s circle
model, each item is represented as a point on a circle. The N points are equidistant on
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the circumference of the circle, and denoted by y1, . . . , yN . Each customer corresponds
to a random point X on the circumference of the circle, distributed uniformly at
random. The customer then values each item i according to Vi = a − b‖X − yi‖,
where the norm corresponds the distance traveled on the circle and a, b are tunable
parameters. Note that the underlying joint distribution for item valuations arising
from Salop’s circle is not independent, as closeness to one item on the circle necessarily
implies the customer is farther from the other items.
When N = 2, Salop’s circle reduces to the Hotelling model, which is well-known
to be exchangeable. We now show that when N = 3, Salop’s circle still gives rises
to an exchangeable valuation distribution. First, observe from Fig. A.2 that the six
possible valuation orders of the 3 items are equally likely. For example, if a customer
is in region c, they prefer item 3, then 1, then item 2. If a customer is in region d,
they prefer item 3, then item 2, then item 1. All 6 orderings are possible when N = 3.
Since X is drawn uniformly at random, then exchangeability follows immediately.
Figure A.2: Salop’s circle for N=3 products, divided into six equal regions.
Unfortunately this argument for exchangeability does not extend beyond N = 3.
One easy way to see this is to note that, when N = 4, the customers are partitioned
into 8 regions corresponding to 8 possible valuation orderings (analagous to Figure
A.2). However, there are 24 possible valuation orderings when N = 4, and thus it
cannot be the case that every permutation yields identical marginal distributions.
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More generally, Salop’s circle has 2N possible orderings arising from 2N customer
regions, while exchangeability requires all N ! valuation orderings are equally likely.
To capture Salop’s circle, we relax our definition of exchangeability from requiring
every permutation to yield identical joint distributions to only a subset of permuta-
tions, S, to have identical joint distributions.
Definition A.2.1. Let Σ be the set of all permutations on {1, . . . , N}. Let sort(·) be
the function that sorts a vector in descending order. We call the random valuation
vector V = (V1, . . . , VN) S-exchangeable if S is a subset Σ such that for all σ ∈ S,
σ(sort(V )) has the same joint distribution as V . 
In essence, S-exchangeability limits the possible orderings of the valuations for
items to the set S and enforces that inside S, each of those orderings is equally likely.
Note that when S = Σ, then S-exchangeability is equivalent to our earlier notion of
exchangeability. It is now easy to see that Salop’s circle model is S-exchangeable,
where S describes the orderings arising from the 2N regions. The joint distributions
for each of these orderings are all the same since X is uniformly distributed on the
circle.
Finally, we note that when customers are pessimistic and their valuations are
S-exchangeable, opaque selling always dominates the revenue from discriminatory
pricing. This implies Corollary A.2.1, which is an extension of Theorem 1.3.1(i).
Corollary A.2.1. Assume α = 1 and customers valuations are S-exchangeable, then
ROPQ ≥ RDP .
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as Theorem 1.3.1(i) where Σ, the set of all
permutations, is replaced by S instead. 
136
A.3 Missing Examples from Chapter 1
Example A.3.1 (OPQ Earning Order N Times More Revenue than SP). We
construct an exchangeable distribution F over N items such that RSP ≤ 2 and
ROPQ ≥ αN , implying a gap between OPQ and SP on the order of αN . Note by The-
orem 1.3.3(i) this implies RDP ≤ 2 (1 + log(N)), and thus ROPQ ≥ α2 N1+log(N)RDP .
To construct V ∼ F , we specify N + 1 possible valuation vectors in RN and
assume that each permutation of the specified valuation vector is equally likely. The
first vector has valuations where one item is valued at 2N and all others are valued at
0. The second vector has valuations where two items are valued at 2N−1 and all other




Uniformly some permutation of (2N , 0, . . . , 0) : w.p. 2−N
Uniformly some permutation of (2N−1, 2N−1, 0, ..., 0) : w.p. 2−(N−1)
. . .
Uniformly some permutation of (2, 2, . . . , 2, 2) : w.p. 2−1
Uniformly some permutation of (1, 1 . . . , 1, 1) : w.p. 2−N
Then RSP = maxi 2N−iP
(
V (1) ≥ 2N−i) = maxi 2N−i∑Nj=N−i 2−j ≤
maxi 2
N−i2−N+i+1 = 2. Now we show ROPQ ≥ αN . Let prices be pi = 2N−i+1. Now
consider a pessimistic customer with V (1) = V (2) = . . . = V (i) = 2N−i+1, which occurs
w.p. α2−(N−i+1). By construction V (i+1) = 0 and thus this customer purchases the
size i opaque product at price 2N−i+1. The total revenue is then




Thus OPQ earns at least αN from pessimistic customers under this pricing strategy
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and ROPQ ≥ αN . 
Example A.3.2 (Tightness of Theorem 1.4.2 when α = 1). We describe a distri-
bution F such that RF1OPQ/RFSP = 2 when customers are pessimistic, demonstrating
tightness of Theorem 1.4.2. Fix z ∈ (0, 1) and let V1, . . . , VN be i.i.d. where
Vi =
 1 : w.p. z1− (1− z)N : w.p. 1− z
Then,
RSP = RSP (1) = RSP (1− (1− z)N) = 1− (1− z)N .
Similarly we compute the revenue of a 1OPQ strategy with prices (1, 1− (1−z)N). In
this strategy, the opaque product is only purchased if the customer has a high valuation
for all items or a low valuation for all items. Thus,




R1OPQ(1, 1− (1− z)N )
RSP =
(1− zN − (1− z)N ) + (1− (1− z)N )(zN + (1− z)N )
1− (1− z)N
= 1 + zN + (1− z)N − z
N
1− (1− z)N . (A.1)
Then Eq. (A.1) can be arbitrarily close to 2 as z goes to zero. Note this example holds for
any N . 
Example A.3.3 (Tightness of Theorem 1.4.2 when α = 0). We describe a distribu-
tion F such that RF1OPQ/RFSP = 32 when customers are risk-neutral, demonstrating
tightness of Theorem 1.4.2 when N = 2. Let valuations for the two items be drawn
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i.i.d. according to the CDF




, x ∈ [1,∞).
Note that for any x ∈ [1,∞), we have that P(max{V1, V2} ≤ x) = 1 − 1x and
P(max{V1, V2} ≥ x) = 1x . Thus RSP = 1 since pP(max{V1, V2} ≥ p) = 1 ∀ p ∈ [1,∞)
.
Now consider the 1OPQ strategy (p, 1) for p > 1. To compute R1OPQ(p, 1), let
V (1) = maxi{Vi}, V (2) = mini{Vi}, u = V (1) − p, and u2 = V (1)+V (2)2 − 1. Note that
u and u2 are the utilities of buying the best item or the opaque product, respectively.
By conditioning on the event V (1) ≥ p, we show that
R1OPQ
RSP ≥ R1OPQ(p, 1)
= P(V (1) ≥ p)
(
pP(u ≥ (u2)+|V (1) ≥ p) + P(u2 > (u)+|V (1) ≥ p)
)
+ P(V (1) < p)
(
pP(u ≥ (u2)+|V (1) < p) + P(u2 > (u)+|V (1) < p)
)
= P(V (1) ≥ p)(pP(V (1) − V (2) ≥ 2p− 2|V (1) ≥ p) + P(V (1) − V (2) < 2p− 2|V (1) ≥ p))
+ P(V (1) < p)(pP(V (1) − V (2) ≥ 2p− 2|V (1) < p) + P(V (1) − V (2) < 2p− 2|V (1) < p))
= P(V (1) ≥ p)(pP(V (1) − V (2) ≥ 2p− 2|V (1) ≥ p) + P(V (1) − V (2) < 2p− 2|V (1) ≥ p))




(pP(V (1) − V (2) ≥ 2p− 2|V (1) ≥ p) + P(V (1) − V (2) ≤ 2p− 2|V (1) ≥ p)) + (1− 1
p
)
≥ P(V (1) ≥ 2p− 2|V (1) ≥ p) + 1
p










P(V (1) − V (2) ≤ 2p− 2|V (1) ≥ p) + 1− 1
p
(A.2)
The first inequality follows since RSP = 1 and (p, 1) is feasible for 1OPQ. The first equality
follows from the definition of R1OPQ(p, 1) conditioning on V (1) ≥ p. The second equality
follows from the definitions of u and u2. The third equality follows from the fact that
V (2) ≥ 1 combined with the case where V (1) < p. The fourth equality follows from the
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distribution F . The second inequality follows since V (2) ≥ 0. The last equality follows from
Bayes rule. As p goes to ∞, the expression in Eq. (A.2) goes to 32 , matching the upper
bound in Theorem 1.4.2. 
A.4 Additional Proofs from Chapter 1
Proof of Corollary 1.3.1.
Case (i): From the proof of Theorem 1.3.1(i), the revenue from OPQ dominates the
revenue under SP conditional on every ordering of the valuations. When VN = V
(1),
only the highest-valued item can be purchased under DP . Conditional on this event,
the revenue from DP is clearly at most RSP . Thus,









Rearranging the inequality gives the result.
Case (ii): Recall from the proof Theorem 1.3.1(ii) that w.l.o.g. we may assume
F is supported on {1, 1 + δ}. Suppose the OPQ prices are pi = 1 + δ for i < N and
pN = 1. Recall that U is a r.v. denoting the number of items for which the customer
has a valuation of 1 + δ. A pessimistic customers buys an item at a price of 1 + δ
if 1 ≤ U ≤ N − 1 and the opaque product of size N at price 1 otherwise. Letting
ui = P(U = i), then
ROPQ ≥ 1 + δ(1− u0 − uN). (A.3)
Similarly from Eq. (A.6) in Appendix A.4 we have that





ui ≤ 1 + δN − 1
N
(1− u0 − uN).
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(1− u0 − uN) ≥ γRSP .
Combining these inequalities with Eq. (A.3) we obtain
ROPQ ≥ 1 + δ(1− u0 − uN)
≥ RDP + 1
N
δ(1− u0 − uN)
≥ RDP + γ




(N − 1)(1 + γ)
)
RDP
When customers are risk-neutral, they always purchase the opaque product of size





RDP + 1 − α. Thus when
α ≥ 1− γ
γN+N−1 we obtain ROPQ > RDP . 
Proof of Theorem 1.3.3
Proof. First we prove part (i). Fix an exchangeable distribution F over N items. For
ease of exposition we assume F is continuous and ignore ties, although the same ar-
gument follows when F is not continuous and one carefully considers the tie-breaking
procedure. Let p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pN be the optimal discriminatory pricing and
let q1, q2, . . . , qN be the probability item 1, 2, . . . , N is sold under this pricing. De-
fine Qi = {v ∈ supp(F ) | vi − pi ≥ (vj − pj)+ ∀j}. Note that qi = P(Qi). Let
σi,j : RN → RN be the map that interchanges vi and vj in a vector v.
We first observe that P(σi,j(Qi)) = qi by exchangeability. Further, for all i < j
and any v ∈ Qi, notice that σi,j(v) /∈ Qi since pi ≥ pj. With that established note,
P(V (1) ≥ pi) ≥ P(∪j≥iσi,j(Qi)) = ∪j≥iP(σi,j(Qi)) = (N − i+ 1)qi.
In words, the above equation says the probability the highest valuation is greater
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than pi is lower bounded by the probability of selling item i under a discriminatory
pricing, union with disjoint permutations of the event. Using this observation we can





maxi P(V (1) ≥ pi)pi ≤
∑N
i=1 qipi
maxi(N − i+ 1)qipi ≤ HN .
The final inequality follows from Lemma A.5.1 in Appendix A.5 with C1 = 0, C2 = 1,
K = 1, and HN is the N
th harmonic number. Recalling the fact that HN ≤ 1+log(N)
yields the result.
Part (ii) follows from the observation that one of the N prices in an optimal
opaque selling strategy garners the most revenue. Call that price pi and let qi be
the probability an opaque product of size i is sold. Then we must have that qi ≤
P(V (1) ≥ pi) and thus piqi ≤ RSP (pi) ≤ RSP . Therefore, ROPQ ≤ Npiqi ≤ NRSP .
Part (iii) follows from combining Example A.3.1 with part (i).
Proof of Lemma 1.3.3
The proof is based on following lemma which makes a fundamental connection be-
tween lottery pricings and the Myerson auctions.
Lemma A.4.1 (Lemmas 3 and 4 in Chawla et al. [32]). Consider a customer with
a valuation draw ~v and let i∗ = argmaxivi. Let L be a lottery pricing such that the
custo mer buys lottery (p, q1, . . . , qN) = l ∈ L. Let M be the Myerson auction for
one item, run on N bidders with valuations drawn from F . Then




where RL(~v) and RM(~v) denote the revenue earned by the lottery pricing and Myerson
auction when the valuation draw is ~v.
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Proof. Let (p, ~p) denote the prices of an optimal OPQ strategy under F , where p is
the price of items and ~p are the prices of the opaque products. Note that every opaque
product S can be written as a lottery with the same price and a uniform allocation
probability over S. Furthermore, we can describe the items as N individual lotteries,
each priced at p with a deterministic allocation. Thus for risk-neutral customers, our
opaque selling strategy can be recast as a lottery pricing which we call LOPQ, i.e.,
ROPQ = RLOPQ .
From Lemma A.4.1, we have that




We note that if a customer with valuation ~v and i∗ = argmaxivi purchases an item,
then
∑
i 6=i∗ qivi = 0 since qi∗ = 1. Otherwise if an opaque product is purchased,∑
i 6=i∗ qi ≤ N−1N and vi ≤ v(2) for i 6= i∗. Combining these facts with Eq. (A.4) yields





ROPQ ≤ RM + N − 1
N
E[V (2)]






The first inequality follows from taking the expectation of Eq. (A.5) over ~v. The
second inequality follows from the fact that E[V (2)] is the revenue of a second price
auction, which is dominated by the Myerson auction. The third inequality follows
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from Lemma 1.3.2. 
Proof of Theorem 1.4.1
Proof. Let F be an exchangeable distribution where item valuations can take only
two points {a, b} where a < b, and suppose the market is α-mixed. Recall for dis-
tributions supported on two points the optimal discriminatory pricing uses prices
~p = (a, a, . . . , a), (b, b, . . . , b) or a mixed pricing where exactly one price (since F is
exchangeable it doesn’t matter which price) is low (a, b, b, . . . , b). If either (a, a, . . . , a)
or (b, b, . . . , b) is the the optimal discriminatory pricing given F , then RSP = RDP
and the claim follows automatically. Suppose RDP > RSP , then the optimal pricing
is the mixed strategy and, under a mixed pricing, a discriminatory selling strategy
always sells the item. Further we restrict ourselves to 1OPQ strategies that always
sell the item, thus we may normalize the support of F to {1, 1 + δ} without changing
the ratio RDPR1OPQ .
Define U to be the random variable supported on {1, . . . , N} such that P (U = i) =
P
(
V (i) = 1 + δ, V (i+1) = 1
)
where V (i) is the ith highest order statistic of F . In words,
U is the random variable for how many of the N valuations are equal to 1 + δ. Recall





arrangements of valuations over the N
items are equally likely (thus knowing the distribution of U is equivalent to knowing
F in a two point setting). Let ui := P(U = i). Conditioning on U we can compute
RDP as



















where the second equality follows from Eq. (1.1).




δ, 1). To analyze the revenue from such a pricing, first note a pessimistic
customers always buy an item at price 1 + N−i
N
δ for any 1OPQ pricing (1 + N−i
N
δ, 1)
as long as U 6= 0, N , and the opaque product otherwise. Thus a pessimistic customer
has expected revenue 1 + (1− u0 − uN)N−iN δ.
For risk-neutral customers and 1OPQ pricing (1+N−i
N
δ, 1), customers will purchase
an item at price 1 + N−i
N
δ if 0 < U ≤ i, U 6= N , and the opaque product otherwise.





them together we have
R1OPQ ≥ 1 + max
i∈N
α(1− u0 − uN)N − i
N










δ (1− u0 − uN)
α + 1− α





















where the second inequality follows from noting Eq. (A.7) is an increasing function
of α and then plugging in α = 0. The second equality follows since i = N is not the





































The first inequality follows from Eq. (A.6) and Eq. (A.7). The second inequality
follows from applying Lemma A.5.2 (under the appropriate change of variables i.e.






RSP (1 + δ) ≤
1 + δ(1− u0)
(1− u0)(1 + δ) ≤
1 + δ(1− u0)
(1− u0)δ .
The first inequality follows from observing thatR1OPQ earns as much as a SP strategy
with price 1 + δ, which has expected revenue (1− u0)(1 + δ). The second inequality
follows from a simple upper bound on Eq. (A.6). Define C = (1 − u0)δ and putting
it all together we have,
RDP




















Proof of Theorem 1.4.2.
Proof. We divide the proof of Theorem 1.3.2 into two parts. First we show that
when customers are purely pessimistic, R1OPQ ≤ 2RSP . Second we show that




)RSP . To obtain the
result, we relax 1OPQ to observe Xα and price pessimistic and risk-neutral cus-
tomers separately. Using the previously mentioned results, we get that R1OPQ ≤(
α · 2 + (1− α) (2− 1
N
))RSP which is equivalent to the desired result.
First we prove that R1OPQ ≤ 2RSP when customers are all pessimistic (α = 1).
Fix a distribution F and let (p, pN) be an optimal solution corresponding to RF1OPQ.
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Then
R1OPQ = R1OPQ(p, pN)
= pP(max
i
{Vi − p} ≥ min
i
{Vi − pN , 0})
+ pNP(V N − pN > max
i
{Vi − p} ∩ V N − pN ≥ 0)
≤ pP(max
i
{Vi − p} ≥ 0) + pNP(max
i
{Vi − pN} ≥ 0)
= RSP (p) +RSP (pN)
≤ 2RSP .
The second equation follows from the definition of R1OPQ(p, pN) and breaks ties by
choosing to buy an item versus an opaque product. The first inequality follows from
increasing the size of the event being measured. The second inequality follows from
the fact that p and pN are feasible solutions to SP. For tightness, see Example A.3.2.
Now we focus on the case when customers are all risk-neutral (α = 0) and
show R1OPQ ≤ (2 − 1N )RSP . Fix a distribution F and let (p, pN) be an optimal
solution corresponding to RF1OPQ. Our proof breaks into two cases depending on the
relative gap between p and pN , corresponding to pN ≥ 1
N
p (Case 1) and pN < 1
N
p
(Case 2). Fig. A.3 illustrates the geometric difference in the two cases for N = 2 items.
Case 1: Recall in this case, pN ≥ 1
N
p. We first define qA, qB, qC , qD to be the
probabilities corresponding to the following disjoint events under F , namely




− pN ,max{Vi} ≥ p)




− pN ,max{Vi} ≥ p)











(a) Case: p2 ≥ 12p. (b) Case: p2 < 12p.
Figure A.3: These figures demonstrate the partition of the valuation space for a risk-
neutral customer when N = 2. In both figures, p = 4. The left figure corresponds to
a small discount for the opaque product and the right figure corresponds to a large
discount for the opaque product. The four letters denote different buying behaviors
of the customer under a (p, pN) 1OPQ strategy and a SP strategy with price p.
Note that qA + qB + qC + qD = 1. Using these probabilities, we have that
RF1OPQ(p, pN) = pqA + pN(qB + qC). Further, we can express the revenues from the
single pricing approximately asRFSP (p) = p(qA+qB) andRFSP (pN) = pNP(max{Vi} ≥









≤ pqA + p
N(qB + qC)








max{x(a+ b), y(a+ b+ c)} . (A.11)
The first inequality follows from the fact that p and pN are feasible for SP. The
second inequality follows from the previous discussion. The third inequality follows
from the fact that (p, pN , qA, qB, qC , qD) is a feasible solution to the optimization
problem in Eq. (A.11), which we denote by OPT . Lemma A.5.3, proved separately,
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shows that OPT ≤ 2 − 1
N
. Combining Lemma A.5.3 with Equations Eq. (A.9))-
Eq. (A.11) completes the proof for the case of pN ≥ 1
N
p.
Case 2: Recall in this case, pN < 1
N
p, where (p, pN) are optimal prices cor-
responding to RF1OPQ. We partition the valuation space under F according to the
events
E0 = {max{Vi} < pN}
E1 = {pN ≤ max{Vi} < p}
E2 = {p ≤ max{Vi} < N
N − 1(p− p
N)}
E3 = { N
N − 1(p− p
N) ≤ max{Vi}}.
We upper bound the revenue from single opaque selling using this partition. Cus-
tomers lying in E0 do not generate any revenue. The revenue generated by customers
lying in E1 is at most p
NP(E1) since they never consider buying an item at price p.
The revenue generated by customers lying in E3 is at most pP(E3) since the best case
scenario is that they all buy an item at price p. Lemma A.5.4, proved separately,
shows that the customers lying in E2 buy the opaque product at price p
N . Combining
the previous arguments shows that
R1OPQ(p, pN) ≤ pP(E3) + pN(P(E2) + P(E1)). (A.12)
Now suppose for contradiction that R1OPQ(p, pN) = R1OPQ > (2 − 1N )RSP . Then
the following two inequalities must also hold:



























by the optimality ofRSP . Now define δ′ = (p−pN)/p. Then combining the Eq. (A.13)
and Eq. (A.14) with Eq. (A.12) and dividing by p yields
1−P(E0)−δ′(1−P(E3)−P(E0)) = 1−δ′− (1−δ′)P(E0)+δ′P(E3) > 2N − 1
N − 1 δ
′P(E3)
(A.15)




(1− δ′)(1− P(E0)) (A.16)
Rearranging Eq. (A.15) yields
1− δ′ − (1− δ′)P(E0) > N
N − 1δ
′P(E3)
and rearranging Eq. (A.16) yields
1− δ′ − (1− δ′)P(E0) < N
N − 1δ
′P(E3),
which is a contradiction and thus R1OPQ ≤ 2N−1N RSP . For tightness when N = 2,
see Example A.3.3. 
Proof of Theorem 1.5.1.
Proof. The proof will depend on the following structural lemma which asserts that
the prices can be found by carefully combing through the support of the valuation
distribution. Suppose ~p is the optimal price vector. By Lemma A.5.5, and for every
i ∈ N , either there exists a type j such that pi = vj,i −maxk>i{(vj,k − pk)+}, or no
customer type buys item i. Using this observation, we can inductively enumerate the
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prices starting from the lowest price and working upwards.
Algorithm 1: Enumerative Algorithm
Main Enumerate Price Tree(F):
Input : Distribution F , supported on m types vi ∈ RN .
Initialize: PN = ∪mj=1vj,N
for ( i = N − 1 : 1 ) {
for ( p˜ ∈ P i+1 ) {
P i = P i ∪mj=1 vj,i −maxk>i (vj,k − p˜k)+
}
}
return arg maxp˜∈P 1RFDP (~p)
We focus on optimal pricing for DP, and the same analysis holds for OPQ. Con-
sider the following algorithm that proceeds by guessing the prices in order from low
to high. Fix some ordering on the prices p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pN , by exchangeability this
is w.l.o.g. By Lemma A.5.5, it must be the case that the lowest price pN ∈ {vj,N}mj=1
or else that item N is not purchased by any customer. If that item is supposed to not
be bought, we can set the price to ∞ effectively discarding the item. Thus there are
m+ 1 choices for pN , one for each customer type and the∞ no-purchase option. Un-
der each of these choices, compute {v˜j,N−1}mj=1 where v˜j,i = vj,i−maxk>i (vj,k − pk)+.
Again, it must be the case that pN−1 ∈ {v˜j,N−1}mj=1 by Lemma A.5.5 or else it is not
bought and we can set the price to ∞. Proceeding in this way we create a tree of
size of depth N with m + 1 branches, terminating in (m + 1)N leaf nodes each cor-
responding to a potential optimal solution. For each leaf node, one can compute the




Lemma A.5.1. For any x1, . . . , xN ≥ 0,
∑




C1 + C2 maxi ixi
≤ C1 + C2KHN
C1 + C2K
. (A.17)
Proof. We first claim that the left hand side of Eq. (A.17), viewed as an optimization
problem over all feasible ~x is maximized when ixi = jxj for all i, j. To prove this,
suppose ~x ∈ [0, K]N maximizes the left hand side of Eq. (A.17) and suppose the
claim does not hold. Let i = arg maxk kxk and j = arg mink kxk, so by assumption
ixi > jxj. Define yi, yj as solutions to the following system of two linear equations:
yi + yj = xi + xj
iyi = jyj
This yields iyi = jyj =
ij(xi+xj)
i+j







a weighted average of ixi and jxj. Consider the maximal solution with components
xi, xj replaced by yi, yj. Since yi+yj = xi+xj, the numerator in the l.h.s. of Eq. (A.17)
is unchanged. However since max{iyi, jyj} < ixi, the denominator strictly decreases
(in the case of many indices’s that maximize kxk, iterating the argument at most N−1
times yields a strict reduction) contradicting the optimality of ~x. Thus Eq. (A.17)







C1 + C2 maxi ixi










Lemma A.5.2. For any x1, . . . , xN−1 ≥ 0, such that
∑




1 + C maxi i
∑N−1
k=i xk
≤ 1 + CHN−1
1 + C
. (A.19)
Proof. We first claim that the left hand side of Eq. (A.19), as a function of ~x, is
maximized when i
∑N−1
k=i xk ≤ (i + 1)
∑N−1
k=i+1 xk for all i ≤ N − 2. To prove this,
let ~x be the maximizing vector and suppose the claim does not hold. For notational
convenience, define Si =
∑N−1
k=i xk, and let j be the smallest index such that jSj >
(j + 1)Sj+1. Note by subtracting jSj+1 from both sides, it follows that j satisfies
jxj > Sj+1. Define a new vector ~y that is the same as ~x except for yj, yj+1 which is
the solution to the following system of equations:
jyj = yj+1 + Sj+2
yj + yj+1 = xj + xj+1.
Note that this has a solution where yj < xj and yj+1 > xj+1. We shall show that
~y results in a higher ratio than x, contradicting the optimality of ~x. Since yj +
yj+1 = xj + xj+1 and yj+1 > xj+1, then jyj + (j + 1)yj+1 > jxj + (j + 1)xj+1 which
implies that the numerator of Eq. (A.19) is strictly increased under ~y. Next we argue





k=i xk for all i 6= j + 1. Since yj + yj+1 = xj + xj+1 and jyj = yj+1 + Sj+2, then
j
∑N−1
k=j xk = j(yj+yj+1)+jSj+2 = (j+1)yj+1 +(j+1)Sj+2 and thus the denominator
is unchanged under ~y. Thus ~y has an increased the value of Eq. (A.19), contradicting
the maximality of ~x.
Thus we may assume w.l.o.g kSk ≤ (k + 1)Sk+1 for any set x1, . . . , xN−1 that




1 + C maxi i
∑N−1
k=i xk
≤ 1 + C
∑N−1
i=1 Si
1 + C maxi iSi
≤ 1 + CS1HN−1
1 + CS1




The first inequality follows from kxk ≤ Sk+1 ≤ Sk, the second inequality follows from
Lemma A.5.1, and the third in+equality from the fact that S1 =
∑N−1
k=1 xi ≤ 1.
Lemma A.5.3. OPT ≤ 2− 1
N
.
Proof. First note for any optimal solution v∗ = (x, y, a, b, c, d) we may assume w.l.o.g.
that d = 0 (if d > 0 consider v′ where (a′, b′, c′) = (a, b, c)/(1 − d) and d’ = 0). We




s.t z ≥ y
z ≥ a+ b
0 ≤ 1
N
≤ y ≤ 1
a+ b+ c = 1
y, a, b, c ≥ 0
At optimality either z = y ≥ a+b or z = a+b ≥ y. Suppose z = y, then the objective
becomes 1 + a−ay
y
, which is maximized when a is maximal. Thus the constraint
a + b ≤ y forces b = 0 and a = y. Subbing in, then OPT = maxy≥ 1
N





. Similarly, suppose z = a + b ≥ y which implies c ≤ 1− y, then the objective
becomes a+y(b+c)
1−c which is maximized when c = 1 − y, a = y, and b = 0. Thus






2− y = 2− 1
N
.
Lemma A.5.4. Any customer ~v ∈ E2 buys the opaque product in the 1OPQ strategy
(p, pN).
Proof. Suppose a customer draws valuation (v1, v2, . . . , vN) ∈ E2, then maxi{vi} =
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p+ k, for some k ∈ [0, N
N−1(p− pN)− p). Then
max
i




















where the first inequality follows from the definition of k, and the second inequality
follows from the fact that
∑
i vi ≥ maxi vi. Thus the utility from any item at price p,




−pN , the utility from the opaque product. We also note







0, where the last inequality follows from the case assumption pN < 1
N
p.
Lemma A.5.5. Let F be a distribution over m customer types. Let ~p be a revenue
optimal pricing and suppose that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pN . Then for all i ∈ N , either
there exists a type j such that pi = vj,i −maxk>i{(vj,k − pk)+}, or no customer type
buys item i.
Proof. Let ~p be the optimal prices with p1 ≥ . . . ≥ pN , and let v˜j,i = vj,i −
maxk>i (vj,k − pk)+. Suppose for a contradiction that there exists an item i (choose
largest index if there are multiple options) that is purchased by a customer type, but
pi /∈ {v˜1,i, . . . , v˜m,i}. Call the customer type that purchases item i as type j, and if
there are multiple options select the type with smallest v˜·,i. Note that pi < v˜j,i, since
the reverse inequality implies type j would prefer to buy a different item (or no item)
based on the definition of v˜j,i.
We now consider an alternate pricing scheme ~p ′ where all prices are the same
except p′i = v˜j,i, which is a price increase. Under ~p
′, clearly all customers who
purchased an item other than i will still purchase that item due to the price increase
of i. The type j customer will buy an item with index at most i, since his favorite
among the items with index greater than or equal to i is i under the new pricing
(recall ties go the higher priced item), i.e., vj,i − p′i = maxk>i (vj,k − pk)+. Now
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consider a type l 6= j that also purchased i under the pricing ~p. Then vl,i − p′i =
v˜l,i + maxk>i (vl,k − pk)+ − p′i ≥ v˜j,i + maxk>i (vl,k − pk)+ − p′i = maxk>i (vl,k − pk)+,
where the inequality follows since j was chosen to have the smallest v˜·,i. Thus l, like
j, also prefers an item with index i or lower. Therefore, ~p ′ is a pricing with strictly
better revenue, resulting in a contradiction of the optimality of ~p.
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Chapter B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Bounding the Value of Personalized Pricing
Using the General Moments
Bounding the Value of Personalized Pricing Using
Coefficient of Variation
In this subsection, we apply Theorem 2.5.2 to bound the value of personalization in






















Since f(·) is convex, the possible maximizing solutions are the boundary points
{pk−1, pk} or the stationary point 1− λ12M2λ2 if 1− λ12M2λ2 ∈ [pk−1, pk] and λ2 < 0.
We then apply the constraint generation procedure of the previous section. In
Figure B.1, we plot the bound from Theorem 2.5.2 as a function of the coefficient of
variation. This curve is qualitatively similar to that of Fig. 2.4, which plots the value
of personalized pricing as a function of the coefficient of deviation. In both cases, the
value is maximized at intermediate levels of heterogeneity. In Fig. B.1, we also show
illustrate the dependence of our procedure on the choice of N , plotting the relative
gap between Eq. (2.12) and the discretized version of Eq. (2.11). We observe that the
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Figure B.1: The left panel shows the bound in Theorem 2.5.2 versus the variance,
using with N = 200 discretization points. The right panel plots the percent error in
Theorem 2.5.2 when M = .9, S = 10 and σ
µ
= 4, as a function of N , the number of
discretization points.
optimality gap rapidly shrinks for relatively small values of N , suggesting that the
number of samples needed to generate strong bounds on the value of personalization
is not prohibitive.
Bounding the Value of Personalized Pricing Using Geometric
Mean
In this subsection we apply Theorem 2.5.2 to bound the value of personalization in
terms of the geometric mean of the valuation distribution, G[V ] := exp (E[log (V )]),
which was studied in [99]. As noted in [99], for any valuation V , G[V ] ≤ E[V ] and
the inequality holds with equality if and only if V is a point mass. Similar to the
coefficient of deviation, the statistic G(V )
E[V ]
is bounded between 0 and 1 and intuitively
provides a measure on the heterogeneity of F .
For simplicity, we focus on the case c = 0 and µ = 1. (The general case can be
treated by Lemma 2.3.1.) Let f(t) = log (t) − log (B) so that E[f(V )] = 0 ⇐⇒
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G[V ] = B. Equation (2.13) then becomes
max
v∈[pk−1,pk]
λ1v + λ2 (log (v)− log (B))
Since f(·) is convex, the possible maximizing solutions are the boundary points
{pk−1, pk} or the stationary point −λ2λ1 if −λ2λ1 ∈ [pk−1, pk]. We then apply the con-
straint generation procedure of Section 2.5. In Fig. B.2(a) we plot the bound from
Theorem 2.5.2 as a function of the scaled geometric mean along side Theorem 2.1 in
[99]. In Fig. B.2(b) we plot the relative error in terms of N , the number of discretiza-
tion points.
Figure B.2: The left panel shows Theorem 2.5.2 with N = 250 points versus the
scaled geometric mean. the right panel plots the percent error in Theorem 2.5.2
when M = .9, S = 10 and G[V ]
E[V ]
= .4, as a function of N , the number of discretization
points.
Notice that for most values of G[V ]
E[V ]
, the bound from [99] is very weak and is only
useful in the limit as this quantity tends to 1. By contrast, Theorem 2.5.2 provides
an essentially tight bound for all values of the parameter.
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B.2 Omitted Proofs from Chapter 2
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1
The proof of Theorem 2.3.1 treats each regime of D separately. Within each regime,
we utilize the same basic technique as in Lemma 2.3.2. To that end, we first establish
two integral representations of D in terms of F (x).
Lemma B.2.1 (Integral Representations of D). For any F with scale S and margin




F (µx+ c)dx =
∫ M
0
1− F (µx+ c)dx. (B.1)
We now prove Theorem 2.3.1.
Proof. For simplicity, we first consider the special case when c = 0 and µ = 1. In this
setting RPP = µ = 1 and M = 1. We follow the general technique of Lemma 2.3.2.
















where we have pointwise upper bounded F (x) by 1 for x ∈ [0, RSPRPP ] and used the












We next use properties of W−1(·) to rewrite the inequality. For brevity, let α = RSPRPP .
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Then,
D ≥ 1− α + α log(α) ⇐⇒ D − 1 ≥ α(log(α)− 1)
⇐⇒ D − 1
e
≥ elog(α)−1(log(α)− 1) (using α = e · elog(α)−1).
Since D ∈ [0, 1], the right hand side is between −1/e and 0. Applying W−1(·) to both






















D − 1 , (B.6)
where the penultimate implication follows from the definition of W−1(·), and the last
line follows from the definition of α. We stress Eq. (B.6) holds for all D and coincides
with the Low Heterogeneity bound when c = 0, µ = 1.
Similarly, we can bound the cCDF in the first identity in Lemma B.2.1 to yield




















Again, we stress Eq. (B.7) holds for all D and coincides with the Medium Hetero-
geneity bound.
The High Heterogeneity bound can be derived similarly, using a different bounding
of the cCDF which is tighter when D is large. We defer the details to the next
subsection and only state the result in Lemma B.2.2 below.
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To summarize, when c = 0, Eqs. (B.6) and (B.7) hold for all 0 ≤ D ≤ δH and
Eq. (B.8) holds for all δM ≤ D ≤ δH . These results are sufficient to prove that
the bounds from the theorem are valid. For completeness, however, the next lemma
further proves that in each regime, the bound for that regime is the strongest of the
applicable bounds.










is negative for D ∈ (0, δL), is positive for D ∈ (δL, δH ], and has a unique root








has a unique root at D = δM and is non-negative for all D ∈ [0, δH ].
A consequence of Lemma B.2.3 is
• When D ∈ [0, δL], Eq. (B.6) dominates Eq. (B.7).
• When D ∈ (δL, δM ], Eq. (B.7) dominates Eq. (B.6).
• When D ∈ (δM , δH ], Eq. (B.8) dominates Eqs. (B.6) and (B.7).
This concludes the proof that the bounds are valid when c = 0 and µ = 1.
For a general c > 0 and µ > 0, we transform the problem to one in which c = 0
and µ = 1 using Lemma 2.3.1 and apply the results from Eqs. (B.6) to (B.8) using
the new Sc, Mc and Dc. Note, the coefficient of deviation Dc of Fc (as defined in
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Lemma 2.3.1) is related to D by Dc = D/M . Simplifying proves that the bounds are
valid for general c and µ.
It only remains to establish that the bounds are tight. We use the same technique
as in Lemma 2.3.2. Namely, in each regime, given S, M, D, and µ, we construct a
cCDF that makes all pointwise bounds on the cCDF simultaneously. A difference
from Lemma 2.3.2 is that the integral representations of D in the proof of Theo-
rem 2.3.1 do not determine F over its whole domain [0, Sµ]; they only span [0, µ],
or [µ, S] depending on the regime. This introduces some freedom in constructing the
cCDF on the remaining segment and causes the tight distributions to be non-unique.
Nonetheless, since these constructions follow the proof of Lemma 2.3.2 closely, we
defer the details to Lemma B.2.4 in the next subsection for brevity.
Omitted Proofs from Theorem 2.3.1.
We now provide proofs for the lemmas necessary to complete the proof of Theo-
rem 2.3.1.
Proof of Lemma B.2.1. Let V ∼ F and note,
0 = E[V − µ] = E[(V − µ)+]− E[(µ− V )+] =⇒ E[(V − µ)+] = E[(µ− V )+].
Moreover, E[|V −µ|] = E[(V −µ)+] +E[(µ−V )+], hence, combining with the above
yields E[|V − µ|] = 2E[(V − µ)+] = 2E[(µ − V )+]. We use these two identities to




















where the last line follows from the change of variables µ + t → µx + c. Similarly,
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where the last line follows from the change of variables µ− t→ µx+ c.
Proof of Lemma B.2.2. We follow the same strategy as previous two regimes bounds.
Note that when the coefficient of deviation is high, the probability that V is “close”
to 1 is low, since µ = 1. Formally, we claim that
Pr(V ≥ t) ≤ 1−D ∀t ∈ (1, S) (B.9)
To prove the claim, note that D = E[(1 − V )+] ≤ Pr(V ≤ 1), where the equality is
Lemma B.2.1 and the inequality uses (1−V )+ ≤ 1. Rearranging proves Pr(V ≥ 1) ≤
1−D, which in turn implies Eq. (B.9).
We use this inequality when pointwise bounding our integral representation.






















(Eq. (B.9) and Pricing Inequality)












. We next argue that D ≥ δM






Recall by Eq. (B.7) RPPRSP ≤
log(S)
D
for all values of D and, in particular, we have







= 1 + log (S) .













(1−D) is the unique minimizer.




(1−D) into Eq. (B.10) yields:








We next use properties of the Lambert-W function to simplify this equation. For
notational convenience define α = RSPRPP . Then,





⇐⇒ 1 ≤ α(1 + log (S(1−D))− log(α)) (B.11)
⇐⇒ −1 ≥ α(log(α)− log (eS(1−D)))




The left hand side is between −1/e and 0 by inspection. The function W−1(·) is
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≤ log(α)− log(eS(1−D)) (B.12)
⇐⇒ α ≥ eS(1−D) · eW−1( −1eS(1−D))



















Proof of Lemma B.2.3. First consider part a). Recalling that −W−1(−1/e) = 1, we
confirm directly that the given function is negative as D ↓ 0 since it is continu-
ous. Notice further that −W−1(·) is an increasing function (cf. Fig. 2.2), whereby
−W−1(− 1−De ))
1−D is an increasing function, while log(S)/D is a decreasing function. It
follows that the given function has a unique root, and it suffices to show this root is































































The second equivalence follows from the definition of the Lambert-W function. The








first follows from applying W−1(·). This completes the proof of part a).


















because the function y 7→ yey is the inverse of W−1(·) and is non-increasing on the









· S D−1D .






→ y so this last inequality is equivalent to
−1
e
≤ yey. One can confirm by differentiation that y 7→ yey has a unique minimizer
at y = −1, and, thus, this last inequality holds for all y. This proves the function







= −1. Simplifying shows this condition is equivalent to
D = log(S)/(1 + log(S)) = δM , as was to be proven.
We next explicitly describe the distributions which make Theorem 2.3.1 tight. By
Lemma 2.3.1, it suffices to consider the case where c = 0 and µ = 1. The general
case can be handled by scaling and shifting the below tight distributions:
Lemma B.2.4 (Tight distributions).





. Then, there is a random
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variable V with cCDF
FL(x) =

1 if 0 ≤ x < αL
αL
x
if αL ≤ x ≤ 1
D
log(S)x
if 1 < x ≤ S
0 otherwise,
(Tight cCDF, Low Heterogeneity)
and this random variable has scale S, coefficient of deviation D, and mean 1
and satisfies Eq. (B.6) with equality.










−1 if x ∈ (0, eS1− 1D )
αM
x
if x ∈ [eS1− 1D , S]
0 otherwise,
(Tight cCDF, Medium Heterogeneity)
and this random variable has scale S, coefficient of deviation D, and mean 1
and satisfies Eq. (B.7) with equality.







. Then, there is a
random variable V with cCDF
FH(x) =

1 if x = 0,




if x ∈ ( αH
1−D , S)
0 otherwise,
(Tight cCDF, High Heterogeneity)
and this random variable has scale S, coefficient of deviation D, and mean 1
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and satisfies Eq. (B.8) with equality.
Proof of Lemma B.2.4. Intuitively, FL, FM , and FH each make all the pointwise
bounds on the cCDF the integral representation of D used in the proofs of Eqs. (B.6)
to (B.8) tight, simultaneously. Thus, they will make the overall bound tight.
To prove the lemma formally, we will prove that FL, FM and FH are valid cCDFs,
each with mean 1, scale S, and coefficient of deviation D, and that RSP (FL, 0) = αL,
RSP (FM , 0) = αM and RPP (FH , 0) = αH , respectively. The lemma then follows
directly from the definition of αL, αM and αH since RPP (FL, 0) = RPP (FM , 0) =
RPP (FH , 0) = µ = 1.
a) (Low Heterogeneity) Note that replacing α by αL and the inequality by
equality in Eq. (B.4) and then following the implications backwards proves that αL
satisfies
D = 1− αL + αL log(αL).
We next prove FL is a valid cCDF. By inspection, we need only prove FL is
non-increasing, i.e., that αL ≥ D/ log(S) ⇐⇒ 1/αL ≤ log(S)/D. This inequality
follows directly from Lemma B.2.3 since D ∈ [0, δL], and the lefthand side is low-
heterogeneity bound while the right side is the medium heterogeneity bound. This










FL(x)dx = αL − αL log(αL) +D = 1,
where the last equality uses the identity proven above for αL. Thus, FL has mean 1.











dx = 1− αL + αL log(αL) = D, (B.13)
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again using the identify for αL. By inspection, it has scale S.
Finally, any price x ∈ [αL, 1] earns profit αL, while any price x ∈ [0, αL) earns
profit strictly less than αL. Any price x ∈ (1, S] earns profit D/ log(S) which is at
most αL as we noted when proving that FL is valid. Thus, RSP (FL, 0) = αL, which
proves that a random variable V with cCDF FL will satisfy Eq. (B.6) with equality.
b) (Medium Heterogeneity) To prove that FM is a valid cCDF, it suffices to
show that eS1−
1
D ≤ S, which is equivalent to 1 ≥ D
log(S)
. Rewrite this last inequality
as 1
αM
≥ 1, and recall from Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 that 1
αM
is an upper




















where the last equality uses the definition of αM . It follows that FM has mean 1,
and, by inspection, scale S. Write,
∫ S
1
FM(x)dx = αM logS = D,
to conclude from Lemma B.2.1 that FM has coefficient of deviation D. Finally,
observe that any price x ∈ [eS1− 1D , S] earns profit αM , while any other price earns
strictly less profit. Thus, RSP (FM , 0) = αM , completing this part of the lemma.
c) (High Heterogeneity) To prove FH is a valid cCDF, it suffices to show that
αH/(1−D) ≤ S. Note that by Lemma B.2.2, 1/αH is an upper-bound on the value of
personalization, whereby αH is necessarily at most 1. Moreover, for the Lambert-W
function defining αH to be well-defined, we must have that
1
S(1−D) ≤ 1 which implies
S(1 −D) ≥ 1. Thus, αH ≤ 1 ≤ S(1 −D) which implies that αH/(1 −D) ≤ S and
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We claim this last quantity equals 1. Indeed, from the definition of W−1(·), αH =
eS(1 − D) · eW−1( −1eS(1−D)). Then, replace α by αH and the inequality by equality in
Eq. (B.12) and follow the implications backwards to Eq. (B.11), proving the claim.
Thus, FH has mean 1, and, by inspection, has scale S.
To compute its coefficient of deviation, we first claim that αH/(1−D) ≥ 1. Indeed,
recall that
D ≥ δM = log(S)
1 + log(S)















where the last inequality follows from Lemma B.2.3. Now compute
∫ 1
0
1− FH(x)dx = D,
whereby FH has coefficient of deviation D by Lemma B.2.1.
∫ 1
0
1− F (x)dx = D.
It remains to check that RSP (F, 0) = αH , which we verify directly by observing that
any price x ∈ [ αH
1−D , S] obtains profit αH any any other price obtains profit no more
than αH .
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Other Omitted Proofs from Section 2.3
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1. First note the profit from personalized pricing under valuation
distribution F is RPP (F, c) = E[V ] − c = µ − c and under Fc is RPP (Fc, 0) =
E[ 1
µ−c(V − c)]− 0 = 1. Hence, it suffices to show that RSP (F, c) = (µ− c)RSP (Fc, 0)
to prove the first statement. Observe that
RSP (F, c) = max
p



















µ− c → q)
= (µ− c)RSP (Fc, 0).
For the last statement of the theorem, note that µc = E[
1
µ−c(V − c)] = 1, Mc =
1− 0/µc = 1, and
Sc =
















S − 1 +M
M
.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.3. Consider the case when c = 0 and µ = 1, which implies that
M = 1. We first prove that D ≤ δH and that there exists an F whose coefficient of
deviation is exactly δH . To this end, consider an arbitrary random variable V , and
define the new random variable V with two-point support
V =

E[V |V ≤ 1] with probability Pr(V ≤ 1)
E[V |V > 1] with probability Pr(V > 1).
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|V − 1| | V ≤ 1
]
Pr(V ≤ 1) + E
[





1− V | V ≤ 1
]
Pr(V ≤ 1) + E
[







V | V ≤ 1
])














i.e., both V and V have the same coefficient of deviation. Thus, to find a distribution
with maximal coefficient of deviation, it suffices to consider two-point distributions.





q(1− x) + (1− q)(y − 1)
s.t. qx+ (1− q)y = 1
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 ≤ y ≤ S, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1,
where the objective is the coefficient of deviation of a distribution with mass q at x < 1
and mass 1−q at y > 1. The constraint ensures that the mean is 1. In particular, this
constraint implies q = y−1
y−x for any feasible solution, whereby the objective simplifies
to (1−x)(2y−1)
y−x . This function is decreasing in x, whereby the optimal solution is x
∗ = 0,
y∗ = S and q∗ = S−1
S




= δH since M = 1.
Next we show 0 ≤ δL ≤ δM ≤ δH . Notice that δL = log(S)−W−1(− 1eS ) is the ratio of two
positive terms. Thus, it is positive. To show δL ≤ δM , note that, since S ≥ 1,





which, after rearranging, implies
− (1 + log (S)) e−(1+log(S)) ≤ −1
eS
.
Applying W−1(·) to both sides and noting this function is decreasing shows














as was to be shown.





≤ S − 1
1 + (S − 1) = δH ,
since x 7→ x
1+x
is an increasing function for x ≥ 0. This completes the proof in the
case c = 0 and µ = 1.
For general c > 0 and µ > 0, first apply Lemma 2.3.1 to obtain an instance with
zero cost and unit mean with corresponding parameters Dc, Sc, and Mc. From the















Proof of Lemma 2.3.4. Let us fix S and M , and define α(D) := α(S,M,D). Fix
any D1, D2, with 0 ≤ D1 ≤ D2 ≤ δH , and any t ∈ [0, 1]. We will show that
α(tD1 + (1− t)D2) ≤ tα(D1) + (1− t)α(D2) to prove the theorem.
By Theorem 2.3.1, there exists random variables V1 ∼ F1 and V2 ∼ F2 each with
scale S and margin M such that the coefficient of deviation of F1 is D1, the coefficient
174
of deviation of F2 is D2, α(D1) =
RSP (F1,c)
RPP (F1,c) and α(D2) =
RSP (F2,c)
RPP (F2,c) .
Since both V1 and V2 have the same margin and cost, they also have the same
mean µ = c
1−M . Take X to be a Bernoulli random variable with parameter t, and let
V˜ ≡ XV1 + (1 −X)V2 where X, V1, V2 are sampled independently. Note that V˜ has







|XV1 + (1−X)V2 − µ|
])













= tD1 + (1− t)D2.
To conclude the proof, write




tRSP (F1, c) + (1− t)RSP (F2, c)
RPP (F˜ , c)
≥ RSP (F˜ , c)RPP (F˜ , c)
≥ α(D˜)
= α(tD1 + (1− t)D2).
The first equation follows from the definitions of F1 and F2. The second equation
follows from the fact that the personalized pricing strategy yields µ − c for F1, F2,
and F˜ . The first inequality follows from the fact that the optimal single price for
V˜ yields revenue of at most RSP (F1, c) for the market corresponding to V1 and at
most RSP (F2, c) for the market corresponding to V2. The second inequality follows
Theorem 2.3.1. The last equality follows from Eq. (B.15).
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2 log(1/x) +O(log(1/x)) as x→ 1.
Substituting this expression into the bounds in the low heterogeneity and high het-
erogeneity regimes proves the result.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.2. For simplicity, we consider the special case when c = 0,
the general case is handled by transforming via Lemma 2.3.1. We will follow the
geometric intuition depicted in Fig. 2.6(a). First we will construct a trapezoidal
lower bound on RPP (F, 0), then an upper bound RSP (F, 0) by considering the area




and suppose the revenue maximizing single price p∗ is less than α, then it follows that
RSP (F, 0) ≤
∫ p∗
0
F (x)dx ≤ λµ which in turn implies RPP (F,0)RSP (F,0) ≥ 1λ . For the remainder
of the proof suppose that p∗ > α and let p∗ = (1 + k)α for some k > 0.
By unimodality, F is convex on [α,∞), thus there is a supporting line at p∗ which
we will denote as lp∗(x) := F (p
∗) − f(p∗) (x− p∗). Since F (x) is decreasing, for any
x ∈ [0, α], F (x) ≥ F (α) ≥ lp∗(α) = F (p∗)− f(p) (α− p∗). Integrating yields a lower















≥ αlp∗(α) + lp∗(α)
(












where the final equality follows from the first order optimality conditions for the
revenue maximizing price, d
dp
pF (p∗) = 0 =⇒ F (p∗) = f(p∗)p∗. We will now
compare RSP (F, 0) with Eq. (B.16).
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By definition of the supporting line at p∗, lp∗(p∗) = F (p∗) and the line has a
unique root lp∗(p
∗ + F (p
∗)
f(p∗) ) = lp∗(2p
∗) = 0. Using these two points we may rewrite
the supporting line as lp∗(x) =
2lp∗ (α)p∗−lp∗ (α)x
2p∗−α from which we can derive that F (p
∗) =
lp∗(p
∗) = lp∗ (α)p
∗
2p∗−α . Combining this expression with Eq. (B.16) we obtain
RPP (F, 0)

















To complete the proof will proceed in two cases depending on the size of λ.
(Case 1: λ ≥ 2
3
) By rearranging the equality Eq. (B.17) we can rewrite RSP as,























≤ 2 (1− λ) ≤ λ.
The third inequality follows from noting 1−λ = ∫ 2p∗
α






The final inequality follows from λ ≥ 2/3.
(Case 2: λ ≤ 2
3
) Following the geometry in Fig. 2.6(a), first write RSP (F, 0) as
the sum of the area before the mode and after the mode i.e., RSP (F, 0) = αF (p∗) +








2p∗−α . The second term is bounded by (p











RSP (F, 0) ≤ λ p
∗
2p∗ − α + (1− λ)


























(λ−2)2 . To complete the proof we will










F (x)dx = 1−D +
∫ α
µ
F (x)dx ≤ 1−D.
Substituting in both cases gives the result.
Omitted Proofs from Section 2.4
Proof of Theorem 2.4.1. We let FV |X denote the conditional distribution of V | X,
with corresponding mean µ(X), scale S(X), margin M(X), and coefficient of devia-
tion D(X). By assumption, M(X) = 1− c
µ(X)
≥ δ almost surely, and
D(X) =
E
[∣∣V − µ(X)∣∣ | X]
2µ(X)
=







where the last equality follows from the assumption on . From Lemma 2.4.1, we
have that
RXP = E
[RSP (FV |X, c)]
≥ E [RPP (FV |X, c) · α(S(X), M(X), D(X))] (Theorem 2.3.1)
= E
[





















(µ(X)− c) · α
(







The last inequality follows because α(S,M,D) is non-increasing in S, S(X) ≤ S, and
the function M 7→ S+M−1
M
is decreasing in M for S > 1. Since M(X) ≥ δ, the bound
follows.
By Lemma 2.3.4, D 7→ α(S+δ−1
δ








is also convex whenever y ≥ 0. Indeed, the second derivative of
this function is
















, 1, D) ≥ 0 for all D. Letting y → µ(X) − c,
we recognize that the right-hand side of Eq. (B.18) is an expectation of a convex
function of µ(X)− c, and hence, by Jensen’s inequality,
RXP ≥ (µ−c)·α
(















where the equality follows from Lemma 2.3.1. This proves the result.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.3. By inspection, RPP = t2 . To compute RkP , consider an opti-
mal segmentation s0, . . . , sk+1 with corresponding prices p1, . . . pk. (Recall s0 = c = 0,
sk+1 = t, and pi ∈ [si, si+1), i ≥ 1.) By Lemma 2.4.2, si = pi for i = 1, . . . , k.
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Now, on segment [si, si+1), the conditional distribution of V is uniform, so the




for all i, since only si+1−si
t
fraction of the market is in this interval. By contrast, for i = 1, . . . , k−1, the k-market
segmentation strategy earns revenue si
si+1−si
t
since pi = si and thus, all customers in
the segment buy. The difference in revenue between the two strategies is then









· si+1 − si
t















The segmentation which maximizes RkP (F, 0, s,p) also minimizes this difference. By
inspection, for a fixed s1, the optimal segmentation is equispaced, i.e., si = si−1 + tk+1











Consequently, RPPRkP = 1 + 1/k.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.2. We prove the second part of the theorem first.
(b) We first consider the case where V ∼ F has µ = 1 and c = 0. Consider a
partition δ = s0 < s1 < . . . sk < sk+1 = S. Let Vi ∼ Fi denote the random variable V
conditional on the event V ∈ [si, si+1), i.e., Pr(Vi ≤ t) ≡ Pr
(
V ≤ t |si ≤ V ≤ si+1
)
.
Further, let qi = Pr(si ≤ V ≤ si+1) be the market share of the i-th segment, Si be
the scale of Vi and RSP (Fi, 0) = maxp pFi(p).
From Eq. (2.5) in the proof of Lemma 2.3.2 we have that for any γ ≤ RSP (Fi, 0),
RPP (Fi, 0)






We will apply Eq. (B.19) to each Fi with the trivial lower bound si. Notice that since
Vi ≤ si+1 almost surely, SiE[Vi] ≤ xi.
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where the last line follows because partitioning at the si and offering prices p
i ∈
arg maxp≥si pFi(p) is a feasible segmentation policy. We minimize this last bound by











. This choice of si yields











For the general case note that for the transformation in Lemma 2.3.1, one can
prove that RPP (F,c)RkP (F,c) =
RPP (Fc,0)
RkP (Fc,0) by considering each segment separately and applying
an argument analogous to Lemma 2.3.1. Thus, given an F with arbitrary mean and
c > 0, first transform to Fc and apply the above result. Substituting the original
parameters proves the second part of theorem.
We now use the previous result to prove the first part of the theorem.
(a) First consider the case where µ = 1 and c = 0. We prove the bound by separat-
ing the distribution into a small lower component near 0 and an upper component.
We bound the lower component of F in terms of D and bound the upper component
by applying (a). Fix some ∆ > 1 which we shall select later. To bound the lower
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tail, note




























Rearranging yields Pr(V ≤ 1/∆) ≤ ∆D










Pr(V ≤ 1/∆) ≤ D
∆− 1 . (B.21)
Now by splitting the expectation,

























∆− 1 + E[V∆] Pr(V ≥ 1/∆)
where V∆ is the conditional distribution of V given that V ≥ 1/∆, i.e., Pr(V∆ ≥ t) =
Pr(V ≥ t|V ≥ 1/∆).
Note that E[V∆] ≥ 1 and that V∆ has scale S/E[V∆] ≤ S. Most importantly,
Pr(V∆ ≥ 1∆) = 1, so that we can apply part (b) to upper bound the expectation
yielding







RkP (F∆, 0) Pr(V ≥ 1/∆).
Finally, letting \∗ be the optimal segmentation for RkP (F∆, 0) and p∗ be the corre-
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sponding prices. Define the function
r(v) =

p∗i if v ∈ [s∗i , s∗i+1) and v ≥ p∗i , i = 1, . . . , k
0 otherwise.
Then,










































Plugging in above yields,















≤ 1 + 1
k
+








For a general c > 0 and µ 6= 1, apply the transformation of Lemma 2.3.1. As in
the previous part, note that RPP (F,c)RkP (F,c) =
RPP (Fc,0)
RkP (Fc,0) . Apply the result of the previous
part and then make the appropriate substitutions.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.3. We shall prove that
RkP (Fµ(X), c)−RkXP (FXV , c) ≤ RPP (Fµ(X), c)−RXP (FXV , c). (B.22)
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Note that RPP (Fµ(X), c) = RPP (F, c) so that Eq. (B.22) implies the two inequalities
above by rearranging. In fact, we will prove that the portion of profits earned by
each strategy for a fixed context x ∈ X satisfies Eq. (B.22).
To that end, let {si}ki=0 ∈ Rk+1 be an optimal k-market segmentation for
RkP (Fµ(X)) of the form described in Lemma 2.4.2 where s0 = c and sk+1 = ∞.
Partition the feature space, Xi := {x ∈ X
∣∣µ(x) ∈ [si, si+1)} for i ∈ 0, 1, . . . , k. Let
p(·) : X → R denote the optimal pricing function forRXP (FXV , c). Finally, let x ∈ Xi
be some fixed realization of X for some i = 0, . . . , k.
When X = x, the XP strategy earns
x-Contribution to XP = (p(x)− c)P {µ(x) +  ≥ p(x)} ,
where we have used independence to drop the conditioning on X = x.
Similarly, when X = x, the kP strategy earns
x-Contribution to kP = (si − c)
on Fµ(X), since by Lemma 2.4.2 all customers in the segment buy at price si.
Next, we lower bound the x-Contribution to kXP by considering a feasible feature-
based segmentation strategy. Let xi ∈ arg minx∈Xi µ(X), and consider offering price
p(xi) to every customer in Xi. When X = x, this strategy earns at most
(p(xi)− c)P {µ(x) +  ≥ p(xi)} ≥ (p(xi)− c)P {µ(xi) +  ≥ p(xi)} ,
since µ(x) ≥ µ(xi) for all x ∈ Xi. We again use independence to drop conditioning
on X = x. On the other hand, by Lemma 2.4.1, p(xi) is the optimal single price
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when X = xi, so that pricing at p(x) + µ(xi)− µ(x) must earn less profit, i.e.,
(p(xi)− c)P {µ(xi) +  ≥ p(xi)}
≥ (p(x) + µ(xi)− µ(x)− c)P {µ(xi) +  ≥ p(x) + µ(xi)− µ(x)}
= (p(x) + µ(xi)− µ(x)− c)P {µ(x) +  ≥ p(x)} ,
where now we use independence to drop the conditioning X = xi throughout. Com-
bining these two inequalities shows
x-Contribution to kXP ≥ (p(x) + µ(xi)− µ(x)− c)P {µ(x) +  ≥ p(x)} .
Now combine these contributions as in Eq. (B.22),
x-Contribution to XP + x-Contribution to kP− x-Contribution to kXP
≤ (si − c) + (µ(x)− µ(xi))P {µ(x) +  ≥ p(x)}
≤ (si − c) + (µ(x)− µ(xi))
≤ µ(x)− c,
where the last line follows because µ(xi) ∈ [si, si+1). Recall x was chosen arbitrarily.
Averaging this inequality over realizations of X yields Eq. (B.22) to complete the
proof.
Omitted Proofs from Section 2.5.
Proof of Theorem 2.5.1. Without loss of generality, suppose c = 0. Now recall that
the revenue of a feature based strategy RXP (F, 0) equals the expectation of single
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price strategies over every realization of X i.e.,











where as in Theorem 2.4.3, the independence of X and  allows us to drop of the
conditioning µ(X) = x. We will prove bounds on Eq. (B.23) by applying the bounds
from Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 to each realization of X, RSP (Fx+)
x
. Note the coeffi-
cient of deviation of the distribution x +  is E[||]
2x

















) is convex in x on the open interval
[c,∞), applying Jensen’s inequality to the right hand side of Eq. (B.23) yields the
desired lower bound.
To derive an upper bound, first note x+ is unimodal and left-skew for any x, thus
the conditions of Theorem 2.3.2 are satisfied for every realization of X and may be
applied in a similar fashion as before. Unfortunately the resulting integral is convex





1−D if D ≤ 1/3,
(1+D)2
8D




is the minimal concave (linear in fact) upper bound on the right hand




















Dividing through by RSP (F, 0) gives the result.
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Proof of Theorem 2.5.2. We first consider the case when c = 0 and µ = 1 so that
M = 1. Our strategy will be to compute lower bound, z∗, on RSP/RPP so that
1/z∗ is an upper bound on RPP/RSP . Since (2.11) provides a tight upper bound on
















I(v ≥ p)dPv, ∀p ∈ [0, S].
dPv ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ [0, S]








dQp = 1 (B.25)
θ + λ1v + λ2f(v)−
∫ S
0
pI(v ≥ p)dQp ≤ 0, ∀v ∈ [0, S]
dQp ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ [0, S].
By weak-duality, any feasible solution to problem (B.25) yields a valid lower bound to
(B.24). To form such a feasible solution to (B.25), we constrain Qp to be supported
only on {p0, . . . , pN} and denote the corresponding point masses as Q0, Q1, . . . , QN .
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Qj = 1, Qj ≥ 0 ∀j = 0, . . . , N (B.26)
θ + λ1v + λ2f(v)−
N∑
j=0
pjI(v ≥ pj)Qj ≤ 0, ∀v ∈ [0, S] .
Notice that the sum of indicators in the second set of constraints of Eq. (B.26) is
constant over [pk−1, pk). Thus, we can rewrite this constraint of Eq. (B.26) as N + 1
separate sets of constraints:
θ + λ1v + λ2f(v) ≤
k−1∑
j=0
pjQj, ∀v ∈ [pk−1, pk), k = 1, . . . , N,




Replacing the second family of constraints of Eq. (B.26) with these N + 1 sets of
constraints completes the proof when µ = 1 and c = 0.
In the general case, by Lemma 2.3.1, the value of personalization for a random
variable V with scale S, margin M and mean µ equals the value of personalization
for the random variable Vc =
V−c
µ−c , which has scale Sc =
S+M−1
M
, margin 1, and mean
1. Furthermore, if E[f(V )] = 0, then, E[fc(Vc)] = 0 where fc(t) = f(t(µ − c) + c).
Thus, we can apply the above result to Vc (with shifted parameters) and fc(·) with









Qj = 1, Qj ≥ 0 ∀j = 0, . . . , N (B.27)
θ + λ1v + λ2fc(v) ≤
k−1∑
j=0
pjQj, ∀v ∈ [pk−1, pk) , k = 1, . . . , N,




Note that fc(v) = f(v(µ − c) + c) = f (vµM + µ(1−M)) and fc(Sc) = f(Sµ) to
complete the proof.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 2.5.1. Let p∗ be such that supF∈F RSP (F ) =
supF∈F RSP (F, p∗) and let i be such that (1 + δ)i − 1 ≤ p∗ ≤ (1 + δ)i+1 − 1. Let
F ∗, Fi, Fi+1 be the respective tight distributions and note that each distribution is in
F . Then,
p∗F ∗(p∗) ≤ pi+1F ∗(p∗) ≤ pi+1F ∗(pi) ≤ pi+1Fi(pi)





Where the third inequality follows by the optimality of F i for (Pi) and all other
inequalities follow from their respective definitions.
B.3 A Dynamic Programming Algorithm for
Computing (kP)
In this section, we describe an efficient dynamic programming algorithm for com-
puting the optimal k-market segmentation when the valuation distribution is known
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precisely and discretely supported on n values. One should compare this algorithm
to the distribution-agnostic procedure given in Theorem 2.4.2 when the valuation
distribution is not known precisely.
Structurally, computing the optimal k-market segmentation is extremely similar
to the 1D Clustering problem for which dynamic programming approaches have been
employed (see [64] for a modern overview). Formally, suppose V is supported on
n values {vi}ni=1, occurring with probabilities {qi}ni=1. Without loss of generality
suppose the values are indexed from low to high, i.e., vi ≤ vi+1 for all i. By an
argument identical to Lemma 2.4.2 the optimal segmentation {si}ki=0 is contained in
the support of V , we wish to find {si}ki=0 ⊂ {vi}ni=1 that maximizes
k∑
i=1
si Pr (V ∈ [si, si+1)) .
We give a dynamic programming solution that uses time O(kn2). Define D[m, j] as
the optimal j-market segmentation that considers the m lowest points {(vi, qi)}mi=1,
our goal is to compute D[n, k]. Our algorithm depends on the following observa-
tion: consider the optimal k-market segmentation and suppose [vik , vn] defines the
kth segment. If one considers the market without the customers in the kth segment,
the remaining k − 1 segments must be an optimal (k − 1)-market segmentation on
{(vi, qi)}ik−1i=1 . Formally we express this observation as the following recursion,
D[m, j] = max
l∈[m−1]




which states that the optimal j-market segmentation on the lowest m valuations, is
equal to some optimal (j − 1)-segmentation on a smaller market, plus the value of
the jth segment. Using Eq. (B.28) we may populate a table of size kn, starting at
D[0, 0] = 0, and computing column-wise. Each computation of D[m, j] requires O(n)
operations, thus the table may be populated in O(kn2) time.
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Chapter C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Omitted Proofs from Chapter 3
Omitted Proofs from Section 3.2
Proof of Theorem 3.2.1. We will consider the two cases separately.
(a) Unique Box. Consider a customer facing a catalog of N items. Let Xk =∑k
i=1(Vi − p), which is the net utility of buying k unique boxes. Note the customer
will buy the first unique box if XN ≥ 0, and continue to purchase until the mean
valuation for the remaining items is less than p. Specifically, a myopic customer stops
purchasing at the first t such that
∑
i6∈St (Vi−p)
N−t < 0, which implies that
∑
i∈St
(Vi − p) = XN −
∑
i 6∈St
(Vi − p) ≥ XN .
Hence, the net utility of myopic strategy is at least XN . On the other hand, consider
{Vi}Ni=1 as valuations for the goods in the order in which they are purchased i.e. the ith
loot box purchase yields an item valued at Vi. Then an upper bound on the maximum
possible net utility of any purchasing strategy is the utility of the clairvoyant strategy
that stops when customer utility is maximized: MN = maxk∈[N ]
∑k
i=1(Vi − p).
For a random customer, since Vi are i.i.d, MN is equivalent to the maximum
deviation from 0 of the random walk of partial sums, {Xk}Nk=1. By Theorem 2.12.1 in
[65], limN→∞MN/N converges to max(0, µ− p) almost surely. Further by the strong
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law of large numbers, limN→∞XN/N converges to µ−p almost surely. Let UOPTN and
UMN be the net utility of the optimal strategy and the myopic strategy, respectively.
Then we have max(0, XN) ≤ UMN ≤ UOPTN ≤MN . Dividing by N yields:
UMN
N
≥ max(0, XN )
N










a.s.−−→ max(0, µ− p)
which together imply that the normalized net utility of both the optimal strategy and the
myopic strategy converge to max(0, µ− p) almost surely.
(b) Traditional Box. As in (a) consider a customer facing a catalog of N items,
with valuations {Vi}Ni=1. If a customer purchased t boxes and their valuation for another
traditional box exceeds the price, 1N
∑
j∈[N ]−St Vj ≥ p, then clearly purchasing the next box
gives positive expected utility and will be undertaken by an optimal policy. Suppose instead
that after t purchases 1N
∑
j∈[N ]−St Vj < p. We will show that in this case a purchase will
never increase a customers utility in expectation which implies the myopic policy is optimal.
To see this, consider the following lottery: with the probability 1N the customer will
receive Vj utility for each j /∈ St, and with probability N−|St|N they will receive nothing.
Clearly after t purchases this lottery is equivalent to a traditional loot box, and for every
loot box purchase after t, the customer will prefer this lottery since the lottery eliminates
the replacement effect from items acquired after t. However, even for this strictly better
lottery, buying any amount has negative utility. Hence when customers reach a traditional
box for which 1N
∑
j∈[N ]−St Vj < p, it is optimal to stop purchasing.
Omitted Proofs from Section 3.3
Proof of Item a). Consider the extended sum utility random walk from the proof of
Theorem 3.2.1(a), {Xj}∞j=0 where Xj :=
∑j
i=1(Vi − p), X0 = 0, where valuations are
indexed so that the ith item a customer receives is valued at Vi. Recall a myopic
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customer will purchase loot boxes until their expected utility is negative i.e. until the
first time t such that Xt > XN .
To prove the theorem, we will construct a sequence of prices pN = µ− N , where
limN→∞ N = 0. Then Xt is always a random walk with positive drift, and we show
that the fraction of unique boxes purchased under these prices tends to 1. Fix an N ,
a corresponding price pN = µ− N < µ, and some kN ∈ (0, 1). Let sN be the selling
volume, i.e., the first time t such that Xt > XN , and τN be the first passage time
of {Xi} to the line (1 − kN)NN . Unfortunately sN is not a stopping time making
it difficult to characterize, however τN is, and we will use τN to approximate sN for
our desired result. Note that for the sample paths such that XN ≥ (1 − kN)NN ,









]− E [τNIXN<0] . (C.1)
We will lower bound Eq. (C.1) term by term. First since τN is a stopping time, we






= (1− kN)N. (C.2)
For the second term in (C.1), i.e., the case that XN ∈ [0, (1 − kN)NN), the most
conservative case for the seller is when XN = 0 and the walk does not hit (1−kN)NN
before N . In this case it takes another (1 − kN)N steps in expectation to reach
(1− kN)NN . Thus,
E [τN |XN ∈ [0, (1− kN)NN)] ≤ N + (1− kN)N. (C.3)
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The probability that XN ∈ [0, (1− kN)NN) can be upper bounded using Cheby-
shev’s Inequality,


















For the third term in (C.1), i.e., the case that XN < 0, since Vi ≥ 0, a simple lower
bound on XN is −NpN . Supposing XN = −NpN , in expectation it takes another
(NpN + (1 − kN)NN)/N steps from N for the random walk to hit (1 − kN)NN .
Thus, E [τN |XN < 0] ≤ N+ Np+(1−kN )NNN and, as before, the probability that XN < 0
can also be upper bounded using Chebyshev’s Inequality,































Plugging Eqs. (C.2), (C.5) and (C.6) into the right hand side of Eq. (C.1) yields,
E[sN ] ≥ N
(




















Now we can lower bound the normalized revenue of a unique box strategy,






















Choosing N = µN
−1/5, and kN = N−1/5, we have
RUB ≥ µ(1−N−1/5)
(
















Combined with the fact that RUB ≤ µ, we conclude that limN→∞RUB = µ.
Proof of Item b). Consider the sum of valuations random walk, {Yi}∞i=0, where Yj =∑j
i=1 Vi and Y0 = 0. For a random customer, YN/N is their expected valuation of the
first traditional box. Each time the customer receives a new item, they move back
one index on the random walk from Yj+1 to Yj, the customers total valuation for all
the remaining j items. Note that Yi is strictly increasing with i, and every time the
customer receives a new item, their total valuation for the remaining item decreases
monotonically.
Similar to our proof of (a), we will construct a sequence of prices pN such that
limN pN → µe and show the expected number of traditional loot boxes purchased
by a customer at price pN tends to N . Fix an N and a corresponding price pN .
Then a customer purchases until the first time t (counting down from N) such that
Yt
N
< pN ⇐⇒ Yt < NpN . Let τ(pN) be the first passage time of {Yi} to NpN i.e.,
τ(pN) := min{t : Yt ≥ NpN}. Note that since Yi is monotonic, the random walk
crosses NpN exactly once. Suppose τ(pN) ≤ N , then at time τ(pN) the number of
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distinct items a customer will own is N−τ(pN)−1, and the number of traditional loot
boxes they will have purchased is the sum of N − τ(pN) − 1 independent geometric
random variables, Geo(1) + Geo(N−1
N
) + . . . + Geo( τ(pN )
N

















































= log k + γ + ζk, with {ζk} converges to 0 from above, and γ is the
EulerMascheroni constant.
First we will bound E[τ(pN)]. Since τ(pN) is the passage time, Yτ(pN ) ≥ Np and



































































where Eq. (C.11) follows from the fact that − log τ(pN )
N

















which is our desired guarantee. We will now upper bound the revenue, RTB(N, pN).
Consider the event that τ(pN )
N
≤ (1 − N) pµ for some small N . We can upper bound
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where the last inequality follows by Chebyshevs. Note that τ(pN) is at least 1, we




































Iτ(pN )<N(1−N ) pNµ
]
(C.15)

















= pNζN + pN max{log µ






where Eq. (C.17) follows by the monotonicity of log(·), and by applying Eq. (C.14)
and τ ≥ 1. Now setting N = N− 13 and substituting gives,









Maximizing Eq. (C.18) over pN gives p¯N := µ/exp(1+log(1−N− 13 )−ζN). Combining











 ≤ RTB ≤ p¯N (ζN − log(1−N− 13 ))+ p¯N log µ
p¯N
+






Taking limits of both sides of Eq. (C.19) completes the proof.
Omitted Proofs from Section 3.4
Proof of Corollary 3.4.1. We modify the random walk Xt in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.3.1(a) into a stochastic process {X ′t, t ≥ 0}. For t ≤ N , let X ′t be the net utility
of a random customer after opening t boxes. For t > N , simply let X ′t−X ′t−1 = µ¯−p.
For now X ′N has mean Nµ¯ and variance Nσ¯
2. Also, the expectation of Xt − Xt−1
is µ¯ for any t ≥ 1. Following the proof of Theorem 3(a), the Wald’s equation and
Chebyshev’s inequality are still valid, so the result remains the same. 
Proof of Lemma 3.4.1. Fix k ∈ (0, 1) and let p = ∑Mm=1 dmµme− dmβm k, we will show
that the normalized number of loot box purchases made by a customer under the




, tends to k as N → ∞. Formally,
for any  > 0, we will show there exists an integer M such that for all N ≥ M ,
k −  ≤ E [QNd (p)] ≤ k + . For clarity we will separate the proof into two cases.
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k, we first bound the probability that QNd (p) < (1− )k.
Note since a customers valuation for the next loot box decreases after each purchase,
this event is complementary to the event in which a customers valuation for the loot
box dips below is less than p after they have opened (1− )kN boxes. We will bound
this event by applying Chebyshev’s inequality, for which we will need estimates of
both the mean and variance of customers valuation after opening (1 − )kN boxes.
Let Zmi be an indicator random variable taking value 1 if item i from class m has
not been revealed after (1 − )kN purchases, and 0 otherwise. When the class is
clear from the context we will drop the superscript. Now, after each purchase the
probability that item i in class m is obtained is dm
βMN







Let Gm denote the set of items in class m. For a random customer, the valuation
of the next loot box after (1 − )kN purchases is given by ∑Mm=1∑i∈Gm dmβmNViZmi ,


































Moreover, for each class m the set of indicators {Zmi }|Gm|i=1 is negatively correlated
since, for any i, j ∈ Gm, if Zmi is not revealed, Zmj is more likely to be revealed. Thus
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Now applying Chebyshev Inequality to the event that less than , we have
P
(




































































































































− e− dmβm k
))2 (C.21)
Taking the limit as N tends to infinity, the numerator of Eq. (C.21) approaches
a constant, and the denominator goes to infinity. Thus for any  > 0, there exists
M1 such that for all N > M1, P
(
QNd (p) < (1− /2k)k
) ≤ /2k. Applying Eq. (C.21)




































] ≤ k + 
As for the lower bound, we will first control the event that QNd (p) > (1 + )k. Let
Zmi = 1 now denote the event that after opening (1 + )kN loot boxes, item i in
group m is still not revealed. As before we will omit the superscript when it is clear










































































































p−∑Mm=1 µmdm (1− dmβmN)(1+)kN)2

























Now we will choose  = − log(1 − N−1/3)/k. Substituting our choice of  into the
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where the second inequality follows from
((
1− dmβmN
)(1+)kN ≤ e− dmβm (1+)kN). Plugging
back into Eq. (C.23), the probability that customer purchases more than (1 − log(1 −
N−1/3))kN boxes is then bounded above by,
P
(

























Finally, returning to QNd(p), a trivial upper bound on E[Q
N
d (p)] is the expected number
of purchases necessary to obtain all N items. To compute this fix a class m, to collect all
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the item in class m, on average the customer needs to open





































The expected number of purchases required to collect all the items is bounded by the sum
of the number of purchases to collect all the items in each class,












































































































































































Thus for any  > 0, there exists M2 such that for N > M2, the RHS of (C.25) < k + .
Taking the maximum of M1 and M2, and combining Eqs. (C.22) and (C.25), we know that












Proof of Theorem 3.4.1. Consider a finite group allocation d = (d1, . . . , dM). For
p >
∑M
m=1 dmµm, by the law of large numbers, the normalized selling volume will
tend to 0. Now suppose p ≤ ∑Mm=1 dmµm. Note ∑Mm=1 dmµme− dmβm k equals µ when
k = 0, and decreases monotonically to 0 as k → ∞. Thus for any such p, there






































function obtains its maximum at k = βm/dm, and the maximum value is βmµm/e,
which is independent from the value of dm. Hence, the revenue is bounded by∑M
m=1 βmµm/e = µ¯/e. For any d, we can reach the the upper bound µ¯/e only if





m=1 dm = 1, the only possible allocation is dm = βm,






k = µ¯/e. Hence the optimal solution is p = µ¯/e with propor-
tional allocation, and the optimal revenue is µ¯/e.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1. Let p be the price separate selling uses. Now consider a
loot box strategy (either unique box or traditional box) with salvage cost p and price
p. The customer will purchase indefinitely, keeping all the items which they value at
p or greater, and returning the unwanted items for a full refund. Hence, such a loot






Proof of Theorem 3.4.2. We will consider the two cases separately.
(a) Let V ci = max{Vi, c} and Fc be the valuation of item i and the distribution of
customer valuations under the a salvage system with cost c. Let η˜ be the mean of
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Fc. By Theorem 3.3.1(a), as the number of items N →∞, the optimal price tends to
η˜ and the expected proportion of items obtained tends to 1. Since almost all items
are obtained in expectation, the proportion of items salvaged is F (c) = γ w.p. 1.




γc. Together, the normalized revenue is then η˜ − γc. Noting η˜ can be rewritten as
E[max{V, c}] = γc + (1 − γ)E[V |V > c] = γc + (1 − γ)η and plugging in gives the
result.
(b) Following Theorem 3.3.1(b), we will consider the a modified sum of valuations
random walk for customers of traditional box with salvage cost c. First, consider
partition the items into two sets based on the items that will be salvaged, SL =
{i|Vi ≤ c}, and items that will not be salvaged SU = {i|Vi > c}. Index the items in
SU from 1 to |SU | in reverse order in which they will be allocated {V Ui }|SU |i=1 . Then the





and Y0 = cN . For a random customer, Y|SU |/N is their expected valuation for the
first traditional box. Each time the customer receives a new item from SU , they move
back one index on the random walk from Yj+1 to Yj. Then {Yi} is strictly increasing,
since every time the customer receives a new item from |SU |, their total valuation for
the remaining items decreases.
Fix an N and price pN . Then a customer purchases until the first time t (counting
down from |SU |) such that YtN < pN ⇐⇒ Yt < NpN . Let τ(pN) be the first
passage time of {Yi} to NpN i.e., τ(pN) := min{t : Yt ≥ NpN}. Note that since
Yi is monotonic, the random walk crosses NpN exactly once. Suppose τ(pN) ≤
|SU |, then at time τ(pN) the number of distinct items a customer will own and
keep is |SU | − τ(pN) − 1, and the number of traditional loot boxes they will have
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. That is,
RcTB(pN) = (pN − c)E
[(










Now we will bound E[τ(pN)]. Recall η = E[V |V > c] is the mean valuation of
an item in SU . Since τ(pN) is the passage time, by Wald’s equation, E[Yτ(pN )] =










η − c ,N
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Note |SU | is binomial with mean (1 − γ)N . Conditioning on the event that SU ∈
[(1− γ)N − δ, (1− γ)N + δ] we have a lower bound on the revenue,
RcTB(N, pN) ≥ (pN − c)E
[(











− log τ(pN)|SU | − δ
)]
+ cE
[ |SU | − τ(pN)− 1
N
]
) Pr (|SU − (1− γ)N | ≤ δ)
≥(−(pN − c) logE
[
τ(pN)
|SU | − δ
]
+ cE
[ |SU | − τ(pN)− 1
N
]
) Pr (|SU − (1− γ)N | ≤ δ) .
where the final inequality follows from Jensens. Plugging in our upper bound for
E[τ(pN)], applying straight forward concentrations on SU , and taking the limit yields,
lim
N→∞
RcTB(p,N) ≥ (p− c) log
(










Maximizing over the price yields p = c+ e−
η
η−c (1− γ)(η− c). Plugging in p gives our







. An upper bound on the revenue follows
by an argument analogous Theorem 3.3.1(b), we omit the details for brevity.
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